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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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                                             23 Cr. 490 (SHS)
                V.
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     ROBERT MENENDEZ,
     WAEL HANA, a/k/a "Will Hana,"
 6
      and FRED DAIBES,
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                    Defendants.
                                             Trial
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      ----x
 9
                                              New York, N.Y.
                                              July 8, 2024
                                              9:30 a.m.
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     Before:
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                           HON. SIDNEY H. STEIN,
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                                              District Judge
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                                              -and a Jury-
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                                APPEARANCES
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          Southern District of New York
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(Trial resumed; jury not present)

THE COURT: Good morning. We have a number of matters to cover. I'll just deal with the things that have come across in the last 36 hours or so, including at 8 a.m. this morning.

I think it's appropriate that I add the jury charge that the government has requested regarding Daibes to reflect that Daibes was released on bail as per the parties' stipulation. I think that's appropriate.

I'm going to use the jury verdict form submitted by the government with the addition that I want or the change I want 12 lines, rather than simply a signature by the foreperson. Just 12 lines that each juror will sign.

Now, I have a letter from Ms. Collart at 3 p.m. yesterday, not filed. I see no reason why it shouldn't be filed publicly. So I'm directing Ms. Collart to file it publicly, assuming there is no objection.

Really, Employee Number 2 hasn't gotten a visa for I don't know why, nobody says why he hasn't been able to get a visa. Apparently it was approved in June. And the request of Mr. Hana's attorneys is to take his testimony by audio visual. They call it a Rule 15 deposition. I don't think it's a Rule 15 deposition. I simply think it's testimony taken remotely.

So, I don't know what the position of government is on that except for a single reference in the letter that says the

government opposes it. Let me hear.

MR. RICHENTHAL: We do.

THE COURT: I should say also, I think I said last week that my general rule is that if you don't have a witness, you rest. That really is an overstatement. Obviously I'm going to make whatever accommodations I can to have a witness here. At some point, though, we just can't wait around.

Government, speak to me. Hana wants to put on the witness that I said could come on to testify, but he hasn't gotten his visa yet.

MR. RICHENTHAL: We don't know why this individual has not gotten his visa. We've made our best efforts to assist. We obviously don't control the State Department.

Our position, which Ms. Collart I think accurately described in her letter, is we do oppose video testimony for this witness. We think this is the type of witness that needs to be subject to cross-examination. He works for the Egyptian government, there are potential bias issues, there are potential other issues. We have been consistent with these witnesses from the beginning.

THE COURT: Wouldn't you be able to cross-examine him?

MR. RICHENTHAL: Certainly we can. In my experience,

video testimony, I mean live video testimony, at best, is

difficult. It is far more challenging I think for the jury to

judge credibility on a video screen without the human dynamic

in the courtroom. That gives us concern, so we've been consistent about these witnesses.

Now let's be clear. It is true we've consented to video for other witnesses. We're trying to be witness-specific here, not just take an across-the-board position. But this is a witness who we think opposition is appropriate.

THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Hana's attorneys.

MR. LUSTBERG: Your Honor, I really don't have a lot to add. This Court considered a motion by the government to preclude all of our, basically all of our witnesses. You allowed some limited witnesses, one of them testified. This is the other one.

This is not a situation where we've been dilatory. As you noted, this gentleman got approved for a visa on June 10.

I know that the Department of Justice does not control the State Department. I also agree that members of the prosecution team did make efforts to assist us in this regard, but those failed.

This is a matter that's within the control of the United States of America, which is our adverse party here, and they have not permitted our client, our witness to appear. And it is the government, the government, qua government, the whole thing.

THE COURT: No, but this prosecution team hasn't stopped it in any way.

MR. LUSTBERG: Not in any way.

THE COURT: In fact, you indicated that Ms. Clark has been assisting I believe.

MR. LUSTBERG: That's absolutely correct, your Honor. So I'm not blaming them. But on the other hand, government is the government. And somehow our witness isn't here. We don't know the reason why, once the visa was approved, it wasn't issued, which seems to be providing a piece of paper. Seemed like progress was being made.

We are not, your Honor, just to be clear, asking for any kind of adjournment. We heard your Honor loud and clear. So, it was with that in mind that we requested an opportunity, assuming we could make the necessary technological arrangements, which hopefully we can this morning, to have Dr. Sayed appear.

THE COURT: Is he available now?

MR. LUSTBERG: Yes.

THE COURT: What's the difference in time?

MR. LUSTBERG: It doesn't matter. He's available.

Seven hours. We spoke to him this morning, he's available,

we'll make it happen.

You should note one other thing Mr. Richenthal's point about difficulties of cross-examination as well, we'll need an interpreter for him, but we've spoken to the interpreters about that and that can be done.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I don't think it changes materially what we're talking about. But just for the record, there is a distinction as we understand it between approved and issued. Approved is the final step prior to a screening interview. Various visa applicants are subject to screening interviews. It think this applicant has been rejected for a visa in the past. I can't speak to whether there is issues with perceived veracity. This is one of the issue concerns we have. When we say it is approved, that's technically correct, but it doesn't mean it can be imminently issued.

THE COURT: I understand. I thought the approval was back in June.

MR. LUSTBERG: That approval did occur after an interview, so it was further along in the process.

THE COURT: This is what I'm going to do. I'm not going to adjourn the trial here. This is the beginning of the ninth week of the trial, the eighth week of testimony.

Everyone has seen the jury, you know, wants to conclude its business here.

If it can be done technologically, and I've spoken to the circuit executive, we're going to do it. But only if it can be done today. Somebody from the audio visual department has already come up and is here. Who is that?

Will? Now, do you know who to speak to on the defense side, Will, to set this up? Mr. Lustberg who is right there.

He is standing up. Deal with him. If it can be done, we're going to do it today.

I propose 11 o'clock our time. The jury is supposed to be in at 10:30, that will give them a little time.

11 o'clock our time.

What's important, just so everybody knows, is that Dr. Sayed can see the jury, and that the jury can see Dr. Sayed, and that the connection is such that he can easily be heard, especially with the issue of an interpreter here. So it has to be clear, that he can see everybody -- that he can see the jury and the jury can see him and the transmission has to be clear. That's the only circumstances in which I'm going to allow it. If that can't be done, we're not going to have it. All right.

Will, if you'll talk to Mr. Lustberg or his designee, we'll get that moving.

MR. LUSTBERG: It will be my designee, Judge, because this is way over my head.

THE COURT: It will have to be something facing the jury. A big screen facing the jury.

MS. COLLART: Understood, your Honor.

MR. JARRETT: The image would appear on the jury's screens. Not a large screen.

THE COURT: Thank you. I'm not up to date on the technology. Thank you.

By ECF 501, reconsideration of my determination that the years since 2019 are relevant for whether IS EG Halal is a viable entity.

I had earlier held for that witness, I forget which number he is, that he was precluded on the grounds that he did not have testimony relevant to 2019 or the months thereafter. I do not find it is relevant as to whether or not IS EG Halal has been a viable or thriving entity in any event. The defense already has some of that in evidence because we had the witness from Latin America talk about the various offices that IS EG Halal has. But, I'm adhering to my prior determination that that witness was precluded.

I have a submission from 8:30 last night, it's ECF 502, the government is seeking preclusion on the summations of four areas, I don't think there is any issue -- or five areas. Each of the government's positions is correct.

No personal stories or vouching for your clients. I think quoting from, as I say, famous people is unnecessary.

And to the extent somebody like Dr. Martin Luther King, it adds an element that's not relevant here.

The consequences of conviction or whether or not it's fair for the government to do what the government did, all of that is out of bounds.

The government is correct, again, in regard to Mr. De Castro's opening there, inferences are certainly permissible.

As a matter of fact, that's what a lot of the charges talk about. They can't make guesses, but what's important is they have to decide on the basis of the evidence or lack of evidence, but inferences certainly can be used.

Certain investigative techniques, again, I've talked, I've issued several rulings on that. That's not for the jury. The jury determination is whether the government has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. And law enforcement techniques used is not relevant. So, in essence I'm granting the government's requests there. That's in 502.

MR. LUSTBERG: Judge, if I might. I think there was also part of that application was to preclude something I said in my opening which had to do with, so the government has argued, as you know, that Mr. Hana was a failed businessman, and I argued that it was a good thing that he could pick himself up by his bootstraps and succeed. This wasn't meant to be a big commentary on American success stories, but if the government's going to argue that he didn't deserve this contract because he was a failed businessman, I should be able to argue.

THE COURT: Let's see if the government is going to argue that. I assume they're not.

MR. RICHENTHAL: We might well say he is a failed businessman. Our preclusion was not to preclude Mr. Lustberg from making factual assertions about his client. What

Mr. Lustberg did was paired factual assertions with a broader statement about American values and the prosecution's unfair. That's our concern. If he wants to argue Mr. Hana was qualified, he can obviously argue Mr. Hana is qualified. What he shouldn't say is he was qualified and therefore this prosecution is un-American or he was qualified and this is a Horatio Alger story and the jury should acquit him. It is the second part.

MR. LUSTBERG: I will not argue that the prosecution was unfair, your Honor.

MR. FEE: I'm sorry, I think this is unnecessary but just to state the obvious, we are going to refer to techniques that the government's used to point out the lack of evidence arising from them.

THE COURT: That's all right. But you can't do they should have done this and they didn't do that. You can talk about what they did do, and how that's not adequate in your view.

MR. FEE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Now, let's do the charge.

We'll do it until 10:30 or probably around quarter of 11, we'll see. Hopefully the jury will be in by then and we'll see where we are on the technological aspects.

In terms of the charge, what I think is important is if the parties tell me what they think is important here, or

really what their concerns are. That's the way to handle this, it seems to me.

Why don't we start with the 8 a.m. submission of the government which I've only had an opportunity to skim. And it's saying that the multiple conspiracy charge, they think it's not warranted, but if it is given, it should be revised.

Government, why don't you tell me, just so it's clear to the defense and to the Court what your argument is and let me turn to the multiple conspiracies charge that I do have in the drafts that you received.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I'll start with why we don't think it's warranted, although I take it from the Court's remarks you may be more interested in why we think it should be revised.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I'll briefly say why it's not warranted and I'll shift.

We don't think it's warranted because, as the Second Circuit has made clear going back actually for decades, it is not warranted by the mere fact there are different phases of an operation, different participants, different shifts in emphasis, different shifts in locations. That's not what a multiple conspiracy is about. And we just don't think that the factual predicate here is met.

I will shift to why we think it should be revised. Although I am happy to expand one what I just said if the Court

would like. Why should it be revised.

THE COURT: Go ahead. I think it should be multiple conspiracy, but I want to hear your best argument why it should not be.

MR. RICHENTHAL: The best argument here is, at most, meaning trying to draw inferences for this purpose in the defendants' favor, what occurred in the record in this case, meaning the evidence before the jury, not extra record things, are, is a single conspiracy with Mr. Menendez at the center with Mr. Hana and Mr. Daibes bribing him to achieve multiple ends.

Now, I did just say to achieve multiple ends. But our understanding of the law is that in and of itself is not sufficient to warrant a multiple conspiracy charge. Nor is it sufficient if those ends were achieved over time, or if the ends were more important to certain conspirators and not others.

So, for example, there is the case that talks about how goals, plural, need not be congruent, meaning need not be identical. Those facts are facts or at least the evidence can give rise to those facts. But those are not sufficient. As we understand it, it I think the *Dawkins* case is a good example of this. *Dawkins* is from 2021. What a multiple conspiracy charge, indeed multiple conspiracies are about are independent networks operating separately. That's a near verbatim quote

from *Dawkins* which is quoting either *Berger* or another case.

It's in our letter.

Our view is the record before the jury does not show independent networks. It may again, as I said, show shifts in emphasis. It certainly I think shows temporal changes, that is phases of operation as facts developed in the world. But it was always to bribe Mr. Menendez. It always involved Mr. Hana and Mr. Daibes and it involved overlapping participants, overlapping methods, and overlapping goals.

Even the goals themselves, to the extent they're discrete, occurred at the same time or substantially the same time. Our view, that's not just independent networks.

Now the defense can argue there was no conspiracy. Of course. But we don't think there is a sufficient factual predicate in the record for them to argue there was independent networks of conspiracies, that is, independent conspiracies. I can talk more specifically about that.

I'll note finally, I don't think this fact is dispositive, but I think it bears on the analysis. There is no allegation, indeed, I don't think we expect the defense will argue in summation, that the goals here were at cross purposes or inconsistent. In fact, the record's to the contrary, just to use IS EG Halal as an example. IS EG Halal, once the monopoly came into place, was then used to pay bribes. So it's granted by the Egyptian government. Mr. Menendez is alleged to

taking actions to advance the agenda of the Egyptian government. That includes trying to keep the monopoly in place. The monopoly profits are then used to funnel back to Mr. Menendez or Nadine. So that's certainly not inconsistent.

Obviously Qatar is not inconsistent either with taking actions for Egypt. And the various schemes to seek to interfere with criminal prosecutions are not inconsistent.

Again, as I've said, the lack of inconsistency is not in and itself mean there is not multiple conspiracies. That's off the table. What we really have at most is multiple non-incongruent goals achieved over time in overlapping ways with one man at the center. That doesn't seem like independent networks.

This is a confusing and lengthy charge. We think it should be only given when it's warranted, and in our view it's not warranted.

MR. WEITZMAN: Your Honor, the government's proposed edits make it more confusing and twice as long as it was when you proposed it. It is a warranted charge. There is ample inferences to be drawn that there is no hub and spoke. "Spoke" words he didn't say spoke conspiracy here. Having someone at the hub and no spoke combining the objectives of the parties warrants a multiple conspiracy charge for the same reason we moved to dismiss on a multiple conspiracies theory.

The fact that Mr. Daibes' counsel didn't have to

cross-examine most of the witnesses I think speaks amply about why he doesn't at least believe he's part of multiple spokes of the charged offense. Similarly with Will Hana.

I acknowledge that under the government's theory

Senator Menendez is certainly a hub or at least Nadine is the hub and maybe Senator Menendez is on the side of Nadine.

But, this is certainly a warranted charge, and the case law, none of the cases that the government cites says it should not be given. It is certainly within your Honor's discretion to give, and I think your Honor is exercising that discretion wisely.

I will keep it short, even though the government has put in a letter we did not have an opportunity to respond to. I think your instruction was appropriate, and as drafted, the right instruction.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I'm happy to respond to that or to shift to how we think it should be revised.

THE COURT: I'm going to give it. The question is the revision. Let me look at your revisions here. Because I think there is something to what Mr. Weitzman says about the length of your revision makes it somewhat more convoluted.

MR. WEITZMAN: From our position, we're fine with their edits on page 1 and 2 of their rider. It is the last paragraph, the full --

THE COURT: What I'm looking at is the Exhibit B, in other words, where they've redlined my charge. Is that, when you say 1 and 2, is that what you're referring to?

MR. WEITZMAN: Yes, your Honor. So the edits, the one edit on page 1 that we don't agree with is the deletion of and 15 -- Count 15 should be included.

The other edits we're fine with on page 1 and page 2. We're fine with the first paragraph they edited in full starting with "In determining whether a series of events." I'm just speaking on behalf of Senator Menendez of course. It is the next page I think is getting to be redundant and confusing, and we would propose you delete that full paragraph.

THE COURT: Let me look at it.

MR. RICHENTHAL: If I may briefly, I wanted to make a broader point.

We still maintain Count 15 plainly is not the multiple conspiracy charge. Being a public official operating in Egypt is a status offense. It is a continuing offense over time.

Once one is in that status, one is in that status.

I don't understand how there could ever be multiple conspiracies to put one in that status at same time. Either one is either in the status or one is not.

Whatever the Court thinks about the other counts, and obviously we respect the Court's decision, in our view the jury wouldn't even know what to do with multiple conspiracies as to

make him an agent. Either he is an agent or he isn't an agent. That is the same goal. There are no multiple goals.

MR. WEITZMAN: Your Honor, our response to that is this is a conspiracy count. It's not a status. It is a conspiracy to violate a statute. Whether it's actualized or not is not the point, which I think is Mr. Richenthal's argument.

The reason it's appropriate is because all of this conduct is included in the overarching conspiracy counts that they've charged earlier. There is a way to look at the evidence where Count 15, perhaps some people have one goal, which might be to make someone an agent of the Egyptian government, and others may not have that goal, but might have a different objective.

So I think it's important to keep Count 15 in the instruction.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Just to be clear, I don't mean to be doing ping pong on this. Mr. Daibes is not in Count 15. So the argument that they had different goals just doesn't make any sense. It is Mr. Hana and Mr. Menendez and his wife.

THE COURT: We just had Egypt too.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Exactly, your Honor. It is a single country, and Mr. Daibes is not in the count. I don't think there is a reasonable reading of the record that the jury could find multiple networks among Mr. Hana, Ms. Menendez, and

MR. RICHENTHAL: On page 3. That sentence is nearly verbatim from *Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp.*, a Second Circuit case from 1989.

THE COURT: I know it.

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MR. RICHENTHAL: We have no objection with the Court literally using the language from the Second Circuit if it wishes. The only change we made, is our view is that "congruent" may be a word the lay jury does not understand. And therefore as Judge Engelmayer did, and I think other judges did -- it may not have been Judge Engelmayer -- we suggested the word "coincide exactly."

The mere existence of multiple goals is not itself multiple conspiracies. We plainly have multiple goals here. That's why the defense doesn't like this sentence, as is their right. But the jury needs to understand that that fact alone is not dispositive. They can consider it, of course. But it does not in and of itself demonstrate multiple conspiracies.

MR. WEITZMAN: Your Honor.

THE COURT: Just a moment. Yes, sir.

MR. WEITZMAN: I think the problem with the sentence is that it is confusing when you add in the portion, for example, that says "So long as their goals are not at cross purposes." It sets up a standard that everybody can have different goals, different objectives, different conspiracies, so long as they're rowing in the same direction.

THE COURT: Isn't that true?

MR. WEITZMAN: I don't think that's correct. I think -- Mr. Richenthal I know wants the last word, but I am going to insist that I finish.

1 THE COURT: Neither of us are stopping you, sir.

MR. WEITZMAN: I don't think that's correct. I think that the entire purpose of multiple conspiracies is the hub and spoke issue. If, for instance, Mr. Daibes had one conspiracy involving, let's say, Sellinger, and Mr. Hana had a different conspiracy involving Egypt, and neither knew about the other, or joined with the other, they may not be at cross purposes, but they certainly are not in the same overarching conspiracy.

So the quote from a 1989 case I don't think is the law of the land today where multiple conspiracies is.

MR. RICHENTHAL: So, I don't get the last word, but on this, but for the Supreme Court of the United States, the Second Circuit does. This is the law in this circuit. It is precedential, it is binding. Mr. Weitzman doesn't have to like it. We're not writing the law here. That is the law. It is critical in this case that the jury understand it.

We would have no objection to the Court literally quoting the case. Our suggestion to change language was to simply make it more comprehensible to the lay jury.

MR. WEITZMAN: It is hard to understand what multiple conspiracies is if this language stands.

THE COURT: No, that is not true. Because their goals, it's just their goals could be different, but they can't be at cross purposes.

MR. WEITZMAN: So if they're not at cross purposes,

there is no multiple conspiracies is the way this language reads. So long as they're not inconsistent undermining each other, they're not multiple conspiracies. And that seems very hard to square with the law.

MR. SOLANO: Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: Just a moment. Yes.

MR. SOLANO: I have a slightly different point to make, which is I'm not going to argue with the Beech-Nut application to this case, but that the gist of it, what the prosecutors are arguing for is already covered by your Honor's addition to which Mr. Weitzman has agreed to on page 2, where you instruct the jury that "In determining whether a series of events constitute a single conspiracy or a separate and unrelated conspiracy or a conspiracies, you should consider whether there is a common goal or goals among the alleged co-conspirators." And that should be sufficient to address this additional point being made currently.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I'm not a logic major, but that's not the case as a matter of logic. The first statement that

Mr. Solano is referring to is asking the jury consider whether it is the same goal.

THE COURT: This is what I'm going to do. I'm going to add the language from Beech-Nut. I agree with the government that "congruent" may be a step too far. So "coincide" is fine, but the English doesn't track in what I was

given. It says "The participants' goals need not be coincide."

So, I need to strike the word "be." So it will read "The participants' goals need not coincide exactly for a single conspiracy to exist, so long as the goals are not at cross purposes and co-conspirators need not agree in all of the details of conspiracy where the essential nature of the plan is agreed upon."

That's language from Beech-Nut. That will be a separate paragraph after the addition I have on the bottom of page 2.

MR. RICHENTHAL: We would also note there is a references to paragraph 15 at the very end of the instruction. I understand the Court intends to remove all the references.

THE COURT: 15 is stricken.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I wanted to advise the Court it is also at the very end. Not just at the beginning.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Let's turn to paragraph 2 of the government. Unanimity of theory. Let me turn to it. All right, government.

MR. RICHENTHAL: On this instruction, we don't think this is required either. Although that's not our principal point, and we will concede that the law in this area frankly is a little messy.

Just for the record, the reason we don't think it's

required is a number of cases, including *United States v.*Martha Stewart, which talks about the jury doesn't have been to be unanimous about the means through which a crime was committed.

Our principal issue here is the instruction -- I don't think this was the Court's intention -- appears to take a position as to whether it's one scheme or two schemes. The government's view, and we briefed this prior to trial, is it is just one scheme. We don't think the Court needs to take that view either. We think there should be a revision that basically says, in sum, ladies and gentlemen, the government says, it is one scheme, the defense says it's two. If you find it's one and you find the elements proven, that's fine. If you find it's two, you have to either be unanimous as to one version or the other or both. Just a neutral instruction.

We think there is more than one way to do that, and this I assume will not be objectionable. One way is to simply say defendants engaged in bribery with two goals. I've just not used the word "scheme." That's all. But there is probably more than one way with respect to verbiage to avoid the Court taking a position with a contested factual matter.

THE COURT: What about this. In this count,

defendants -- the third sentence. Rather than the government

has alleged that the defendants engaged in two bribery schemes,

in this count defendants contend that the government's proof

supports the existence of two bribery schemes.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I agree that would be a neutral instruction.

THE COURT: Mr. Weitzman, I think that does it.

MR. WEITZMAN: This is not a count in which our client is charged, but I think the verbiage is a bit too aggressive in saying the defendants contend that the government's proof supports two bribery schemes. That seems to be an acknowledgment that the government's proof suffices, and I'm not sure.

THE COURT: No. It says defendants contend that the government's proof supports --

MR. WEITZMAN: I would say the government has alleged two bribery schemes, rather than talking about government's proof.

THE COURT: That's how I started it. That's how I have it, but you heard government's position.

MR. WEITZMAN: The defendants, I would put it the defendants contend that the government has alleged or charged two bribery schemes, rather than the government's proofs supports two bribery schemes.

MR. RICHENTHAL: The Court can hear from anyone it wishes. Mr. Menendez has no standing as to this instruction. He's not in this count. It is Mr. Hana and Mr. Daibes.

THE COURT: Mr. Weitzman, what's that language again?

MR. WEITZMAN: I would suggest the defendants contend that the government has charged two bribery schemes.

MR. RICHENTHAL: The problem with that, your Honor, is juries don't consider what we charged. They consider the evidence. So the question is whether the evidence shows one or two, or I suppose in the defendants' preferred version of the world, zero. So charge is the wrong language.

THE COURT: Just a moment.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I would also say if the instruction will say what the defendants believe the proof is, it should say what we believe, which again, is there is one scheme.

THE COURT: This is what I'm going to do. That third sentence will read: "In this count, the defendants contend that the government has alleged that the defendants engaged in two bribery schemes." And then go on.

The next sentence will read, it is a new sentence: "The government contends that the defendants engaged in a single bribery scheme."

MR. RICHENTHAL: That's fine with the government, your Honor.

THE COURT: Defense?

MR. SOLANO: Yes, that's acceptable, your Honor.

MR. AGATA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: The third sentence will read, "In this count, the defendants contend that the government" and then you

pick up the sentence "has alleged that the defendants engaged in two bribery schemes." The rest of that sentence. Then we add a sentence, "The government contends that the defendants engaged in a single bribery scheme." And then it goes on "you cannot convict." All right.

Proposed 219 instructions.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Just for clarity, I take it the Court would make the same edits as to the second unanimity instruction that matches. That's instruction 53 on page 78.

THE COURT: Thank you. We will. Yes.

Proposed 219 instruction. What are the positions of the parties? Yes, I did use that guidance, and yes, it's not in and of itself the law. But the parties used the guidance as well.

Have you talked to each other about this? It just came in this morning at 8 o'clock.

MR. RICHENTHAL: We have not talked about it this morning. Our effort here was not frankly to change the substantive meaning. It was to avoid a misinterpretation in our view as to what the meaning is. Indeed, our first edit is literally to combine two sentences without changing the meaning.

THE COURT: Just to talk to each other now off the record to see if the parties agree. I think the idea everyone agrees on the thrust.

(Counsel conferring)

THE COURT: Counsel, why don't we come back to that later when you've had a chance to talk to each other. I'm sure the parties will remind me. So let's go to the last in the government's point which is the obstruction of justice should be revised.

Government?

MR. RICHENTHAL: The issue here in our view is actually reasonably narrow. We understood the Court to be explaining to the jury that an act of obstruction requires acts, knowledge or belief it will influence the grand jury.

As drafted it appeared to tell the jury you literally cannot consider an act for any purpose, unless it achieves acts. Which is not I assume what the Court intended.

To put a fine point on it, under this instruction, the Court I think is intending for the jury to understand that the mere interaction with the prosecutor, without more, is not an obstructive act. That is, Mr. Menendez must intend to influence the grand jury. We don't quibble with that proposition of law.

But the jury is entitled to consider Mr. Menendez's interactions with prosecutors through counsel, or for that matter, any other third party, for any other legitimate purpose such as consciousness of guilt about the scheme.

So our worry here is even though this instruction is

within the obstruction of justice charge, read on its all fours, the sentence on its own, it seems to tell the jury they literally cannot consider these interactions for any purpose, unless they find they were intended to influence the grand jury, which we don't think is, we assume, what the Court intended and not our understanding of the law.

We've proposed an instruction that I think accomplishes what the Court intended. It is not designed to alter the meaning. And again, there is probably more than one way with respect to verbiage to get there.

MR. WEITZMAN: Your Honor, I think there is a simpler way to clean this up. Which is to in the proposed language that you have, just add the word --

THE COURT: Let me turn to it. Yes, sir.

MR. WEITZMAN: Your second paragraph in charge 66 I would just add a few words. You wrote "A defendant's interactions with third parties, including prosecutors, are therefore relevant." And I would add to the obstruction charge "or charges, only if the defendant knew" and continued the rest of the sentence. I think the addition that they are asking for, that the interactions may be relevant for other purposes, goes too far in inviting inferences.

MR. RICHENTHAL: That's also wrong, and in fact it's devastatingly wrong. Here's why. The jury can consider that Mr. Menendez lied to his lawyers who then passed on falsehoods

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to the government in considering whether there is a scheme to obstruct. It is the case under your Honor's reading of the law that those interactions in and of themselves cannot be deemed obstruction. But they are plainly relevant to whether Mr. Menendez had the requisite mental state.

Imagine a different case in which the defendant lied to the FBI agent on day one, and gave documents to the grand jury on day two. Under Mr. Weitzman's instruction, the jury could not consider what happened on day one. This is on all fours with that concept. The jury can consider it. It is relevant. It just isn't in and of itself, that is without more, obstruction.

MR. WEITZMAN: I think the issue, your Honor -THE COURT: Hang on.

MR. WEITZMAN: I think the issue is that what they're arguing is inconsistent with the Supreme Court authority and Second Circuit authority that your Honor's already discussed at length including the *Schwarz* decision. The relevance of these interactions.

THE COURT: That goes to knowledge. That's the issue with Schwarz, seems to me.

MR. WEITZMAN: Well, this sentence does go to knowledge. That's correct. This sentence goes to knowledge.

THE COURT: I'm supporting where you're going I think. Go ahead.

MR. WEITZMAN: So, I think it just goes too broad in suggesting that they can consider all this evidence for other purposes. The question is whether they've satisfied the knowledge requirement and they can consider the evidence to the extent it satisfies the knowledge requirement. The knowledge requirement has to be to affect the judicial or grand jury proceeding. I think --

THE COURT: I think that is Aquilar and Schwarz.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Let me try a different way. If we are to stand up in summation and rebuttal and say -- which to be clear, we might say -- ladies and gentlemen, one reason you should know that Mr. Menendez intended to affect the grand jury, that is, in other words, your Honor, consistent with Aguilar and Schwarz, is that his false production of documents didn't stand alone. He asked his lawyers to make substantially similar false statements to the government. That is, it wasn't accidental. It was intentional and it was part of a broader scheme to avoid being prosecuted.

Our view is that statement I just made is plainly supported by the evidence. The defense can disagree, that's fine, but it is also plainly legally proper to make that argument. But if the jury heard that argument and then read this, the jury would think what I said is not true. That it cannot consider.

THE COURT: Why? Why would they think it's not true?

MR. RICHENTHAL: Because the instruction as drafted is it can only consider this stuff relevant if Mr. Menendez intended to affect the proceeding. But it can consider it relevant, for example, for consciousness of guilt that he engaged in bribery. It can consider it relevant that he had the requisite mental state to try to avoid prosecution through multiple avenues.

Now to be clear, one avenue we've charged is obstruction. And lies to his lawyers, without more, are not obstruction. But that doesn't make it irrelevant. It just means in and of itself it isn't the crime. The word "relevant" is the operative word here that's giving us such great concern.

MR. WEITZMAN: Your Honor, you know, the remarkable thing is the extent to which they will rely on argument that has no support in the evidence. This isn't a hypothetical. This is contrary to the evidence. There is no evidence, there is no evidence that Senator Menendez lied to his lawyers. They didn't put any of that evidence in. They put four pages from the PowerPoint. They can't make that argument for other reasons, having nothing to do with this charge.

I'm lost at the suggestion they can argue that Senator Menendez lied to his lawyers when they didn't introduce his lawyer's statements.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Your Honor, it is plainly a reasonable inference that Mr. Menendez, himself a lawyer, hired

lawyers and told them or authorized what they would say to the government. Mr. Weitzman can say there is a paucity of evidence on that point. That's fine.

But one reason it's a reasonable inference, beyond what I just said, is that the same lies were supported by his wife, the same lies were supported by a conversation with Mr. Uribe. The defendants can say Mr. Uribe's incredible, but that's not for the defendants to decide. That's for the jury. And the same lies were supported by documents that Mr. Menendez produced to the grand jury. Literally the checks about the purported loan.

The jury's entitled to consider all of that and decide whether Mr. Menendez's counsel made false statements with Mr. Menendez's authorization or not. That's why we're having a trial. But it is not the law that we cannot argue the jury can draw that inference because the defense has a response. That's why we have trials.

MR. WEITZMAN: The number of times the government objects to inferences --

THE COURT: Just a moment.

MR. RICHENTHAL: For what it's worth, I would also note that *Schwarz* on page 109 refers and this is a quote, to the intention "being in the defendant's mind." In other words, this whole count in many ways is about what Mr. Menendez was thinking.

Our point, which I didn't think was controversial, is we are allowed to ask the jury to consider, in considering what he's thinking, what his lawyers said to the government.

Mr. Weitzman can respond, no, that's ridiculous, don't consider it, no evidence. That's fine. He can make that argument. We just don't think we should be prevented from making that argument.

I also believe a minute ago I referenced checks. If I said Mr. Menendez, I meant to say Ms. Menendez. She is the one who produced the checks. But the argument is the same.

MR. WEITZMAN: That was what I was just about to mention, which is that the distortion of the facts that we just heard undermines the inferences they're trying to argue.

There is no evidence that Mr. Menendez provided those checks. he did not provide them. Mrs. Menendez provided them. There is no evidence as to where Abbe Lowell, what he said to the grand jury and where he got the information from that he included in the PowerPoint. He could have gotten it from Mrs. Menendez. He could have gotten it from Mrs. Uribe.

THE COURT: He was offering it, as the PowerPoint says, on behalf of Mr. Menendez.

MR. WEITZMAN: I understand that. So to the extent they want to argue a defendant's lawyers' statements can be used, can be looked at, that's fine. But there is no evidence for the argument that they just said they are going to make in

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1 summation, that Mr. Menendez lied to his lawyers.

THE COURT: Why can't they draw the inference?

MR. WEITZMAN: Inference based on what? Based on the fact that the lawyer made a statement? I don't think you can draw the inference.

THE COURT: Which was done on his behalf.

MR. WEITZMAN: That's fine. They can say it's done on his behalf. But they can't say there is evidence in the record, because there is none, that Senator Menendez lied.

THE COURT: But the -- well, let me hear.

MR. RICHENTHAL: This is summation. If either one of my colleagues wants to make this argument, we'll make it. If Mr. Weitzman wants to respond it is not a good argument, he'll make it.

THE COURT: That seems to me it's right. It is an inference to be drawn from the evidence and that's up to the jury. I'm concerned about this sentence.

MR. WEITZMAN: I still think that the sentence is accurate as written with the additions that I proposed.

THE COURT: And give me your addition again. Are therefore relevant.

MR. WEITZMAN: The obstruction charge.

MR. RICHENTHAL: So, I know we are going back and forth. That's just not true.

THE COURT: No, I got that point. I'm not adding

that. I'm going to keep it the way it is based on my view of Schwarz and Aguilar.

That handles all of the government's. Now let me see where we stand in terms of the audio visual.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Your Honor, I can tell when I've lost, but can I ask the Court to at least adopt the suggestion that Mr. Weitzman said he didn't have a problem with which is are only relevant to this charge? We have a substantial worry the jury reading this sentence will think it can't consider the interactions in this case at all.

THE COURT: "To this charge" is fine. I'm adding "therefore relevant to this charge only if the defendant."

I'm told that the audio visual people need to do a test, they need access to the courtroom, and they need to test the connection. Do we know if at the other end Dr. Sayed is available now?

MS. COLLART: Yes, he is, your Honor.

THE COURT: We'll continue for a few more moments because the jury isn't here yet with the charge. Then we have to take a break for the test. If the test is successful, I guess what we do is I bring the jury in, ask if there is another witness, I'll explain it's being done remotely. And again, I repeat, only if it is a good connection where they can really hear and see the witness. We'll do direct, we'll do cross. I then will ask if there is another witness. I take it

there is no other witness.

MR. LUSTBERG: No, we'll have a couple of stipulations.

MR. LUSTBERG: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Stipulations, let me put that in. We'll give the jury a break. I'll allocute Mr. Hana, and then Mr. Hana will rest. Is that how we foresee it, Mr. Lustberg?

MR. RICHENTHAL: Agree with one small addendum. I had understood, maybe misunderstood, the Court had granted our request for a brief voir dire of this witness to ensure, as we put in our letter, that his knowledge of the audit in 2019 is not based on hearsay.

THE COURT: You're very correct.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I don't know it will take long, although I don't know exactly what he's going to say, but otherwise we agree with what the Court said.

I will note, and this is now expanding the lens and this is not disagreeing. We also have two government exhibits we intend to offer in a rebuttal case. I believe they total four pages. Excuse me. Two pages. That is one page each.

THE COURT: And have you passed them by the defense?

MR. RICHENTHAL: We sent them to the defense yesterday
by e-mail. My understanding is that they may be objecting
allegedly on belated notice. I would note again they're

literally two pages long.

MR. WEITZMAN: Every time the defense tries to put in evidence, there is an objection on process grounds by the government, often false accusations where we've provided the notice.

Here we asked for notice on Saturday morning of a rebuttal case. They didn't provide it. They were obligated to provide us the evidence they planned to introduce today on Friday, on Friday by 7 p.m. under the parties' agreement. They didn't provide it. They provided it to us last night at 9:30 p.m. while we are frantically preparing our summations.

What's good for the goose is good for the gander.

This is a process objection. They shouldn't be permitted to put in the rebuttal case.

THE COURT: Just a moment. Is there objection on the substance, what are these things? Sir, I take it it's process as you say. Simply process.

MR. WEITZMAN: It's process.

THE COURT: I got it.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Just so the Court knows, the parties' agreement did not cover this. That's just not true. I can show to it to the Court if the Court would like.

We gave notice yesterday when we decided yesterday to do it, in part based on the charge, that is the Court's charge led us to conclude two pages was useful for our case. We immediately e-mailed the two pages to the defense.

MR. WEITZMAN: This has nothing do with the jury charge. That's just false. This is in rebuttal to line entries in our summary chart. That's all it is.

THE COURT: Let me see what they are.

MS. POMERANTZ: May I pass them up?

THE COURT: Yes. That's the only way I can see them.

MR. RICHENTHAL: We can also put them on the screen if the Court would prefer.

THE COURT: Let me see the agreement of the parties.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I am going to have to pull it up by e-mail. It's from some time ago. It has absolutely nothing to do with the rebuttal case whatsoever. In any event, as I said, we didn't hold these back. We got the jury charge --

THE COURT: You know, let me cut through it.

Everybody has been working assiduously here and providing the

Court with multiple submissions on very short notice. I don't

think there is any bad faith here on the part of the

government. It's pretty consistent with what both sides have

been doing. I am going to allow these two in a rebuttal case.

MR. WEITZMAN: Just to note, when we provided a summary chart with admittedly 40 exhibits that had been produced weeks prior on the Friday before the Monday or the Tuesday or the Wednesday, whatever it was, it was excluded for violating process.

THE COURT: Are you talking about 2500?

1 MR. WEITZMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Totally different. Thank you. You made the case.

MR. WEITZMAN: There is one more point, your Honor.

On June --

THE COURT: 2500 is completely different.

MR. WEITZMAN: On June 26, your Honor told the government when they are moving 700 exhibits en masse they need to advise the defense on what they planned to offer in summation. Last night at about 9 p.m., while we are frantically preparing our summation, they provided notice of about a dozen or 10, whatever it is, exhibits that they plan to use in summation. I think from that 700 list.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Are you talking about demonstrative exhibits here in summation?

MR. WEITZMAN: No, this is about the -- you'll recall they had some clean up exhibits, as they called it. It was about 600 or 700.

THE COURT: We've been through that.

MR. WEITZMAN: Your Honor said, government, tell the defense which ones of those you plan to use in summation. Between June 26 and yesterday at 9 p.m., they didn't say one word about a single one of those documents. Last night they provided it to us at 9 p.m. that they have, I don't know how many, it was 8 or 10 documents that they now plan to use in

1 their summation.

I think it's belated. I think they should have done it when your Honor suggested it. And again, legal doctrine of goose and gander.

MR. RICHENTHAL: The summation wasn't written.

Mr. Monteleoni can respond. This is not worth the Court's time.

MR. MONTELEONI: Your Honor, we're talking about 8 or 10 documents, almost all of which were actually published briefly to the jury. But I included this nevertheless because they didn't come in through a witness. If you recall, there was a discussion about could we be surprising and pulling a fast one where we're now summing up on some document no one's ever heard of.

There is maybe -- the only ones I can think of of these 8 or 10 that actually weren't even seen by the jury and highlighted for the jury are a single wire transfer for the interstate wire, which I believe Mr. Weitzman said is in the category they wouldn't object to, and three text messages about the scheduling of a surgery which Mr. Weitzman put at issue.

THE COURT: All right. I am going to allow it.

Let's take a break. I don't know how long this will take. Let's assume it's, Ms. Blakely, 15 minutes?

MR. RICHENTHAL: I don't want to overstay our welcome. We do have one other thing that --

What?

1 THE COURT:

MR. RICHENTHAL: We noticed after Defense Exhibit 1304, which is a summary chart had been moved into evidence, that it contains a press release subsequent to the charges in this case involving Qatar and the war in Gaza. We said to the defense --

THE COURT: You mean the October 7, the war in Gaza which commenced on or about October 7?

MR. RICHENTHAL: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't see how that can come in.

MR. RICHENTHAL: That's our view. We advised the defense, we understand your Honor let in press releases for context. That's the direct word. We did not understand that context to include the war in Gaza, which began after the charges in this case.

THE COURT: I quite agree. What's the position?

MR. WEITZMAN: Your Honor, we're fine with that.

We've offered -- hold on a second. We've told the government we'll redact any references to the Gaza war in the press release. It will just say thanking Qatar for its humanitarian aid without reference to Gaza.

The government's position is that doesn't go far enough. They want to strike the entry from the summary chart and the underlying exhibit, which has already been moved into evidence, and not include any reference to --

THE COURT: What we're talking about with the Gaza
reference is already part of the evidence?

MR. WEITZMAN: Correct, your Honor, it's -
THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WEITZMAN: We're willing to redact the words in

Gaza.

THE COURT: I got it.

MR. RICHENTHAL: It wasn't published. The jury

doesn't know. It is a November 12, 2023, press release.

THE COURT: If it's been moved into evidence already,

I'm keeping it. Redact Gaza.

15 minutes.

MR. SOLANO: Your Honor, we just had one thing. We could do it after the break, but so it's not lost. We did have some very minor comments in response to your Honor's jury charge that we can raise after the break at some point. But as part of the jury charge conference, we do have some objections we wanted to note.

THE COURT: Thank you.

(Recess)

THE COURT: I'm informed the audio visual set up has been completed, and actually the last juror has just arrived. What I propose we do, given the fact that the government has asked to voir dire this witness, Mr. Lustberg, is to have my deputy swear him in, to allow him to do the voir dire without

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1 the jury, and then we'll proceed accordingly, bring the jury 2 in, yes. 3 Is there any objection, sir, Mr. Lustberg? MR. LUSTBERG: No, your Honor. 4 5 THE COURT: What I think I also should do is after my 6 deputy administers the oath to him, ask him if he understands 7 that he is sworn to tell the truth, and that he is subject to

Any objection?

MR. LUSTBERG: No.

perjury for not telling the truth.

MR. RICHENTHAL: That's perfectly fine. We conferred with Mr. Lustberg. We're comfortable with him asking the questions. We've accepted his good faith representation they are based on personal knowledge. We think we understand the scope of the questions. So we're preserving our right to object, they don't control the witness, but I think we're comfortable going forward.

THE COURT: Without a voir dire?

MR. RICHENTHAL: We had a chance to talk during the We think this should be fine. We reserve the right to object depending on what happens.

THE COURT: Mr. Weitzman, do you have any objections on the charge that you want to lodge?

MR. WEITZMAN: Yes, your Honor. We have a number of objections. We are going to need some time.

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THE COURT: How much time? What does that mean? MR. WEITZMAN: I think it's going to be at least an hour or hour and a half.

THE COURT: Let's bring this jury in.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Just so the Court knows, I think your Honor's deputy knows. We've been advised the nature of the video system does not permit the witness to see a document without the jury seeing it. To the text we need to refresh the witness or for that matter even seek to impeach the witness, our choices are either the jury sees the document or the witness is e-mailed the document. We're trying to make this efficient. What I have done is I've e-mailed Ms. Collart a document I might use to refresh --

THE COURT: It should be by e-mail so the jury doesn't have to see it.

> MR. RICHENTHAL: Yes.

THE COURT: How does this witness see -- I don't know how the technology works. How do I know, obviously the jury will see him. How do I know he sees the jury?

MS. COLLART: We've tested that out on the break and he has a split screen view where he can see the jury box and the lecturn where the questioner is.

THE COURT: Where do I go so he can see me? Because I want to make sure he understands the nature of the oath.

MS. COLLART: If you are at the lecturn, he will see

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0783MEN1
      you.
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                THE COURT: I'll go to the lecturn.
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               MR. LUSTBERG: You're welcome, Judge. We're happy to
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      have you here.
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                (Continued on next page)
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1 (Jury present) 2 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to have 3 a witness who is going to be testifying from Egypt. I believe 4 you can see him on your screens. 5 Ms. Blakely will administer the oath to him, and then 6 I need it go to that lecturn myself, so he can see me and ask a 7 few questions. 8 All right. The last time we were here, which was 9 Wednesday, there was a witness on behalf of Mr. Hana. That 10 witness has left the stand. Mr. Lustberg, is there another witness on behalf of Mr. Hana? 11 12 MR. LUSTBERG: Yes, your Honor. Mr. Hana calls 13 Dr. Moustafa Hossein Abel Majeed Sayed. 14 THE COURT: Dr. Sayed, if you would rise, sir, and 15 raise your hand. 16 (Witness sworn) 17 THE COURT: You may be seated, Dr. Sayed. Can you see 18 me, sir? 19 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 20 THE COURT: Can you see the jury? 21 THE WITNESS: Yes. 22 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, can you see the witness? 23 2.4 A JUROR: Yes.

THE COURT: The jury has indicated yes.

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               Dr. Sayed, do you understand that you are now sworn,
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      that the testimony you are going to give this court is the
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      truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
               THE WITNESS: Of course, of course, for sure.
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               THE COURT: Do you understand, sir, if you do not tell
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      the truth, you can be subject to penalty under United States
7
      law?
               THE WITNESS: Of course.
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               THE COURT: Your witness, Mr. Lustberg.
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               Thank you, Dr. Sayed.
11
       MOUSTAFA HOSSEIN ABEL MAJEED SAYED,
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           called as a witness by the Defendant,
13
           having been duly sworn, testified through the Arabic
14
           interpreter as follows:
      DIRECT EXAMINATION
15
      BY MR. LUSTBERG:
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17
          Dr. Sayed, I'm just going to wait for Judge Stein to go
18
     back to the bench.
19
      Α.
          Okay.
20
      Ο.
          Thank you.
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               MR. LUSTBERG: May I proceed, Judge?
22
               THE COURT: Yes.
23
          Dr. Sayed, how are you currently employed?
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          I am a senior veterinarian at the Central Administration of
25
      Research Quarantine, at the General Authority of Veterinarian
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0783MEN1

Sayed - Direct

Services within the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture. Do you also have a role with IS EG Halal? A. Yes, minister resolution by the minister of agriculture for me in October of 2021 to supervise the offices of IS EG Halal in South America, in Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina. And I was notified by the head of the agency, the late Dr. Abdel Hakim Mahmoud, to be a supervisor for the technical team, being the most senior member next in the team. (Continued on next page)

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BY MR. LUSTBERG:

- Q. And what are your job responsibilities in that capacity?
- 3 A. My job is totally confined to the technical part of the
- 4 halal slaughter in terms of -- we have different scopes of
- 5 work, one of which covers meat and others cover things like
- 6 gelatin products and dairy products. And my job is confined to
- 7 | the authorization of documents to make sure that they conform
- 8 | with sanitary and technical specification and to conduct field
- 9 visits and to issue certificates of validity side by side with
- 10 | the sheikhs who are delegated by the Egyptian Ministry of
- 11 Endowments.
- 12 Q. Thank you.
- 13 | Just briefly, what is your educational background?
- 14 A. I received a bachelor degree of veterinarian --
- 15 | veterinarian sciences from Cairo University in 2002, and I have
- 16 | a diploma in the supervision of health products from Benha
- 17 University in 2013.
- 18 Q. Thank you.
- 19 I'd like to direct your attention to March of 2019 and ask
- 20 | you this. Was there a time when you came to the United States
- 21 as part of an Egyptian delegation to audit slaughterhouses here
- 22 | in the United States?
- 23 A. That's correct.
- 24 \parallel Q. And when was that?
- 25 A. I believe that was between the 13th and the 28th of March

- of 2019. OK. I'm not sure if it started on the 13th or the 17th. That was five years ago.
- 3 Q. OK.

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- And what was your role during that audit?
- A. We were divided into two teams. Every team, every team -- or each team had a veterinarian from the current team and one from the laboratories and one from the slaughterhouses.
 - Q. Go ahead. I'm sorry.

 And what role were you playing?
 - A. A ministerial decision was issued for us to go check on the status of the slaughterhouses in America and how -- how they conform to the specifications that are set by the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture.
- 14 Q. OK. Sorry.
- 15 A. And also to certify or to validate the slaughterhouses that
 16 conform with the Islamic Sharia ways of slaughtering animal.
 - Q. I want to ask you about your own observations with regard to that audit. Please just confine your answers to what you yourself observed as opposed to what anybody told you.
 - A. OK.
 - Q. I want to direct your attention to the audit of a certifier called Ifanca. Do you recall that?
- 23 A. Yes. (in English)
- 24 Yes, I do.
 - Q. And did you attend an audit of Ifanca?

Sayed - Direct

accompany the delegation with Mr. Bret Tate.

Α. I did.

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- 2 Please tell the jury what happened when you observed the 3 audit at Ifanca.
 - I was assigned by Dr. Ahmed Abdel Karim, the head of the delegation, to visit the Ifanca company for halal meat because it was geographically close to the location of our visit as a It was located in Illinois. We conducted a field visit, and our team consisted of myself, Dr. Zaghloul Khedr and Dr. Alsayed Alhassaneen. And from the American side appeared Mr. Bret Tate from the U.S. embassy in Cairo, the Arab Republic of Egypt. And there was -- that was also the presence of Ms. Brittany from the U.S.D.A. And she was assigned to

We visited the center, and we met with Mr. Muhammed Chaudry, who was the head of the Islamic center, and he had his They showed us how the documentation process assisting team. works in the company, and they offered a presentation showing us the way they worked. But we want to -- we wanted to ascertain whether or not what they said on paper was actually applied in reality, so insisted on making a field visit one of the slaughterhouses.

When we made that request to him, he told us that he was not able to accommodate that request at that time. And instead he proposed to show us by video a live process of slaughtering animals the way they do it in the slaughterhouse. In order to

show flexibility, we accepted that proposal so we can start the process of inspection and also to give them a hand, offer help, if needed. So they put us in the external hallway, my team and Mr. Bret Tate and Ms. Brittany, and they started playing a video telling us that this was a live broadcast of a slaughter that was taking place in real time.

I was sitting right in front of the screen, and behind me the team and Mr. Bret, and I noticed that the timing of the screen was different from the time that we were at at the time. It was about 10 o'clock in the morning, and the timing of the screen said 1 p.m. in the afternoon.

At that point I asked the administrator at the center how far the slaughterhouse was located from where we were, and he said about 30 minutes away. And I asked a second question: Is there any difference in the time zone between the area where we were and the area where the slaughterhouse was? And they said no, there was no time difference.

At that point I brought the matter to the attention of Mr. Tate. I told him that doesn't make any sense; the time was not the same. And he smiled back to me and said no comment. That's what happened with the -- and we wrote a report to the head of the delegation, Ahmed Abdel Karim, and explained what happened.

Q. OK. Did you go to any other slaughterhouses during that audit?

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- A. We visited three slaughterhouses in order to audit and ascertain the adherence to the specifications in the slaughterhouses in the United States.
 - Q. I'm sorry. What was that?
 - A. But I was assigned to visit two Islamic centers with my team.
 - Yes. (in English)
- Q. And by your own observations, is there anything that you observed at those other centers that caused you concern?
- A. In terms of the technical issues, adherence to veterinarian standards with the Egyptian international, we noticed they adhered to the standards so we had no problem with them in terms of approving them in that regard. And on that ground, we accepted them as a facility that adhered to the standards of
- 16 | O. OK.
- 17 A. Yes. (in English)
- 18 | Q. What about with regard to halal standards?

the United States food and safety procedures.

A. Regarding halal standards, in the last slaughterhouse I visited, I noticed that the slaughtering was done by the Islamic Society of California. I noticed that the method of slaughtering was vertical slit to throat of the animal to cut the carotid artery, vertical cut across -- yes (in English), and that violates the rules of halal slaughtering, which has to be transverse, transverse cut. That's what I noticed about

this particular Islamic center.

And there was a visit also that was paid to another center called the Islamic Society of America. We visited the center with the same team, and we conducted a document verification process, but what we learned at that point is that they do not directly supervise the process of slaughtering animals — whether cows, lamb and other animals; they don't do that directly. But they obtain the halal products from another Islamic center called Halal Transactions of Omaha.

And when we asked to see the actual slaughtering process, they showed us a video that turned out to be an old one that goes back to 1987.

- Q. How did you know that it was an old video that went back to 1987?
- A. We were sitting watching the video, and we noticed the quality of the picture was very old, and that video was actually -- was also on YouTube.
- Q. One last question. Did you have -- did you make any observations with regard to the question of the time between stunning cattle and slaughter?
- MR. RICHENTHAL: Objection. Leading.
- THE COURT: Sustained. Leading.
- 23 BY MR. LUSTBERG:
 - Q. OK. What, if anything, did you observe with regard to issues of stunning?

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A. The stunning process in the United States is different from stunning some other countries. In the United States they use what they call perforated needle. And according to Egyptian specifications and standards, that method of stunning did not comply with the halal Egyptian standard.

MR. LUSTBERG: Thank you. I have no further questions. Thank you very much. Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: Is there any cross-examination of this witness?

MR. RICHENTHAL: Yes, your Honor, but I don't know if any of the other defendants want to --

THE COURT: Oh, I am sorry. I've done that before.

MR de CASTRO: Not for Mr. Daibes.

MR. FEE: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

- BY MR. RICHENTHAL:
- 18 Q. Good morning from New York, and good evening in Egypt,
- 19 Dr. Sayed.
- 20 A. Good morning.
- 21 | Q. If you have any trouble understanding me, just let me know,
- 22 because we're using an interpreter. OK?
- 23 | A. Will do.
- 24 | Q. Now, you work for the Egyptian government, is that right,
- 25 sir?

- 1 A. Correct.
- 2 | Q. Now, the part of the government that you work for, in
- 3 | English, is sometimes referred to as the General Organization
- 4 | for Veterinary Services, is that right?
- 5 A. Correct.
- 6 Q. I'm going to refer to that as GOVS, G-O-V-S. Is that all
- 7 | right with you?
- 8 | A. Yes.
- 9 Q. Now, you've worked for GOVS for over a decade, correct?
- 10 A. Correct.
- 11 | Q. And you're paid by GOVS -- that's right; your salary, in
- 12 | other words, is paid by the part of the Egyptian government
- 13 | known as GOVS?
- 14 A. Yes.
- 15 \parallel Q. Do you get a salary from anyone else for your work?
- 16 | A. No.
- 17 | Q. And that includes IS EG Halal, correct?
- 18 A. OK. So per the ministerial decree, IS EG pays us a daily
- 19 per diem.
- 20 | Q. IS EG Halal pays money when you do work for IS EG Halal, is
- 21 | that correct?
- 22 A. OK. So this money gets paid per a ministerial decree, it
- 23 | is -- certain fees are paid in that decision --
- 24 Interpreter's correction: So the ministerial decree states
- 25 | that IS EG Halal will pay for travel, lodging and per diem.

Sayed - Cross

- Q. And just to be clear, sir, when you say ministerial decree, you mean a decree of the government of Egypt, correct?
- A. Yes, it was a ministerial decision issued by the ministry, because the company that requested was IS EG Halal Egypt.
- Q. And IS EG Halal Egypt is the only company certified to export meat to Egypt, right?
- 7 A. Correct.
- Q. Now, you recently applied for a visa to travel to the
- 9 United States, is that right, in fact, in early June?
- 10 A. Yes. (in English)
- 11 Correct.
- 12 Q. And you said on the visa that you worked for IS EG Halal, 13 right?
- 14 A. Yes. (in English)
 15 Correct.
- 16 Q. But in fact, you work for the Egyptian government, right?
- 17 A. Yes. (in English)
- 18 Correct.
- Q. Now, you also applied for a visa last year to travel to the United States, is that right, sir?
- 21 A. Yes. (in English)
- 22 Correct.
- 23 Q. And when you applied -- I'm sorry.
- THE INTERPRETER: There's a second lag.
- 25 BY MR. RICHENTHAL:

Sayed - Cross

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- Q. And when you applied for the visa recently, you were asked if you'd ever been denied a visa before, correct?
- 3 A. Yes. (in English)
- 4 Correct. Yes.

- Q. And you answered no, right?
- A. Yes. (in English)
 Yes.
- 8 Q. But in fact, your visa last year was denied, wasn't it?
- 9 A. Can I answer?
- 10 Q. Sir, is it true that your visa last year was denied?
- 11 | That's true, isn't it?
- 12 A. OK. So I was informed by the consular of Uruguay that my
- 13 visa was under administrative process. They said
- 14 administrative process refused but is not denied.
- 15 | Q. OK. Now, you testified about participating in part of a
- 16 | 2019 audit of certain beef slaughterhouses in the United
- 17 States, right?
- 18 A. Correct.
- 19 Q. Now, that audit was not led by you, correct; it was led by
- 20 Dr. Ahmed Abdel Karim?
- 21 A. Correct.
- 22 | Q. And he was your boss, right?
- 23 | A. Yes, he was the head of the veterinarian delegation.
- 24 | Q. And Dr. Karim knew Wael Hana before the audit, did he not?
- 25 A. Correct.

Sayed - Cross

- 1 | Q. But you did not know Mr. Hana, did you?
- 2 A. No, I did not know him.
- 3 Q. Now, at the end of the audit, Egypt approved all of the
- 4 beef slaughterhouses that you had visited; that is, the beef
- 5 | slaughterhouses in the United States were approved to export
- 6 beef to Egypt, right?
- 7 A. Correct.
- 8 Q. And not just the slaughterhouses you visited, other
- 9 | slaughterhouses too, right?
- 10 A. We approved the system for all the slaughterhouses, the
- 11 system itself, same as when the system in Australia was
- 12 approved and the one in New Zealand.
- 13 Q. Now, let me switch from slaughterhouses to halal
- 14 certifiers. All right?
- 15 A. OK. (in English)
- 16 | Q. Now, Egypt approved the entire system -- that is, all
- 17 | slaughterhouses -- but it did not approve all halal certifiers,
- 18 right?
- 19 A. Correct.
- 20 | Q. In fact, it unapproved -- that is, decertified -- all of
- 21 | the existing halal certifiers, right?
- 22 A. Correct.
- 23 | Q. And it then approved a brand-new one, IS EG Halal, right?
- 24 A. Correct.
- 25 | Q. Now, that company, IS EG Halal, had never certified halal

Sayed - Cross

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- 1 | food previously, had it?
- 2 A. Correct.
- 3 Q. Not for Egypt?
- 4 A. Correct.
 - Q. Not for any country?
- 6 A. Correct.
- 7 Q. Now, I want to talk about the companies that you visited.
- Now, first, just to be clear, you only visited some of the existing companies that were certifying meat as halal, correct,
- 10 | sir?

- 11 A. Correct. Yes. The agreement was from the General
- 12 Administration for Veterinary Services and the American
- 13 agricultural attaché, and we were going to see a representation
- 14 sample of the companies that do the certification.
- 15 | Q. And just to be clear, when you say representation sample,
- 16 | what you mean is you only visited or interacted with some, but
- 17 | not all, of the existing certifiers, right?
- 18 A. Yes. (in English)
- So, the representative sample was for slaughterhouses and
- 20 not halal certifiers.
- 21 | Q. And in fact, the other halal certifiers had meetings in
- 22 | Washington, D.C., after you'd returned to Egypt, right?
- 23 | A. That's a meeting that was held through Dr. Ahmed Abdel
- 24 | Karim.
- 25 | Q. Exactly, but you weren't in those meetings, were you,

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Sayed - Cross

1 Dr. Sayed?

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- A. Yes. I did not attend these meetings.
- 3 Q. Dr. Karim attended those meetings?
 - A. Yes.
- 5 Q. And those are the meetings that IS EG Halal was in, right?
- 6 MR. LUSTBERG: Objection.
- 7 THE COURT: We'll find out.
- 8 You may answer. Was IS EG Halal in the meetings in
- 9 D.C. with Dr. Karim?
- 10 | THE WITNESS: I do not know. I don't know. Honestly,
- 11 I don't know.
- 12 BY MR. RICHENTHAL:
- 13 | Q. Well, in any event, you never met with IS EG Halal during
- 14 | the audit, right?
- 15 A. No, I did not meet them.
- 16 \ Q. And you never met with Mr. Hana during the audit?
- 17 A. No.
- 18 | Q. Now, I want to talk to you a minute about Ifanca. That's
- 19 | the company where you said you saw a video of a slaughterhouse
- 20 | that was supposed to be 30 minutes away, and it looked to you
- 21 | like it was not live, is that right?
- 22 A. OK. Yes.
- 23 | Q. Now, this was a presentation the company was making to you,
- 24 | correct?
- 25 \blacksquare A. It was not a presentation.

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- Q. Let me be more precise. They were showing you their operations, but not at their literal place of operation, correct?
 - A. No. They said that the slaughtering takes place in the slaughterhouse through them, and that's why they would broadcast a live video of the slaughtering for us to see the process.
 - Q. That was actually exactly my question. They showed you a live video, but there was no slaughtering at the time, and then they also showed you a recording video, right?
 - A. No. They only showed us one video, and they said that that was a live feed. But it was not a live feed. But verifying the time on the video it was not -- the discrepancy, it was not a live feed.
- Q. Sir, at this time what language were you speaking with Mr.
- 17 A. English.

Tate?

- Q. English. And English is not your first language, is it?
- 19 A. Yes. (in English)
- 20 Yes.
- 21 Q. In fact, you're testifying right now through an 22 interpreter, correct?
- 23 A. Correct.
- Q. And that's because English is not a language you're perfectly fluent in, is it?

Sayed - Cross

- 1 Α. Correct.
- Now, at the end of the audit, I think you said earlier IS 2 Q.
- 3 EG Halal was the only company certified, right?
- 4 Α. Correct.
- 5 Now, you didn't decide that that should be a company that
- gets a monopoly, right? 6
- 7 Correct. Α.
 - That was made above your level, right, sir?
- 9 I'm only a team member, but the decision would be made by
- 10 the General Administration for Veterinary Services and the
- minister of agriculture. 11
- 12 That is, the head of that part of the government of Egypt,
- 13 right?

- 14 A. And -- yes. I would also like to add something, please.
- 15 And also, I would like to add something. Our team was
- mostly concerned with verifying the system generally used in 16
- 17 the United States to ensure food safety in slaughterhouses, and
- that's what our team was concerned with and that's what we 18
- 19 ended up approving.
- 20 Thank you for adding that, sir, because that was actually
- 21 my next question.
- 22 The focus of your visit, to be clear, was not on halal
- certification, right; it was on food safety -- that's why you 23
- 24 referred a few minutes ago you referred to the system in the
- 25 United States? Correct?

Sayed - Cross

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- 1 A. Yes. (in English)
 2 Correct. Exactly.
- 3 Q. The focus on halal certification was others, not you?
- 4 A. Correct. Exactly.
- Q. Now, I've been asking you a series of questions about the 2019 audit. I just want to step back for a moment.
- 7 That was not the first time you visited the United States 8 for the Egyptian government, correct?
- 9 A. Yes. (in English)
 10 Correct.
- Q. In fact, you visited in 2013 as part of a different audit, right?
- 13 A. Yes. (in English)
- Q. Now, that audit -- that's the 2013 audit, for that one, you

were actually the head of the delegation, not Dr. Karim, right?

- 16 A. No. It was Dr. Ahmed Fathy who was the head of the
- 17 delegation.
- 18 Q. OK. But not Dr. Karim, right?
- 19 | A. No.

- Q. Now, in 2013, multiple halal certifiers continued to be certified after the audit, right?
- 22 A. Exactly.
- 23 | Q. And one of those was Amana of New York, right?
- 24 A. Yes.
- MR. RICHENTHAL: Thank you for your time, sir.

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Sayed - Redirect

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1 THE WITNESS: Thank you. (in English) MR. LUSTBERG: Your Honor, brief redirect? 2 3 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 4 MR. LUSTBERG: Thank you. 5 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. LUSTBERG: 6 7 Dr. Sayed, you speak some English, right? (in English) 8 Α. Yes. 9 Yes. 10 0. You can understand, during your trip to -- strike that. During your trip to the United States for the audit, you 11 could communicate in English with Mr. Tate? 12 13 Yes. (in English) Α. 14 We didn't have a translator in the mission. English) 15 Thank you. Just two other questions. 16 17 One, Mr. Richenthal asked you some questions about who pays 18 your salary as between IS EG Halal and the government of Egypt. 19 Can you explain to the jury what the relationship is between IS 20 EG Halal and the government of Egypt? 21 OK. So, I want to explain two aspects. 22 First, IS EG is a company that was established per the 23 decision of the prime minister of Egypt, decision No. 35 for 24 the year 2020. And it is -- OK, and it's a contributing

company that has three ministries under which -- three

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Sayed - Redirect

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ministries, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of
Endowment and general establishment to oversee trade, exports
and imports for the Ministry of Trade and Commerce.

- Q. Let me stop you there. One moment.
- 5 So what you're describing is IS EG Halal in Egypt, correct?
- 6 A. Yes. (in English)
- 7 MR. RICHENTHAL: Leading.
- 8 THE COURT: I'll allow it.
 - A. Egypt, yes.
- Q. And is that or isn't it different than IS EG Halal in the United States?
- A. OK. So, it is a company that is established in the Arabic

 Republic of Egypt and it's not a government company. It is a

 private company. It is considered an independent entity, but
- 15 | it does declaration to the Egyptian government.
- 16 | Q. Right. What I'm trying to understand --
- 17 A. Operation. Operation. OK.
- THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter will correct the word:
- 19 Not declaration. Operation.
- A. So it is -- all these companies that operate overseas, they operate under Egyptian government.
- Q. OK. And IS EG Halal in the United States is something different, right?
- MR. RICHENTHAL: Objection. Personal knowledge and asked and answered.

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1 THE COURT: Yes.

BY MR. LUSTBERG:

Q. What's the relationship between IS EG Halal in the United States and the entity you've been describing in Egypt that's composed three ministries?

MR. RICHENTHAL: Scope, hearsay, personal knowledge.

THE COURT: I'll allow it.

A. OK. So, the company in Egypt, the membership of the board has the three ministries that I mentioned. However, in the operation overseas, whether by America, it all operates under the Egyptian government.

THE COURT: And is that true of the IS EG Halal that operates in the United States as well?

THE WITNESS: Correct.

BY MR. LUSTBERG:

- Q. One last question. You were asked some questions about a company called Amana of New York. Do you remember that?
- 18 A. Yes, of course.
- Q. Did Amana of New York certify any beef products to go from the United States to Egypt as halal?

MR. RICHENTHAL: Objection.

THE COURT: I'll allow it.

A. OK. So, when we did, when we conducted the visit in 2013, under the leadership of Dr. Ahmed Fathy, Amana did not certify any beef. It was solely for poultry, and since 2016, they did

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not export to Egypt anything other than poultry until maybe 2019.

MR. LUSTBERG: Thank you, your Honor. I have nothing further.

THE WITNESS: And something about the salary.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I just have one question.

THE COURT: Yes.

RECROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. RICHENTHAL:

Q. Hello again, sir.

How many conversations did you participate in between Wael

- 12 | Hana and a man named General Ahmed?
- 13 A. What? (in English)
- 14 Q. How many conversations did you participate in between Wael
- 15 | Hana and an individual known as General Ahmed?
- MR. LUSTBERG: Objection. Beyond the scope of
- 17 redirect.
- THE COURT: No. I'll allow it, given the questioning
- 19 on redirect.
- 20 A. Not even once.
- 21 MR. RICHENTHAL: Thank you.
- 22 | THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir. You are
- 23 excused. Thank you, Dr. Sayed.
- 24 (Witness excused).
- 25 THE COURT: Let's cut that connection, please.

Is there another witness on behalf of Mr. Hana?

MR. LUSTBERG: No, your Honor. But I have a couple

of -- one stipulation to read in and we also, just to be clear,

with the consent of the government, we would offer Hana Exhibit

211, which is a list of all the other exhibits that Mr. Hana

has admitted, and I won't read all those to save time unless

the Court wants me to.

THE COURT: All right. Admitted.

(Defendant's Exhibits Hana 211, Hana-013, Hana-013-T, Hana-030 to Hana-036, Hana-095 to Hana-101, Hana-101-T, Hana-102 to Hana-110, Hana-112 to Hana-115, Hana-117 to Hana-122, Hana-124 to Hana-129, Hana-130-100, Hana-131-100, Hana-132, Hana-141 to Hana-165, Hana-167 to Hana-169, Hana-170-R, Hana-171-R, Hana-172, Hana-175 to Hana-178, Hana-180 to Hana-181, Hana-190 to Hana-191, Hana-191-T, Hana-192 to Hana-194, Hana-197 to Hana-200, Hana-202, Hana-204 to Hana-205, Hana-205-T, Hana-207 to Hana-209, Hana-210, Hana-1000, Hana-1001, Hana-1002, Hana A101-100 to Hana A101-104, Hana A103-100, Hana B205-100 to B205-106, Hana B207-100 to Hana B207-100, Hana B207-100, Hana B213-101, Hana B224-100, Hana C102-100, Hana C102-101, Hana C102-103 to Hana C102-108, GX A109-B-TR, GX 10C-6 received in evidence)

MR. LUSTBERG: I do want to read one exhibit, one stipulation. This is Hana Exhibit 1004, in which the following

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is stipulated:

"If called as a witness at trial, a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ('FBI') would testify that in a search executed on November 25, 2019, cash in the amount of \$5,943 was located in Mr. Hana's residence."

I believe we have one -- do we have --

We also offer Defendant's Exhibit 2207, which I believe has been shown to the government. I don't know -thank you.

THE COURT: Is there an objection?

MR. RICHENTHAL: No, your Honor. Some of these are pursuant to a limiting instruction. I think what might make sense, for efficiency, is we can talk to defense counsel and the Court can note that on the record.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. RICHENTHAL: That's for the exhibits that Mr. Lustberg was just referring to.

Separate, we do have a potential issue with one of the exhibits Mr. Lustberg referred to. But I want to respect the time of the jury. We can deal with that separately, specifically 2227.

MR. LUSTBERG: 2207, you mean?

MR. RICHENTHAL: 2207. Excuse me.

MR. LUSTBERG: We can address that after. Other than that, Mr. Hana rests.

1 THE COURT: I need to admit that. What exhibits are 2 you admitting now? 3 MR. LUSTBERG: So, we've admitted all the exhibits. 4 We've admitted Hana Exhibit 1004, which is the stipulation I 5 read, and we've admitted Hana Exhibit 211 and all the exhibits 6 that are listed on 211, none of which, I understand, have any 7 objections to them. 8 THE COURT: All right. Admitted. 9 (Defendant's Exhibit 1004 received in evidence) MR. LUSTBERG: And I think all that's left is Exhibit 10 11 2207, which we can address later. 12 THE COURT: All right. 13 Ladies and gentlemen, why don't I excuse you. It will 14 be just about 10 or 15 minutes. We need to deal with some 15 legal matters. 16 (Continued on next page) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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says debit.

(Jury not present) 1 2 THE COURT: All right. Please be seated. 3 Should we handle 2207? What's the issue? MR. RICHENTHAL: So, 2207 we were given notice of this 4 5 morning. I believe this was actually an exhibit that Mr. 6 Menendez wanted to put in before he rested and has now provided 7 to Mr. Hana's team, which is fine, but just to be clear, it's not, to our knowledge, relevant to Mr. Hana at all. 8 9 This is a partial bank record, as we understand it. 10 THE COURT: Let me see it. Do you have a copy, 11 anyone? 12 MR. LUSTBERG: Oh, sorry. 13 THE COURT: Go ahead. 14 MR. RICHENTHAL: So, as I understand it, and we 15 haven't had much time with this, so I may get it wrong. But as 16 I understand it, this is a partial bank record of 2013 of 17 Nadine Arslanian, the woman later known as Nadine Menendez, 18 appearing to indicate one or more debits of an unclear nature. 19 It's not entirely clear to us why Mr. Menendez's team wanted to 20 offer this, why it's appropriate in Mr. Hana's case and, 21 frankly, what it means. Again, it's 2013 -- that's five years 22 before the charges. The debit's entirely unclear. It doesn't 23 indicate it's cash, for example, if that's the theory. It just

Without a witness to put this in context, we think

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it's confusing. It's unclear it's even relevant at all, and it 1 2 should be precluded including because it's being offered in 3 Mr. Hana's case, when it has nothing to do with Mr. Hana. 4 THE COURT: All right. 5 Mr. Lustberg. 6 MR. LUSTBERG: Thank you, your Honor. 7 Obviously, if it's one big conspiracy -- everybody's sort of in it together, as the government alleges, this is an 8 9 exhibit that shows -- it's true -- debits. They appear to be 10 cash withdrawals, although I understand --11 THE COURT: It's 2013. 12 MR. LUSTBERG: I understand. So this is all about 13 where cash came from that was located in the home. 14 THE COURT: No. I'm going to preclude it. 15 MR. WEITZMAN: Your Honor, can I be heard for a 16 moment? 17 THE COURT: Yes. You want to be heard on behalf of 18 Mr. Hana? 19 MR. WEITZMAN: Well, I would like to be heard only 20 because we are in the same conspiracy charge, and the question 21 of the money and what it's doing in the house is relevant to 22 all defendants, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: In 2013. 24 MR. WEITZMAN: Yes, because for the same reason that

the government offered records of Senator Menendez and the

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defense offered records of Senator Menendez that go back to the 1990s and 2000s showing cash withdrawals that go back in years to the dates of when the cash actually is dated in the house is relevant. THE COURT: Precluded as offered by Mr. Hana. Now, Mr. Lustberg, if you have no other witness, I think I should allocute Mr. Hana. MR. LUSTBERG: Yes, your Honor. I agree. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hana, if you would rise, sir. Mr. Hana, I wish to inform you of a couple of things, and I believe you already know them because you've heard my questioning of Mr. Menendez and of Mr. Daibes as well, but I wish to go through them with you. Do you understand, sir, that in American law, the defense in a criminal case has no obligation to prove anything? DEFENDANT HANA: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: The obligation is always on the government to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT HANA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And you and your team can put on no witnesses or introduce any evidence; you have no obligation whatsoever to put forward a case.

Do you understand that?

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you?

1 DEFENDANT HANA: Yes, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Do you also understand, sir, that you are 3 presumed to be innocent at all times until such time, if ever, 4 that the jury believes the government has proved its case 5 beyond a reasonable doubt? 6 Do you understand that? 7 DEFENDANT HANA: Yes. 8 THE COURT: And do you also understand, sir, that 9 there are a number of decisions that really, at the end of the 10 day, are for your lawyer to make, such decisions as who to call 11 as witnesses, what questions to ask, what motions to make, 12 those sorts of things. But there are certain very important 13 decisions that are not for the lawyer to make but for you, the 14 defendant, to make. 15 Do you understand that? 16 DEFENDANT HANA: Yes, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: And among those decisions that are for you 18 to make is the decision of whether or not to testify in your 19 own defense. 20 Do you understand that? 21 DEFENDANT HANA: Yes. 22 THE COURT: And do you also understand that if you do 23 decide to testify, that anything you say can be used against

DEFENDANT HANA: Yes, your Honor.

MR. RICHENTHAL: No, your Honor.

1 THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, Mr. Hana.

All right. I think I should call the jury back. And I take it, Mr. Lustberg, you'll rest at that time.

Then what's the government rebuttal?

MR. RICHENTHAL: Just on the exhibits Mr. Lustberg just moved in, as I said, some or all of them are, I think, with the standard limiting instruction. They weren't published. I don't think the Court needs to give the instruction. But we'll can confer with the defense and we can advise the Court separately.

THE COURT: Do that right now.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I think this actually doesn't need to be dealt with. So, several of the exhibits were only offered for purposes other than for the truth, but they weren't published to the jury. We understand Mr. Lustberg's team is going to respect that limitation in their closing. We'll reserve the right to object if it's not respected, but I don't think we need to take more of the Court's time on this.

THE COURT: All right. Will there be a government rebuttal case in which you say what exhibits you're introducing?

MR. RICHENTHAL: Yes. Ms. Pomerantz has two exhibits to offer, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Fine. And then I'll excuse

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the jury. It's now 12:15. We have more of the charge to go through. What I suggest is we do that and the parties need to have lunch as well. Why don't I, with the assumption that it will take about an hour to go through the charge -- I mean the remaining objections of the parties -- shall I give the jury two hours so that the lawyers will have an hour for lunch?

Does that make sense?

Counsel.

MR. WEITZMAN: I'd be comfortable with a shorter lunch for the lawyers so that we have enough time.

THE COURT: Let's make it an hour and a half then.

MR. WEITZMAN: I was suggesting two hours for the jury, but the lawyers can have a shorter lunch so that we have enough time for the jury charge.

THE COURT: We'll take the time necessary for the charge. I'll give the jury two hours.

MR. WEITZMAN: Thank you.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I would just say, and I think the Court is sensitive to this, we do need a little time between the end of the charge conference and the commencement of the summation, because to the extent that things change --

THE COURT: Why?

MR. RICHENTHAL: -- we need to be able to reflect that in our slides or our remarks.

THE COURT: I understand. You can call that lunch.

1	OK. Let's bring the jury in.
2	I'll give the government time. I appreciate all the
3	parties are helping move toward a resolution here, move toward
4	the jury having this case.
5	How long is the proposed initial government summation?
6	MR. MONTELEONI: Your Honor, I think that I'm going to
7	try to keep it to under five hours.
8	THE COURT: Mr. Lustberg, I don't think you've rested
9	in front of the jury, correct? So we'll do that.
10	MR. LUSTBERG: I might have, but it was pretty
11	quietly, so I'm happy to do it again.
12	THE COURT: All right. I think actually you may have
13	before the allocution.
14	MR. LUSTBERG: Yes.
15	THE COURT: So we'll do it now.
16	(Continued on next page)
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with the lawyers to go over some legal matters. I'm going to give you a two-hour lunch because we need to handle these legal matters. So be back at 2:20, and we then will start the government summation.

The order of summations are set by law. The government goes first, then each defendant goes, and then the government has the right to a rebuttal summation. Because the government has the burden of proof, it's the last one to address you.

At the end of that, I will then read to you my charge, and then you will begin your deliberations. It will take a couple of days for that entire process, but we are still on track. So continue to keep an open mind. You've not heard -- you have heard all of the evidence. I repeat, you have heard all the evidence.

Don't discuss this case amongst yourselves or with anyone else. I'll see you back at 20 after two.

Thank you.

(Continued on next page)

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1 (Jury not present) 2 THE COURT: All right. You may be seated. 3 Mr. Weitzman, what can I do for you, sir? MR. WEITZMAN: I think, depending on how you'd like to 4 5 proceed, we can go through it page by page. I can give you my 6 first proposed edit, or comment, which is page 43 of the 7 charge, or at least it's my version of the charge. So this is 8 charge 28, dual intent, no defense. 9 MR. RICHENTHAL: We have a scrivener's error just 10 prior to that. 11 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 12 MR. RICHENTHAL: Page 37, proposed instruction 25, 13 opinion of defendant's character or reputation. 14 THE COURT: Just a moment. 15 Yes. 16 MR. RICHENTHAL: It says "the defendant." 17 It also says "has called a witness who's given an 18 opinion of his character or reputation." I suppose that's true 19 in the sense that certain witnesses called for another purpose 20 also gave an opinion. 21 THE COURT: Yes. 22 MR. RICHENTHAL: But at a minimum, I think it should be plural, because I think more than one defendant elicited 23 24 such testimony.

THE COURT: I have no objection to that.

Any objection?

All right. Then on page -- let me let my clerk get the system up.

Now we tried to be consistent in saying defendants. Sometimes it will be defendant because it just slipped through, but I'll read it appropriately as defendants.

On page 37, "the defendants have called one or more witnesses who have given an opinion of his character or reputation." OK. 37.

Mr. Weitzman.

MR. WEITZMAN: Yes. On charge 28, dual intent, we believe the charge is inappropriate here, and I can give you an example, your Honor, specific to the FARA charge.

THE COURT: Wait. Let me read it.

Go ahead, sir.

MR. WEITZMAN: Your Honor, in the first instance, we think no such instruction is necessary. The example would be, for example, a senator in connection with a FARA charge may be asked to approve by, let's say, the Ukrainian president, who says we need more aid and the senator might say, well, that is good for Ukraine and it's good for the United States. That's both a good and a bad motive under the government's theory, and the fact that there is the good motive, that he's doing it in aid of the United States's foreign interests is sufficient in that regard.

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So I think this is an overstatement. But at a minimum, your Honor, at a minimum, it needs to be more balanced.

What we proposed, if your Honor were to give this instruction, on page 44 of the defendant's proposed jury charge, is a more balanced one, where it says at the end:

"That said, evidence of a good motive is, of course, relevant in determining whether a defendant also possessed a sufficiently bad motive. What matters is whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant, in fact, acted because of an improper motive even if he also harbored other intents."

And so at a minimum, if it's going to be given, it should be balanced, but we don't think it needs to be given at all.

MR. RICHENTHAL: So, taking those in order, with respect to what Mr. Weitzman referred to the FARA charge, but I assume he means the 219 charge, the 219 charge already incorporates the principle he's talking about; namely, if an action benefits the foreign principal but is not taken as agency, it's actually the fourth sentence within instruction 70, on 97, which reads, and I'm now quoting --

THE COURT: Just a moment.

Yes, sir. Go ahead.

MR. RICHENTHAL: So, if your Honor looks at the

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foreign agent request explained, the sentence to which I was referring, which is the third from the bottom, I believe it's the fourth from the top.
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THE COURT: What page?

MR. RICHENTHAL: Page 97.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Instruction 70.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RICHENTHAL: The instruction, and I'm now quoting, reads: "So a foreign principal does not make a qualifying request merely by asking or persuading another person for his own reasons to do something even if the request, if fulfilled, would benefit the foreign principal."

So in that example, it's not agency, for the reason Mr. Weitzman's explaining. That's encapsulated here and also encapsulated more generally within the definition of agency.

With respect to dual intent itself, the instruction that the Court is proposing to use has literally been standard, to my knowledge, for more than 50 years. It was most recently approved by the Second Circuit in the Calk case. I believe the defense is getting this from a Seventh Circuit case in 1971. That's not the law here and hasn't been for a very, very long time.

MR. WEITZMAN: Your Honor, we're only proposing that the judge instruct the jury, which I think is correct -- I

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don't think there's any law contrary to this -- that they can look at good motives to evaluate whether there are bad motives. We're not changing the law in any way.

THE COURT: Isn't that, first of all, as it is now, pretty standard in a number of cases? What do you gain with that last sentence?

MR. WEITZMAN: The charge, as it currently reads, suggests that any modicum, any minimal amount of bad motive suffices, and I don't think that's an accurate statement of the law. And so I think the jury can look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the good motives undermine an inference of bad motive.

MR. RICHENTHAL: So that hasn't been the law in more than 50 years. I'm now going to quote *Calk*, 87 F.4th 164, 181 (2d Cir. 2023). This is it; everything I'm about to say is a direct quote:

"In the context of public official bribery, we have stressed that a valid purpose that partially motivates a transaction does not insulate participants in an unlawful transaction from criminal liability."

That is not Mr. Weitzman's position. I respect that, but that is the binding precedent in this circuit.

THE COURT: I'm going do keep it the way I have it.

MR. WEITZMAN: Just to be clear, I did not suggest that there's insulation in any way, but I understand your

Honor's ruling. I just think it suggests that a good motive has no relevance to a finding of whether there's a bad motive. THE COURT: It's been used many times before. Next. MR. WEITZMAN: From me, the next change is, or next objection is charge 38. In particular, on the page that's --the paragraph that starts "to qualify as an official act." (Continued on next page)

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THE COURT: Just a moment.

MR. WEITZMAN: In the third sentence, it says the decision or action may include using one's official position to exert pressure on another official to perform or not perform an official act. That sentence and the next sentence, next two sentences, I think are an incorrect statement of the law.

The suggestion here is that an official act can be satisfied by a third-party official conducting the official act. That is not the law under <code>McDonnell</code>. It requires Senator Menendez undertake an official act or agree to take an official act. A third party taking an official act is not what is required under <code>McDonnell</code>.

MR. RICHENTHAL: That's irreconcilable. This was briefed extensively before trial. In fact, to my knowledge, literally every court has rejected it uniformly, soundly, and thoroughly for really good reason, including McDonnell itself that quite literally talks about how the act can be taken by someone else. This is to my knowledge every instruction since McDonnell says this. I know why the defense doesn't like it, but it's not the law.

MR. WEITZMAN: I don't think it is correct.

THE COURT: Just a minute, gentlemen. Go ahead, Mr. Weitzman.

MR. WEITZMAN: Your Honor.

THE COURT: Clearly a third person can be involved

here.

MR. WEITZMAN: A third person.

THE COURT: Can take the act.

MR. WEITZMAN: That's not how I read *McDonnell*, your Honor. If you look at *McDonnell*, the language is quite clear that it was McDonnell himself that needed to engage in the official action. I'll quote.

THE COURT: Wait just a moment. Let me get it. No, it looks like I don't have it in front of me.

MR. WEITZMAN: So the jump cite is page -- the pin cite is page 47 of the ruling, and the paragraph at the top of page 47, the Court analyzes the problem with the District Court's instructions regarding official act. And I quote, "The testimony at trial described how Governor McDonnell set up meetings, contacted other officials, and hosted events. It is possible the jury thought that a typical meeting, call, or event was itself a 'question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy.'"

THE COURT: That's taken care of. Call, meeting, so forth. They're not official acts.

MR. WEITZMAN: Correct. Then the Court continues, "If so, the jury could have convicted Governor McDonnell without finding that he committed or agreed to commit an official act as properly defined." It continues two paragraphs below, "The District Court did not instruct the jury that to convict

Governor McDonnell it had to find he made his decision or took an action or agreed to do so on the identified question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, as we have construed that requirement. If the testimony reflects what Governor McDonnell agreed to do at the time he accepted the loans and gifts from Williams, then he did not agree to make a decision or take an action on any of the three questions or matters described by the Fourth Circuit."

In McDonnell itself, the question was whether he set up meetings with state university officials. And the Court is saying it's not what the state university officials will do and whether they're in their public official capacity taking official acts. It is whether Governor McDonnell is taking an official act.

Under the theory that this instruction permits, a non-public official who causes another public official to take some action would be guilty of bribery or honest services fraud. It doesn't make any sense. Senator Menendez has to be the one who is engaged in official action. Otherwise McDonnell has no teeth. It means he can arrange meetings and someone else can engage in official action.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I think Mr. Weitzman made his record. He should keep reading the case. Because --

THE COURT: Please. Just --

MR. RICHENTHAL: This has been rejected for a very long time because it would immunize our public officials against bribery prosecutions. I am going to quote from 573.

THE COURT: Just a moment. I now have it.

572. "For example, a decision or action to initiate a research study -- or a decision or action on a qualifying step, such as narrowing down the list of potential research topics -- would qualify as an 'official act.' *United States v. Birdsall*, (finding "official action" on the part of subordinates where their superiors "would necessarily rely largely upon the reports and advice of subordinates ... who were more directly acquainted with" the "facts and circumstances of particular cases.")

What do you want me to look at in 573?

MR. RICHENTHAL: I'm sorry, your Honor. That is 573.

That is what I was going to direct the Court to.

THE COURT: I have it as 572. But I guess it doesn't matter. Is that what you were going to refer me to?

MR. RICHENTHAL: Yeah. It appears in multiple places.

THE COURT: I think that answers it. All right. I'm keeping the government's charge.

Next?

MR. WEITZMAN: Your Honor, just one addition, though I think this only refers to, if I read it correctly, advice, and there is no discussion of pressure here, which is I think what

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the government has charged. It may be elsewhere here but I'm not seeing it.

MR. RICHENTHAL: The sentence before says the advice or action may include using one's official --

THE COURT: Where are you?

MR. RICHENTHAL: I was --

THE COURT: In the charge, yes.

MR. RICHENTHAL: There are two sentences. The first refers to pressure. The second refers to advice. Just like *McDonnell*, it can be executed through pressure or executed through advice.

THE COURT: What page?

MR. WEITZMAN: Your Honor, I see it. The issue I have though is there is no definition of what pressure means.

THE COURT: Government, I see it. The decision or action may include using one's official position to exert pressure on another official to perform or not perform an official act. I'm going to leave it as it is.

MR. WEITZMAN: There's no context or definition of what pressure and advice mean. I'd like to preserve. And I would refer your Honor to page 76 through 79 of the defendant's proposed charge which has a definition of pressure and advice. And what it makes clear is that the pressure and advice have to be an exercise of official action itself, which I think is correct. You have to use the public office of the senator to

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exert that the pressure or advice. It can't just be a phone call which is exactly what -- a phone call that doesn't actually exert pressure or advice.

THE COURT: No, but a phone call -- that's correct.

But a phone call that does exert pressure is actionable.

MR. WEITZMAN: Correct, but --

THE COURT: But that's what the parties are going to debate here.

MR. WEITZMAN: I agree with your Honor. But there is no guardrails or definition of what pressure or advice means, so we refer to our proposed instruction there.

THE COURT: Government?

MR. RICHENTHAL: Your Honor's sentence literally says using one's official position to exert pressure. I believe that is also lifted directly from *McDonnell*. If Mr. Weitzman wants to argue the senator didn't use his official position, he can so argue.

THE COURT: The question is pressure. What is pressure.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Oh. Well, that is your Honor's pressure sentence. The sentence reads "The decision or action may include using one's official position to exert pressure on another official to perform or not perform an official act."

That's a legally correct sentence taken directly from McDonnell.

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1 THE COURT: There is no definition of pressure. MR. RICHENTHAL: That's true. 2 3 THE COURT: On page 76. MR. RICHENTHAL: There is no definition in McDonnell 4 5 It is a layperson's term. It is for the parties to either. 6 ask the jury to decide. 7 THE COURT: I am going to keep it the way it is. 8 What else? 9 MR. RICHENTHAL: We have our own comment with respect 10 to the Court's official act instruction. It is slightly 11 earlier. Page 56 of the instruction says "The question or 12 13 matter must be something specific and focused that is pending 14 or may be by law be brought before any public official." 15 That's the final full sentence on page 56. 16 That sentence I think is largely or entirely taken 17 from McDonnell. But what the Court writes next is as follows. 18 "That means something within the specific duties of an 19 official's position, the function conferred with the authority 20 of his or her office." That's also from McDonnell. 21 problem is using the word "that" seems to modify both pending 22 and may be, may by law be brought. 23 As we read the decision, there are two types of

conduct at issue. One that can be pending, and one that may be

understand it refers to the may be by law. The reason that has to be so is two fold. So first, pending or --

THE COURT: No, I understand. But what's your proposal to change that?

MR. RICHENTHAL: We would have the beginning of the sentence that reads "that means" changed to "may by law be brought means." Because we understand *McDonnell* to be talking about that. Otherwise the "or" would be an "and." The pending would be rendered superfluous or meaningless.

MR. WEITZMAN: I don't really understand it would be superfluous.

THE COURT: Just a moment. Go ahead.

MR. WEITZMAN: I don't understand the proposed edit, because a matter that is pending has to be within the specific duties of an official's position if it is official action. The notion that something can be pending and outside an official's official duties.

THE COURT: Yes, I think that's right.

MR. RICHENTHAL: If I can direct the Court to page 570. I think this is an error. We should try to track the Supreme Court's decision as close as we can. I'm now going to quote page 570 of McDonnell.

THE COURT: Just a moment.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I'm looking at the paragraph that begins "In addition to the requirements we have described."

1 THE COURT: Yes, I see it.

MR. RICHENTHAL: So, this is now a quote three sentences below. "In particular, 'may by law be brought' conveys something within the specific duties of an official's position -- the function conferred by the authority of his office." We have no problem with your Honor literally quoting the case. That is different, with respect, from what's written here, which refers we think, grammatically speaking, to both pending and may be by law be brought.

MR. WEITZMAN: I don't think that's the proper reading of McDonnell.

THE COURT: That's what the words say. May by law be brought conveys something within the specific duties of an official's position. That's literally from McDonnell.

MR. WEITZMAN: Correct. But you've got to look at the reason why they're saying -- what McDonnell was saying in this paragraph, it is defining what pending and may be law be brought. And in defining the two of them, it's using one of the terms, may by law be brought, conveyed something within the specific duties of an official position. And it is using that to say that pending and in the sentence before pending and may by law be brought suggests something that is relatively circumscribed. So the circumscribed thing that applies to both of them is it has to be within the official duties of the official's position. That's why it's only using one example to

1 define the broader set.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Our view is if that were right, the word "pending" has no meaning at all. Because everything would fall in the other category. Pending would have no meaning. It has to have a meaning. And indeed, McDonnell itself, just to step back, cites Birdsall, which is a case from 1914 which talks about how things that are in the public official's power that comes from duty or custom.

THE COURT: This is what I'm going to do. I'm going to use the direct quote from *McDonnell*. So, all I'm going to do is change that where it says that means something within to say "may by law be brought" means something within the specific duties and so on and so forth. That's an exact quote and I'm going to use it.

Next.

MR. WEITZMAN: So, my next one is the same instruction, in the quid pro quo section, the paragraph -- and I'm sorry, my pagination is different from your Honor so I can't refer to page number. The paragraph that starts with keep in mind that. The second sentence is it is not --

THE COURT: Wait. I need to find that paragraph.

MR. WEITZMAN: Page 59, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes. Keep in mind that.

MR. WEITZMAN: In the sentence that says "It is not a

defense that the public official would have performed a particular official act without the influence of a thing of value." We would request the instruction that we proposed on page 73 of the defendant's requested charge. It reads --

THE COURT: Just a moment. Go ahead.

MR. WEITZMAN: What we had proposed was "If, however, you conclude that the public official would have taken the same action, regardless of anything of value, you may consider that as evidence that the public official did not demand, accept, or agree to accept a thing of value in exchange for being influenced in the performance of any official act."

We agree it is not a defense, but it is a relevant piece of evidence.

MR. RICHENTHAL: So the defense can argue it is a relevant piece of evidence.

THE COURT: Just a moment.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. RICHENTHAL: If the defense wants to argue that alleged evidence that Mr. Menendez would have done something anyway shows he didn't have corrupt intent, they can make that argument.

The problem is this instruction is legally wrong. What it's asking is for the jury to engage in a counterfactual hypothetical of what would have occurred. Implicit in that is

that the bribe has to have actually influenced his conduct, which is not true. As the Second Circuit has made clear ever since at least Meyers, which is cited in the list of authorities we put in our RTC, it doesn't actually matter if the official's influenced at all. Literally it doesn't matter. The official could be play acting. That's a direct quote from Meyers.

So to ask the jury to perform a counterfactual as an argument matter, meaning in summation, Mr. Weitzman can do that. But to tell the jury if it performs the counterfactual and concludes that the defendant would have taken the action anyway, it may consider him not guilty, is wrong. It doesn't matter whether the bribe influenced him.

THE COURT: Mr. Weitzman, isn't that true? It doesn't matter as a matter of law, it does not matter whether the bribe influenced him or not.

MR. WEITZMAN: That is correct, your Honor. I'm just -- I think that the jury is entitled to consider whether a public official was going to do that in any event as evidence of whether he accepted the bribe. Your question assumes there is a bribe. And we're using the argument, what Mr. Richenthal describe as counterfactual, I just think that's not true. He is coming from a position of an assumption there is a bribe. If you don't assume there is a bribe, and you look at the senator's conduct, that's what we're asking the jury to look

at.

MR. RICHENTHAL: So the problem here is the charge shouldn't have any assumptions at all. This is a defense argument.

THE COURT: I'm going to keep it the way it is. If anyone else has anything, they should, as we go along, state it. We're up to I guess page 60 of my charge.

MR. AGATA: There is one matter we'd like to bring up on the quid pro quo portion. That's on 58 on my copy.

Paragraph begins, "Government must prove that the defendant you are considering" it is the last sentence. "At a minimum, the government must prove the public official promised to take official action on a particular question or matter as the opportunity to influence the same question or matter arose."

In light of McDonnell, we ask that that sentence be removed. McDonnell places into doubt whether something that is unconcrete as a matter arose really satisfies that standard. The government has to assert that, using McDonnell's language, something that's focused and concrete, the question and matter etc. is identified at the time of the alleged quid pro quo. This theory allows this to be identified at some later time, at least the way this language is phrased, so we would ask that last sentence be removed or certainly revised so that theory is removed from the charge.

THE COURT: Let me read the introduction to that.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I just have a very brief response. I think it will make it more efficient. I think Mr. Agata is trying to preserve their argument that the Court's already rejected. Namely that the as opportunities arise theory does not exist after McDonnell. The Second Circuit has concluded repeatedly to the contrary. Every circuit has repeatedly concluded to the contrary. I think the Court has already rejected as opportunities arise no longer exists.

THE COURT: I'm keeping it as I have it.

Next, Mr. Weitzman.

MR. SOLANO: We have one. To the extent that the attorneys for Mr. Menendez or Senator Menendez or Mr. Daibes raise objections, we're all raising them. We are not going to reargue them.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. SOLANO: On page 59, the second full paragraph ends, "This element can be satisfied regardless of whether the parties to the exchange had a prior relationship, nor does it matter who initiated the exchange."

We don't quibble with that sentence. But we would ask that the prior relationship can be probative of whether or not there is a corrupt intent, essentially. That is, the parties — the jury shouldn't be led to believe that they should disregard the existence of a prior relationship.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I think is similar to what I said

with respect to Mr. Weitzman's most recent comment. That's a perfectly fine defense argument, but this is a charge. It's legally accurate as written. It is standard. It comes from *McDonnell* and its progeny. It doesn't say the jury can't consider --

THE COURT: Mr. Solano, do you have a disagreement that this paragraph -- are you saying this paragraph does not state the law?

MR. SOLANO: No, your Honor. I think the paragraph accurately states the law. But what it can do is suggest to the jury that the prior relationship between the parties is not relevant. And all we would ask is that the jury be instructed that a prior relationship between the parties can be considered in determining whether the requisite intent exists.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Again, that's not a balanced charge. But also literally the next charge, charge 39, is an entire charge on good will gifts and prior relationships.

THE COURT: I think since this states the law, we're all agreed with that, I'm going to keep it as it is. I don't think that prior relationship, really lack of a prior relationship or existence of a prior relationship, I don't need to put that in. We can be satisfied regardless of whether they had a prior relationship. I think that's fine as it is. You have your objection.

MR. WEITZMAN: Yes. Charge instruction 40, the

definition of corrupt intent we believe is too narrow. In your proposed charge it says "Corrupt intent means to act with an improper motive or purpose."

THE COURT: Isn't that absolutely standard?

MR. WEITZMAN: It may be standard, but it's not the way the government has been defining it or the court has been defining it for years in many cases, your Honor. So in the Arthur Andersen case --

THE COURT: I gave you your corrupt intent as the fourth element. That's throughout this. That's a major, seems to me --

MR. WEITZMAN: It is, your Honor, and we appreciate that but the definition of corrupt intent --

THE COURT: I thought that was the right way to go.

MR. WEITZMAN: Definition of corrupt intent in the case law is corrupt intent means to act with a wrongful, immoral, depraved or evil motive or purpose. That's directly from the Arthur Andersen case and directly what the solicitor general argued in connection with another bribery case which was the Snyder case that just recently came out. And if you look at the solicitor general's brief, it states that --

THE COURT: I have not done that, sir.

MR. WEITZMAN: I understand. I'll just quote it.

"Congress did not define corruptly for purposes of Section 666,
which is the gratuity statute, but this court has explained

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that the natural meaning of that term is 'normally associated with wrongful, improperly depraved or evil conduct.'". Quoting Arthur Andersen. So we would ask for that instruction.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Two responses. With tremendous respect for the office of the solicitor general of the United States, that's a brief. What your Honor's doing is tracking case law, and I think this is the safer course to track case law. And second, even the brief, I am not saying it is necessarily wrong, even the brief uses the word "or." If it is "or," it is utterly unnecessary to put more words in if the defense is conceding the words here is correct.

MR. WEITZMAN: The solicitor general is citing from the case. That's corrupt intent.

MR. RICHENTHAL: It is quoting in part, but it is also referring, as Mr. Weitzman said, to a statute that's not charged in this case.

THE COURT: I think I've taken this basically from Sand. I think this is fine as it is.

All right. What else? Next.

MR. WEITZMAN: Just to preserve our objection, at the end of instruction 40, again there is essentially a dual motive instruction which we object to. I understand your Honor's ruled on that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WEITZMAN: The end of instruction 58.

25 MR. WEITZMAN: T

MR. RICHENTHAL: We have a small matter right before that. Not right before that. Prior to that.

THE COURT: What is it?

MR. RICHENTHAL: Page 65, instruction 42. The final paragraph refers to the government's evidence. I think this is the only time in the charge the Court used that phrase. We think it should be "the evidence." There is evidence we didn't put on.

THE COURT: Let me see it. I think that's correct.

Let's keep it as the evidence. Just strike the word

government's. Okay. That's on page 65.

Mr. Weitzman, back to you, sir.

MR. SOLANO: Your Honor, I think we have one on page 73, jury charge 49. Page 73.

THE COURT: Sir.

MR. SOLANO: Just at the end of this charge, the Court is going to give the jury two examples, and our objection is to including the last two sentences of the last paragraph as examples, given how close they track to the alleged facts in this case. So we think the law is accurately stated.

THE COURT: Let me look at it.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I have a proposal that may ameliorate some or all of the defense concern as I understand it. The reason the Court is doing this, which we think is not just accurate, but essential, is to distinguish an honest services

fraud from the other bribery charges who the act or the official act can be. These are examples are to make clear to the lay jury what the Court is doing.

If Mr. Solano is concerned that these examples are too close to this case, one way to deal with it, indeed, perhaps the best way, would be to change state official to non-federal official. Simply make it more generic. That's the point, so the lay jury understands what's going on. Or state or local, for example. State or municipal.

In other words, if you make it more generic, then it no longer looks like this case, but the lay jury still understands what the Court is saying, which is there is an important distinction in these charges.

MR. SOLANO: I think that's accurately captured by the Court's prior sentence in which it says "For purposes of honest services fraud, an official act may also be performed or caused by a non-government federal official."

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I don't see that.

MR. SOLANO: A couple of sentences.

THE COURT: Aren't we on page 73?

MR. SOLANO: Yes, and a couple of sentences up.

THE COURT: Oh, I was looking immediately up. I see it now. "For the purposes of honest services fraud, an official act may also be performed or caused by a non-federal government official."

MR. SOLANO: So our concern is, again, the last sentence starts, "So, for example, the use of one's official position to exert pressure on a state official to perform an official act is itself official action for purposes of honest services fraud." Again, it tracks what the allegations are in this case.

So, I appreciate Mr. Richenthal's suggestion, but I don't think it cures the overall problem when you read it as a whole.

MR. WEITZMAN: Your Honor, I have one more point to add to that because we join in this request. I think the last sentence in particular is problematic, I don't believe --

THE COURT: That's what we're talking about.

MR. WEITZMAN: There are two last sentences. I'm saying the last sentence goes beyond what *McDonnell* authorized. I can see a theory where pressure on a state official can constitute official act, if you're using your official office to exert that pressure. I don't know of any case where advice to a state official can constitute an official act.

So I join that as well. I think this is a disputed issue and I think that the sentence you have already earlier in the paragraph suffices.

MR. RICHENTHAL: So, they now changed arguments, which is fine. But this last argument is deeply wrong. Again,

McDonnell could not be more clear. It can be advice or

pressure. The defense is not entitled to only ask the jury to consider one theory. I don't know I need to say more on that.

As to the argument Mr. Solano first made, I think it is ameliorated by changing the verbiage, which we're open to. But to strike it entirely as crafted we have very, very serious concern the jury will not understand what the Court is saying. What the Court is saying is for these counts, the action can be performed by a non-federal official. By the action we mean the action sought through pressure or advice. Without linking those two things, that is the second thing I just said, we think the lay jury won't understand --

THE COURT: I got it. Let me look at it. Rather, make your record.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I'm saying only the reason we think the jury won't understand is the sentence that Mr. Solano quoted beginning "for the purposes"isn't the last sentence even under his own theory. The sentence would continue, "in all other respects, however, the official act for the purposes of honest services wire fraud is the same act for the purposes of bribery." For the lay jury to know what that means, the jury will have to flip back a number of pages, read the other official act instruction.

THE COURT: This is what I'm going to do. I think there is no harm in using examples, and I will make it a little less track the evidence here. State or local in all three

cases. So it will say, "So, for example, use of one's official position to exert pressure on a state or local official." And then later, similarly, "Using one's official position to provide advice to a state or local official." And then "Such advice will form the basis for an official act by a state or local official." That's 73. Next.

MR. AGATA: Just if I can state for the record that, like Mr. Hana's counsel, we're joining in all, for the record, defense's objections, so it's clear we join in them.

THE COURT: Absolutely. Any objection raised by a defendant is deemed to be raised by all the defendants. Go ahead.

MR. WEITZMAN: So the same issue arises I think, your Honor, in connection with the extortion count, charge 58. At the end states in the last sentence, "That is, like with the honest services wire fraud counts, the official act may involve a non-federal official, unlike in the bribery counts, which relate only to official acts by federal officials."

I think that's an incorrect statement of law. In each of the counts, every single one of these counts, there has to be official action by the federal official. That's what McDonnell stands for.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I think they're just making a record, but I'm happy to respond.

MR. WEITZMAN: It's more than making a record, your

1 Honor.

THE COURT: A substantive request. Go ahead.

MR. WEITZMAN: McDonnell involved honest services wire fraud, bribery, and extortion. All counts were reversed because the instruction was incorrect as to whether there has to be a use of official power in exerting advice or pressure. There has to be a use of official power before you get to any conviction.

THE COURT: So how does that last sentence differ, what you just told me?

MR. WEITZMAN: Because the last sentence suggests that there need not be, for either honest services wire fraud or extortion, use of official power by the federal official.

MR. RICHENTHAL: So, docket no. 180, pages 66-67, this has been rejected no fewer than three times by the Second Circuit. It has been rejected in *Boyland*, in *Skelos*, rejected in *Percoco*. It's also been reject by every other court in the United States to ever consider it. It's just not the law.

MR. WEITZMAN: Under the government's theory --

THE COURT: Just a moment.

MR. WEITZMAN: Under the government's theory there need not be any use of official action in order to convict for honest services fraud or extortion.

So, I'll give you a hypothetical, your Honor. A senator's good friends with the governor and says, unless you

pass certain state legislature, I'm not inviting you to dinner at my house any longer.

That will not be pressure as McDonnell identifies it.

It has to be official use of the office pressure. It has to be something connected to his office to be pressure or advice. If you are not linking the two, it could be something totally personal and outside of the use of the office, which is not what McDonnell authorizes.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Which is why the Court's charge doesn't say that. The Court charge literally says use of official position. They're making a different argument here. It is an argument the Second Circuit has rejected three times. It is an argument that Judge Caproni said in *Percoco*, which was affirmed, is an argument -- and I'm now quoting -- that misreads *McDonnell*, runs afoul of clear precedent, and defies common sense.

THE COURT: Tell me what argument, how she states what the argument was.

MR. RICHENTHAL: What she states, and this case was affirmed by the Second Circuit, one of the three cases, this is page 67 of docket 180. What she is he talking about is the argument which I now think the defense is making, they've made before in briefs, that only a person with formal power or authority over the actions sought may be convicted of bribery. In other words, as Mr. Weitzman keeps saying, only the

senator's own actions count.

That was rejected by McDonnell itself. We talked about that 10 or 15 minutes ago. And it's been rejected repeatedly by the Second Circuit and every other court to consider it for really good reasons. It would immunize huge swaths of conduct against corrupt charges.

When I said the Court already made this point, the "this" that I'm referring to is the idea that it has to be official. The Court actually does this a few times, but we're talking about the extortion charge right now. So in the extortion charge itself, which is page 83, charge 58, the first --

THE COURT: That's what we're dealing with.

MR. RICHENTHAL: The first sentence in the charge reads "The third element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that Robert Menendez used the authority of his public office." And then the sentence continues.

That's correct. We have to prove that. We think we have. It will be up to the jury. But there is no doubt the jury's being told that. What the defense wants is that only action that he personally formally --

THE COURT: I've already ruled on that.

MR. WEITZMAN: That is not what I just asked for, and I think he's intentionally distorting it. I'm asking --

THE COURT: Let's keep it on a professional level.

1	MR. WEITZMAN: Yes, your Honor. I apologize.
2	I think what I'm asking is that you need to reinforce
3	that it has to be a use of the official authority in that last
4	sentence. Otherwise when you read it, it suggests that
5	non-official acts, non-official authority would suffice.
6	THE COURT: No, it doesn't. I don't see that. I'm
7	going to keep it as it is. Next.
8	MR. WEITZMAN: So, on instruction 65, the definition
9	of corruptly I think is too narrow and we would propose the
10	definition that we included in our instruction which is
11	THE COURT: Let me take a look.
12	MR. RICHENTHAL: This is the argument your Honor
13	rejected 10 minutes ago.
14	MR. WEITZMAN: It is a different statute.
15	MR. RICHENTHAL: It is the same definition.
16	THE COURT: Let me find it, gentlemen. Where is your
17	request, sir, in the defendant's charge?
18	MR. WEITZMAN: Charge 75, the first paragraph, last
19	two sentences.
20	THE COURT: Haven't I just decided this, sir?
21	MR. WEITZMAN: I mean, you decided it with respect to
22	that language in connection with corrupt intent for purposes of
23	a different statute.
24	THE COURT: Got it. And all right. Government?

MR. RICHENTHAL: You did decide it with respect to a

different part of the charge. I think the reasoning is equally applicable. This is standard language.

THE COURT: It seems to me it is a different statute, but it's still the same element, same issue. I'm keeping it as I have it.

MR. WEITZMAN: My next one is charge 67. So, in the second paragraph, where it says "FARA requires the registration with the Department of Justice of anyone who is or acts as an agent of a foreign principal." In the next sentence I would propose striking "owes a duty of honest and faithful duty to the public he serves."

So it reads, "However a public official cannot act as an agent." I think that's the point. And I think conflating honest services with FARA is confusing to the jury.

THE COURT: Government?

MR. RICHENTHAL: The reason we asked for this, and we don't typically ask for purposes, is non-public officials can engage in conduct if they register. Public officials can't. That is, registration is not an out. That is maybe comprehensible to a lawyer, I think it's probably a difficult concept to a lay jury. This was an attempt just to explain at a fundamental level what's going on, and it is not meant to put a thumb on the scale. It is not meant to describe facts. It is just meant for the jury not to be confused.

THE COURT: Let me just check something.

MR. WEITZMAN: By the way, I'm not suggesting striking that whole sentence. Just the words --

THE COURT: I understand. I'm going to grant the defense request here. I'm going to strike the phrase "owes a duty of honest and faithful service to the public he serves and" so that sentence will now read, "However, a public official cannot act as an agent of a foreign principal, even though someone who is not a public official can, if he or she registers with the Department of Justice."

Next.

MR. WEITZMAN: Skipping ahead, others may have something beforehand, but my next instruction is 81.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I think next in order is the subject of our letter. We've only conferred in part, so maybe we can narrow those objections and we can proceed.

THE COURT: Let me go back to the letter.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Specifically, the first part of our letter refers to instruction 70 which starts on page 97. We have no --

THE COURT: I've got to find the letter.

MR. RICHENTHAL: We have no objection if Mr. Weitzman wants to continue with the other objections.

THE COURT: Talk to each other now. You don't need me for that. You were conferring, correct?

MR. RICHENTHAL: We were conferring. We had not

0783MEN3 completed it, so I don't know how much we'll be able to narrow, but let's try. THE COURT: Try it right now. I am going to step off the bench. I'll be right back. (Counsel conferring) (Continued on next page)

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MR. SOLANO: And the next request, No. 71, page 98,

I'll go to the areas of disagreement, and then, we have agreed on the --

THE COURT: Let me look at my chart.

Yes, sir.

MR. SOLANO: In the instructions, the third and fourth paragraphs set forth factors that may support or may count against a finding of agency, and so for that reason, we've agreed, and we'd suggest to the Court, if the Court's willing to accept it, adding the word "may" in both paragraphs, so that paragraph No. 3 would start, "factors that may support finding an agency," and then go on from there. And paragraph No. 4, would start, "conversely, the following factors may count against finding an agency."

THE COURT: I have no objection to those two additions. All right. We'll add those two mays.

MR. SOLANO: The last area of agreement, to make it balanced, the government has requested, and we do not object, to adding to paragraph 3 among the list of factors the following.

THE COURT: Wait. This follows "receives feedback on his work from the foreign principal"?

MR. SOLANO: Yes. I think we could add there -- I'm not sure the government has a position on where they want it in that paragraph, but as long as one of the factors listed is the following: "The foreign principal's goals do not align with

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1 the alleged agent's own interests or subjective viewpoint." 2 Why don't we just make that -- we'll THE COURT: 3 strike the word "and" where it says "and where the person seeks to receive feedback on his work" and then after foreign 4 5 principal, "if the foreign principal's goals do not align with 6 the alleged agent's own interests or subjective viewpoint." 7 Does that do it, gentlemen? I guess put "and" before, "and if the foreign principal's goals do not align." 8 9 MR. SOLANO: I believe it does from our end, your 10 Honor. 11 THE COURT: OK. Fine. That's what we'll do. 12 MR. SOLANO: That was the extent of our agreement on 13 the two charges. 14 I think there was a third issue that the government 15 raised which they may want to argue on the bottom of page 4 of 16 their filing. 17 THE COURT: The bottom of page what? 18 MR. SOLANO: 4 of the filing, ECF-504. 19 THE COURT: Oh. 20 MR. SOLANO: The government has proposed additional 21 language to the second paragraph of instruction 71, to which 22 the defendants object. 23 THE COURT: All right. 24 Government, let me hear you.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Given the nature of this case, we had

asked for the sentence on the bottom of page 4 of our letter to be added about payment giving rise to a sense of obligation.

The reason we made that request is that --

THE COURT: Where would that go?

MR. RICHENTHAL: It would go in the paragraph beginning "in determining whether."

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RICHENTHAL: And here's why we're making that request.

THE COURT: Let me read it. This is the one that came in this morning.

Yes, sir. Go ahead.

MR. RICHENTHAL: So we're trying to think like laypeople, and what's in that sentence, meaning the sentence beginning "in determining," is the phrase "sense of obligation." Our concern is that the average layperson would not think that sense of obligation includes a compensation relationship. People don't normally think of obligation as driven by money. They think of it as driven by philosophical factors, for example, and so what we suggested at the bottom of page 4 was language, which is permissive, not directive, can give rise, that makes clear that obligation could include a compensation relationship.

The exact language, I will say, is not the point for us. It's to avoid the misimpression that obligation refers to

something outside of a compensation-based relationship.

MR. WEITZMAN: Your Honor, I think that this is a directive. It's effectively saying if there's any finding of compensation, then that creates an agency relationship. And it's unnecessary, your Honor, because when you look at the factors that you've already included, one of them is compensation, the second in the third paragraph, "if instructions or requests are coercive or are accompanied by an offer of the provision of compensation."

THE COURT: All right. I'm not going to add the government's request here. I'll add what we just put on the record but not this sentence that says accepting payment can give rise to a sense of obligation such that, etc.

All right.

MR. WEITZMAN: My next one is charge 81. And I think this is consistent with where the parties are at, although I've not run it by the government, what I'm asking for is an instruction at the end of paragraph 81 that states that no codefendant is or can be a foreign principal. I think the law is that a U.S. citizen cannot be a foreign principal.

MR. RICHENTHAL: That's true, but a U.S. citizen can be an intermediary for a foreign principal. So if we add that, I think we need to add what I just said; that is, Mr. Hana can be, indeed, we believe the evidence shows, that he was an intermediary for a foreign principal and same with

Ms. Menendez. The Court's instructions don't get to that level. My only point is that the jury will have the misimpression it's binary, foreign principal or not. In fact, it's in between, an intermediary.

MR. WEITZMAN: Your Honor, this is why we requested in our instruction that the government be required to identify who they're alleging is the foreign principal.

THE COURT: I just don't think that's the law. You want specificity. I don't see anywhere that that's the law.

MR. WEITZMAN: I understand, your Honor. We're preserving that issue. Right now the ambiguity in the instruction is that maybe Mr. Hana is the foreign principal because he's Egyptian or maybe Ms. Arslanian, because she's Lebanese. And that's not the law. They cannot be the foreign principal. Whether they're acting on behalf or as an intermediary is a different issue, but I think the jury needs to understand who can or cannot be a foreign principal.

MR. RICHENTHAL: So just to be clear, the Court's instruction says -- this is the penultimate sentence on the bottom of 15 -- As to Count Fifteen, the government charges that the goal of the conspiracy was to have a public official, Robert Menendez, act as an agent of a foreign principal; that is, the government of Egypt and Egyptian officials.

We're not going to argue that Ms. Menendez or Mr. Hana was the government of Egypt. We're not going to argue that Ms.

Menendez or Mr. Hana are Egyptian officials, because they're not. It's just not going to be said to the jury. So to the extent there's a definition, it's right here. The government of Egypt and its officials. What we're resisting is saying the negative, suggesting --

THE COURT: I understand.

Mr. Weitzman, Mr. Richenthal is correct. The government charges that the goal of the conspiracy was to have a public official, Robert Menendez, act as an agent of a foreign principal; that is, the government of Egypt and Egyptian officials. I think that really does it for you.

MR. WEITZMAN: Yes. I think the addition of a U.S. citizen may not be -- whether we identify codefendants or not --

THE COURT: But what this says is that the foreign principal alleged is the government of Egypt and Egyptian officials. It's right there. I think you have it.

MR. WEITZMAN: The next one I've got is --

THE COURT: I'm not adding what the defense is requesting.

Sir, go ahead.

MR. WEITZMAN: Venue.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. WEITZMAN: Charge 87, I think there are references throughout to any act, and I think it should just say any overt

1 act.

THE COURT: Government.

MR. RICHENTHAL: So, it depends what reference we're talking about. Right? There are times when overt act is what's required. There are times --

THE COURT: That certain counts have overt act requirements --

MR. RICHENTHAL: Right.

THE COURT: -- and others don't.

Now your turn.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Since we're talking about venue, I will just say we also have our own suggestion. When the case law talks about --

THE COURT: Wait. Let's deal with Mr. Weitzman's first.

I think that's correct, sir. It depends on the statute.

MR. WEITZMAN: While it is correct, your Honor, I think that in the first sentence, for example, there is no reference to overt act, and so when you're discussing acts in furtherance of the crimes charged, I think you're referring to overt act in that context.

THE COURT: Government.

MR. RICHENTHAL: So, the problem is there are counts here that don't have overt acts, and so the word "overt" has no

meaning to the jury for those counts, because they don't -
THE COURT: I think given the fact that some of the

counts require overt acts and others don't, it's cleaner if we

MR. WEITZMAN: OK. Then when you're discussing the substantive counts --

just say any act. Yes, I agree with the government on that.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. WEITZMAN: -- with respect to the substantive counts resting on a bribe being demanded, so on and so on and so on, at the end of the paragraph, you have "including acts that were part and parcel of this conduct," and I don't think that's correct statement of law of venue with respect to substantive counts. So it appears twice in that paragraph and in the next paragraph, and it's an undefined issue. What is part and parcel of conduct?

MR. RICHENTHAL: That language is from *United States* v. Stephenson, which is a Second Circuit case. It's cited as one of the several authorities in our requests to charge.

THE COURT: All right. Let me pull up Stephenson.

MR. RICHENTHAL: We're looking for the cite right now, your Honor.

THE COURT: What's the citation?

MR. RICHENTHAL: United States v. Stephenson, 895 F.2d 867, at pages 874 to 875. In that section of the decision, the Second Circuit is upholding venue where phone calls to New

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York -- let me start by giving the quote. The quote begins:

"Calls to New York were part and parcel of the offense of
demanding, seeking and agreeing to receive a bribe."

I incorporated certain alterations when I said that. the case says demand, seek and agree instead of demanding, seeking and agreeing, but that's a quote. It's a bribery case from -- I believe I can give the year. It's a Second Circuit case from 1990.

THE COURT: All right. I'll pull that up.

Just so the parties know, I think I may have something in the concluding instructions -- I may have taken it out -- saying that if they want any evidence they can ask for it.

What we now do, assuming the parties agree, is put everything on a thing that can then go into a computer that's put in the jury room. So they will have all of the evidence on these -- I'm not sure what they're called --

MR. FEE: USB.

THE COURT: That's it, USBs. That makes it a lot easier, and the computer will only be able to access that.

All right. Government, any issue?

MR. RICHENTHAL: No. We think that's fine.

THE COURT: OK. Mr. Lustberg, Mr. De Castro.

MR. LUSTBERG: No issue, your Honor.

MR de CASTRO: No issues, your Honor.

MR. SOLANO: No issue, your Honor.

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Thank you, Mr. Weitzman.

MR. RICHENTHAL: And this dovetails nicely with the only comment we had on venue. There are a few times, including, I think, the first sentence, where the proposed charge says foreseeable but doesn't have the word "reasonably" before it. We think it should always be reasonably foreseeable, as it is here.

THE COURT: I have no objection. So when foreseeable occurs in charge 87, venue, we'll put reasonably foreseeable.

MR. RICHENTHAL: And I think it comes up a few times.

THE COURT: All right. Tell me where.

MR. RICHENTHAL: We noticed the first sentence.

THE COURT: Reasonably foreseeable occurred within the Southern District of New York.

MR. RICHENTHAL: And then in the second paragraph, the sentence beginning "a preponderance of" ends by saying foreseeably occurred. So again, it would be reasonably foreseeably occurred.

THE COURT: Reasonably foreseeably occurred.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Then in the next sentence, that's the last sentence that ends on page 126, it right now ends "foreseeably occurred," so it's the same phrasing.

THE COURT: Oh, add in reasonably there.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Correct. I think those are the only times, if we caught it, other than the sentence beginning "with respect to conspiracy offenses," which we just talked about.

So on page 127, the first, the paragraph that begins "with respect to the conspiracy offenses," that sentence, the word "reasonably" should be inserted before foreseeably occurred.

THE COURT: Now I'm not sure where you are. The paragraph that begins "with respect to the substantive counts resting on the bribe." Go ahead.

MR. RICHENTHAL: No. The prior paragraph, your Honor. The one beginning "with respect to the conspiracy offenses."

THE COURT: We already have in reasonably foreseeable to the defendant you are considering.

MR. RICHENTHAL: No. The first sentence in the paragraph that begins "with respect to the conspiracy offenses, as I said."

THE COURT: That's right. Reasonably --

MR. RICHENTHAL: Exactly.

THE COURT: -- Foreseeably occurred. OK. Done.

MR. AGATA: If I can just ask one question. I may have missed it. That paragraph with respect to the conspiracy offenses, did we insert the word "overt" act?

THE COURT: No. We're not using overt act.

MR. AGATA: With respect to conspiracy? OK.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I thought this was the issue we resolved. I'm sorry. There are conspiracy counts here that don't have overt acts so we think it's going to mislead the jury.

Exactly. You've preserved that. 1 THE COURT: 2 MR. AGATA: Thank you, your Honor. 3 THE COURT: All right. That's it? 4 5 MR. SOLANO: Your Honor, I think there are a couple We have one. On 84, multiple conspiracies. 6 more. 7 THE COURT: Yes, sir. MR. SOLANO: We had just asked, your Honor did this 8 9 elsewhere when you described the elements, you reminded the 10 jury from time to time that it has to be found beyond a reasonable doubt. 11 12 THE COURT: Yes. 13 MR. SOLANO: And so here, we would just ask that that 14 be done. 15 THE COURT: Where? 16 MR. SOLANO: I think the logical place would be the 17 second paragraph, towards the end it says "is a question of 18 fact for you, the jury, to determine" and insert "beyond a 19 reasonable doubt." The second full paragraph, second sentence. 20 THE COURT: What's the view of the government? 21 MR. RICHENTHAL: So, Mr. Solano and I conferred at the 22 break about this. We didn't reach agreement. I appreciate 23 him, therefore, raising for the Court. 24 It's obviously the case that to the extent we have a 25 burden it's beyond a reasonable doubt other than with respect

to venue. The problem here is we don't have to prove, or to put a finer point on it, the jury doesn't have to find any particular number of counts for conspiracy. What they have to find is that the charged conspiracy existed.

Mr. Solano's language, I think it's unintentional, to my ear, suggests the jury must be unanimous on the number of conspiracies. That's not so. They simply have to be unanimous as to whether we've proven the ones we've charged. If several of the jurors thought there was some other conspiracy and their colleagues didn't think so, that's fine, as long as they're unanimous on the one we've charged. So the language Mr. Solano proposed, in our view, would inadvertently, I think, mislead the jury into thinking it must be unanimous as to the precise number of conspiracies. That's not so. They just have to be unanimous that we've met our burden that the charged ones existed.

MR. SOLANO: It's certainly not intended to reach that conclusion. It was more direct, to simply say that there has to be a single conspiracy found beyond a reasonable doubt.

Let me see if there's another place to put it.

MR. RICHENTHAL: One way to do that -- I'm doing this in the moment. I suppose if that's the concern, the sentence beginning "whether there existed" could read "whether the government has proven there existed."

We fully embrace our burden. We just don't want to go

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beyond our burden.
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MR. SOLANO: Actually, I think that would be acceptable. Can we add "whether the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt a single unlawful agreement"? That would be acceptable.

MR. RICHENTHAL: Well -- sorry.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RICHENTHAL: This is the danger of thinking in the moment. I apologize.

So, I'm going to take back my suggestion, and here's why.

The rest of this sentence refers to whether the jury concludes there's multiple agreements. We don't have to prove multiple agreements. Actually, unfortunately, I have suggested something that creates the very problem I'm trying to avoid.

Put differently, we have to prove the charged conspiracies existed and the defendant they're considering was a member.

THE COURT: I'm going to keep it the way it is, gentlemen.

All right. Next? Anything?

MR. WEITZMAN: Yes, your Honor.

We'd request a missing witness instruction, which we had proposed.

THE COURT: What's the theory?

MR. WEITZMAN: Your Honor, we subpoended a number of potential witnesses. We've subpoended the two AUSAs who handled the Daibes case. We subpoended someone from the State Department. We subpoended someone from the U.S.D.A. We made Touhy requests to the U.S. Attorney's Office and of those agencies, and they were declined.

THE COURT: I don't think I was aware of that.

MR. WEITZMAN: Yes. And so there's at least four or five witness, plus there's the Heritage witnesses, which we believe -- I understand your Honor may view it differently.

THE COURT: I'm shaking my head negatively because we've been over that with Heritage, but go ahead.

MR. WEITZMAN: Yes, but I think if the government had asked for their testimony, they would have received it.

THE COURT: No, sir. There's nothing in the record to suggest that.

MR. WEITZMAN: In any event, the *Touhy* requests, at a minimum, that we've made for numerous witnesses from the U.S.D.A., U.S. Attorney's Office and U.S. State Department are clearly not equally unavailable. They're in the control of the government, as are the ten AUSAs who attended the Abbe Lowell presentation but who were not called.

THE COURT: Let me see. I took that out. Let me see that charge in your draft, sir.

MR. WEITZMAN: It's page 36 of our draft.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I'm happy to respond whenever the Court would like.

THE COURT: Missing witnesses including not available to the defendant, is that what you're referring to?

MR. WEITZMAN: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: This is basically Sand.

MR. WEITZMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Let me just read it.

Yes. Government.

MR. RICHENTHAL: There's a process for *Touhy*. The defense engaged in it as to some but notably not all of the people he just identified. The process was completed. We, the prosecution team, do not control it. To our knowledge, the defense was satisfied with the process. Indeed, they were able to call the witnesses they believed offered material testimony in their case, including Mr. Khanna, who we chose to call instead but who testified when subject to cross, including Sellinger.

The other people, to the extent they were denied, were denied because they have utterly immaterial and inadmissible evidence.

THE COURT: What was denied?

MR. RICHENTHAL: So, I'm not intimately familiar with the ins and outs of the *Touhy* process, but I can say, in sum, my understanding is what was denied was, for example, calling

process what happened.

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to testify the line assistant U.S. attorneys in the District of New Jersey about not being influenced by Mr. Sellinger's recusal. Of course, that's already in the record. That's nothing the jury needs to hear about. It's not even disputed. I think they tried to call two different line assistant U.S. attorneys for that purpose. Mr. Sellinger himself testified.

THE COURT: You said they tried to call. Under this

MR. RICHENTHAL: So, the civil division of the U.S. Attorney's Office leads the *Touhy* process with respect to the Department of Justice. Other agencies of the United States have their own general counsel's offices and their own processes. We don't control the U.S. Department of Agriculture, for example, but those departments, to my knowledge, had a liaison role with the U.S. Attorney's Office civil division.

If Mr. Weitzman had been unhappy with the result of this process, he could have raised it -- I'm not exaggerating -- months ago. To raise it at the charge conference suggests out there there's witnesses with material testimony. That's the quote, material testimony.

THE COURT: This is something I was unfamiliar with in terms of the specifics until this moment.

Go ahead.

MR. RICHENTHAL: My point, with respect, is even if

Touhy did not exist -- that is, even if there were no process at all -- the defense correctly, in the footnote, says this instruction should only be given if applicable. The "if applicable" refers to a proper basis in evidence or the record before this Court that there is material testimony -- that's a direct quote -- that could have been given that the defense could not procure. They have identified none because there isn't any. It would be wildly improper at the last minute to suggest there's some magic witness out there they couldn't get, even if there were no process, which, of course, they actually went through and, to my knowledge, didn't object to.

MR. WEITZMAN: We did object, your Honor. We subpoenaed the witnesses and then --

THE COURT: Before me?

MR. WEITZMAN: No, not before you, your Honor. We objected with the U.S. Attorney's Office and with the agencies. We subpoenaed the witness, I believe it was Mr. Abdi, from the U.S.D.A. We subpoenaed a witness from the State Department, Ms. Cressy. We subpoenaed the two AUSAs who were in charge of the Daibes prosecution, and we were told that Vikas Khanna would be able to answer all questions regarding the Daibes prosecution, and instead he pled ignorance.

We also were denied the opportunity, your Honor, to question an employee of the U.S. Attorney's Office regarding the substance of the presentation by Abbe Lowell, and I am sure

that if we sought to subpoena Damian Williams or any of the AUSAs who were present there, that would have been denied.

The charge just says that if you believe that there are witnesses who were in the control of the government and you didn't hear from them, you can hold it against the government.

THE COURT: But presumably you're going to argue those individuals in the summation.

MR. WEITZMAN: Correct, your Honor, and they need to be told that that's a proper inference for them -- just in the same way that, right now, there's only one charge on missing witnesses and it's equally unavailable.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WEITZMAN: But not all missing witnesses were equally unavailable. There were some available to the government and not available to the defense. We tried subpoenaing them and we were refused.

MR. RICHENTHAL: That's just so false it's offensive. That is not the process.

THE COURT: Gentlemen, gentlemen --

MR. RICHENTHAL: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Gentlemen, gentlemen --

MR. RICHENTHAL: Your Honor, this instruction is designed to put the people at this table on trial. It is wrong. It is misleading. It should have no business before this jury. There is none -- none -- anything in the record at

all about what these people, some of whom they didn't even attempt to procure a subpoena for, would have said that this jury has any business hearing about. If the defense wants to argue that Mr. Sellinger's recusal had no effect on the case, there is abundant evidence, including from the mouth of Mr. Sellinger. The assistant U.S. attorneys they wanted to call -
THE COURT: Sellinger did say there was no effect.

THE COURT: Sellinger did say there was no effect.

That's correct.

MR. RICHENTHAL: So did Mr. Khanna. It's not actually even just Mr. Sellinger, and it's not disputed. We don't intend to argue it. So they purport to want the jury to think there are witnesses out there with exculpatory information when, in fact, they know it does not exist. It is wildly improper. It is wildly belated. It should be denied.

MR. WEITZMAN: Histrionics aside, your Honor -THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WEITZMAN: -- the fact that we were denied the opportunity to question a witness about what was said by Mr. Lowell, the fact that there were numerous AUSAs --

THE COURT: We've been over that. Go ahead.

MR. WEITZMAN: -- and U.S. Attorney and the deputy U.S. Attorney and the chief of the criminal division, none of which we could have called, are missing witnesses in the government's control. We're not putting the government on trial here, but it's an accurate statement.

THE COURT: Well, I think you are. 1 MR. WEITZMAN: It's an accurate statement. 2 3 THE COURT: You're making that argument, and I 4 certainly would have appreciated knowing of this issue before 5 2:10 in the end of the charging conference. 6 MR. WEITZMAN: Yes, your Honor. I apologize for that. 7 We did request the instruction. I understand that we did not alert your Honor to the numerous Touhys that were refused. 8 9 THE COURT: All right. I'm not going to grant the 10 request. You have the witness charge that's in there. 11 All right. Does that do it? 12 MR. RICHENTHAL: Just for the record, the Touhys that 13 were allegedly denied, that's not an accurate statement -- it's 14 a mixed bag because of the process -- that all happened before 15 When I said months, the date of the documents I'm 16 referring to is May 10, 2024. 17 MR. WEITZMAN: They were denied. They were denied. 18 THE COURT: Gentlemen, enough. 19 MR. SOLANO: One last issue. 20 THE COURT: Yes. 21 MR. SOLANO: I think it will be noncontroversial. 22 We started beyond this, but instruction No. 4 -- I'm 23 sorry, No. 6. 2.4 THE COURT: You're going to instruction No. 6. 25 right.

MR. SOLANO: This is the last one we have.

On page 13, where the Court is going to instruct the jury on reasonable doubt --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SOLANO: -- our request.

THE COURT: Reasonable doubt. My reasonable doubt charge has not, assuming this is my usual reasonable doubt charge, which I believe it is, not a single word has changed. It was specifically approved by the Second Circuit in another case. But go ahead, sir.

MR. SOLANO: I appreciate where this is going to go for me then, but the request was a single sentence that said a reasonable doubt may arise from the evidence or the lack of evidence. I think your Honor has given that sentiment elsewhere, but it's particularly important and supported by the case law in this instruction, so that would be it, to add a sentence that said "a reasonable doubt may arise from the evidence or the lack of evidence."

THE COURT: Government.

MR. RICHENTHAL: I think your Honor's charge, which has been given since time immemorial, is good and consistent with the case law, and there's no reason to mess with it.

THE COURT: Well, I haven't been on the bench since time immemorial, although in this case it seems like I have been. I'm going to keep the charge as I've always had it.

AFTERNOON SESSION

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2:40 p.m.

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THE COURT: All right. Bring the jury in.

You may be seated in the courtroom.

MR. MONTELEONI: In terms of trying to plan when to take a break --

THE COURT: I think with the jury probably it is a little awkward, but it would be two and a quarter hour stints, so I think they do need a break, yes.

MR. MONTELEONI: I'll try to look for a good time when I'm switching, if that's all right.

THE COURT: Yes, sure. Probably around -- it's now quarter to three -- around 4:15, something like that, between four and 4:15.

Understood, your Honor. And then MR. MONTELEONI: there's also in terms of where we break for the day, I think that there's a point that I can identify that I think we're likely to hit at five. It's a little before or a little after.

THE COURT: All right. The jury has indicated on a couple of occasions that they want to go home at five, but you have some leeway, of course.

MR. MONTELEONI: All right. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: As a matter of fact, probably at the break, I'll have my deputy ask if they could stay a little later tonight.

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MR. MONTELEONI: That's fair. It might be a couple minutes before five also.

THE COURT: I understand. I want as few interruptions as possible for all summations.

(Jury present)

THE COURT: You may be seated in the courtroom.

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

Now, you know you have heard all of the evidence. What remains are the summations. You know several things about the summations. You know the order of summations is set by The parties have no say in it. The government gets the first summation, and then each of the defendants will have his own summation, by his attorneys. And then the government gets a rebuttal summation. As I said, I think that derives from the fact that the government bears the burden of proof at all times, and you know what that burden of proof is.

The government bears the burden of proving its case against each defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and you must presume each defendant to be innocent until such time, if ever, you determine that the government has met its burden of proof in proving the defendant you are considering to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

You also know that what these lawyers are going to tell you is not evidence. That's important. They will tell you, I think, what they think, what they believe the evidence

Summation - Mr. Monteleoni

showed and almost certainly what conclusions they ask you to draw from that evidence. But it is not evidence. I want you to listen to what they have to say, but you decide what the evidence is. They don't.

Also, I'm the one who gives you instructions on the law. The lawyers don't. Now, they may say in the course of their summations that they believe the judge will instruct you later on thus and so. That's perfectly OK. But what's important is that you indeed listen to my instructions, not what they say the instructions are going to be or they think they're going to be.

All right. The first summation is by Mr. Monteleoni on behalf of the government.

Sir.

MR. MONTELEONI: Thank you.

THE COURT: And what we'll do is take a short break at some point, because otherwise it would be two and a quarter hours. That's too long. And around five, a little before or a little after, we'll find a logical time in Mr. Monteleoni's presentation to break. And then we'll pick it up tomorrow.

Sir.

MR. MONTELEONI: Thank you, your Honor.

On June 16, 2022, the FBI searched the home of Robert Menendez and his wife Nadine. They found envelope after envelope of cash -- cash stuffed in bags, cash stuffed in the

Summation - Mr. Monteleoni

pockets of Menendez's jackets, cash stuffed in Menendez's boots. They found a Mercedes-Benz convertible in the garage. They found 11 one-ounce gold bars worth about \$20,000, two one-kilogram gold bars worth almost \$60,000 each. And that day, other FBI agents seized phones from Menendez and his wife. You saw what they found on those phones. They found evidence, like photos of more gold, two more kilo bars, five more one-ounce bars -- on top of the ones that were found in the house -- and messages about more payments, payments to Menendez's wife for a fake job, payments to the company holding the mortgage on the very house that the FBI was searching, and they found evidence of Menendez directing and receiving reports from his wife as she collected those things for them.

At this trial, you learned where these things came from. You learned that they were bribes that Menendez took from Wael Hana and Fred Daibes in exchange for promises of official action. Those payments to the mortgage company and to Nadine for the fake job, Wael Hana made them through the halal company that the government of Egypt set him up with during this scheme. Envelope after envelope of the cash that was found at the Menendezes' home, Fred Daibes gave it. His fingerprints were all over the tape sealing up those envelopes, sometimes Menendez's fingerprints too. Other envelopes of cash were from people close to Hana. That Mercedes in the garage, Hana first promised it, but it was finally delivered by José

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Uribe, texts and payment records make clear as day. And that gold, that gold came from both Hana and Daibes. You saw the serial numbers match up. Hana gave seven one-ounce gold bars. Daibes gave nine one-ounce gold bars. And he also gave the four big ones, the one-kilo gold bars.

Why? Why did Daibes and Hana shower Menendez and his wife with these valuables? What were they getting when they parted with hundreds of thousands of dollars of gold, cash and other payments?

The promise of power. Robert Menendez, the senior U.S. senator from the state of New Jersey, the ranking member and then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, put his power up for sale. It wasn't enough for him to be one of the most powerful people in Washington. It wasn't enough for him to be entrusted by the public with the power to approve billions of dollars of U.S. military aid to foreign countries. It wasn't enough for him to have the ability to recommend who the president nominates to be the chief federal law enforcement officer for New Jersey.

No. Robert Menendez wanted all that power, but he also wanted to use it to pile up riches for himself and his So Menendez sold the power of his office. He promised wife. to take actions for Hana and Daibes in exchange for those bribes. He promised to approve military aid to Egypt, to provide Egypt with sensitive information about Americans

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stationed abroad and to help Egypt in other ways. He promised to pressure a U.S. Department of Agriculture official to stop opposing the monopoly that Egypt was giving to Hana's halal certification company. He promised to pressure the New Jersey attorney general to disrupt a criminal investigation and prosecution of associates of Hana and Uribe. He promised to recommend a candidate for U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey who he thought he could influence to affect Daibes's federal criminal prosecution, and Daibes asked him to advance a resolution praising the government of Qatar, which Daibes thought would help him land a multi-million dollar investment.

Through the course of this trial, you've seen exactly how they did it. You heard all the evidence. You heard how a sitting U.S. senator took hundreds of thousands of dollars of bribes from two businessmen in exchange for the promise to use his official power to enrich them and to protect them and their associates from anyone in the government who would stand in their way. You saw again and again a clear pattern of corruption. Again and again, from promises of military aid to requests to advance a Senate resolution, from seeking to influence the Department of Agriculture to influencing the New Jersey U.S. Attorney's Office, seeking to influence that or the New Jersey attorney general's handling of a state insurance fraud prosecution, the pattern was the same. Menendez was in His wife, Nadine, was his go-between, demanding

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payment, receiving payment and passing messages, but always -always -- keeping him informed, and in which Hana and Daibes,
sometimes along with José Uribe, they would identify the people
they wanted to protect, identify the acts they wanted performed
for foreign governments to advance their own businesses and
provide the bribes that ended up in Menendez and Nadine's
house, one scheme to protect and enrich the people who were
paying bribes to Menendez.

What I'm going to do in this closing argument is go through each of the charges. And I'm going to go through each element -- that is, each part of each charge -- and I'm going to show how the evidence that you've seen at trial proves each element beyond a reasonable doubt. There's been a lot of evidence, and there are a number of counts. So I'm going to be going through them for the rest of the day today and for some tomorrow to explain how every part of every count is proven. And after getting through that last count, I'll sum up a few points that apply to all the counts.

Now, let's talk about these elements.

Judge Stein will instruct you on the law, and those instructions control, but I'm going to talk today about what I expect he'll instruct you. I'm going to go count by count, talk about how the evidence that you've seen in this trial establishes each of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

And I'm just going to talk about the most relevant portions of

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the evidence here, but if there's something you want to see more of, you'll have it all available to you in the jury room.

First, let's go over what the counts of the indictment There are 18 counts, but they fall into a few general are. groups.

First, there are corruption counts related to the Egypt conduct. That includes both Menendez's promise to aid, promises to aid the government of Egypt in various ways and also to protect Hana's halal monopoly that the government of Egypt gave him. This group of counts includes charges against all of the defendants.

So, second, there are corruption counts related to the New Jersey attorney general conduct; that is, Menendez's promise to disrupt the New Jersey State prosecution and investigation by contacting the New Jersey attorney general, Gurbir Grewal. These include charges against Menendez and Hana.

Third, there are corruption counts related to the New Jersey U.S. Attorney and Qatar conduct; that is, Menendez's promise to disrupt Daibes's federal prosecution and his attempts to help Daibes get the investment from this company linked to Qatar. These include charges against Menendez and Daibes.

Now, fourth, there are the corruption conspiracy counts, which include between them agreements to commit all of

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those corruption offenses. As I expect the judge will instruct you, a conspiracy to commit a crime is just an agreement to commit a crime, and that's a separate charge from the charges for the underlying crimes in those first three groups. And those are what the law calls substantive offenses. So these corruption conspiracy counts include charges against all the defendants.

Fifth, there are the foreign influence counts. Those relate to Menendez's actions and promise to act on behalf of Egypt while he was a U.S. senator. These include charges against Menendez and Hana.

And finally, there are the obstruction counts. Those relate to Menendez's agreement with Daibes to obstruct Daibes's federal prosecution and also to Menendez's own attempt to obstruct the Southern District of New York's investigation into this conduct. These include charges against Menendez and Daibes.

So it's a lot of charges. It's a lot of evidence, because this was a years-long scheme. It had a lot of overlapping players and parts. And I'm going to go charge by charge and break it down for you so you can see how each part is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

First, we're going to add in some blank lines to this chart for each of the counts so that we can keep track of the counts that we've been through as we go.

The first pair of counts that I want to talk to you about is the substantive bribery charges, Counts Five and Six, related to Egypt. Count Five relates to Menendez receiving bribes from Hana and Daibes, and Count Six relates to Hana and Daibes offering and giving bribes to him. So since these two bribery offenses — they're basically sort of different sides of the same coin — I'm going to talk about them together, and I'm going to spend some of the most time on these two counts because, in a way, they're the building block of most of the rest of the other counts.

The first element of both counts is that Menendez was a public official. This one is undisputed. No dispute that Menendez was a member of Congress, and I expect that Judge Stein will instruct you that members of Congress are public officials. So we're done with element one. They're not all going to be quite this fast.

All right. Second is a thing of value. Now, here, I expect the judge will instruct you that for Count Five,

Menendez must have directly or indirectly demanded, sought,

received, accepted or agreed to receive something of value or

else for another person or entity at his direction or for his

indirect benefit to receive something of value. I'm just going

to use receive and accepted as a shorthand for all those verbs

here.

And then similarly, for Count Six, for Hana and

Summation - Mr. Monteleoni

Daibes, they must have offered, promised or given money or something else of value either to a public official or for the benefit of a public official. I'm going to refer to that as offering or giving. So it's important to note here that for both of those counts the thing doesn't have to go to Menendez directly. It's enough if a thing of value is offered or given to or received or accepted indirectly. So that is by someone else that Menendez wants it given to. And here, as you know, for a lot of those things of value that other person was Nadine, his wife.

Now, here, there is some dispute.

First, there's no real dispute that Menendez accepted things like meals from Hana, like you see in the guest check on the left of the screen or transportation from Daibes, which you see Daibes offering in the center image, and then you see the cell site records showing that that transportation was given over on the right. There's no dispute that Menendez got these things, that Hana and Daibes provided these things. That actually is enough just to find this element. I expect Judge Stein will instruct you that a thing of value includes things like intangibles, and you know, that they just have to be something that the giver or recipient considers to be worth something. Doesn't have to be a lot, just something. But obviously, these minor things are only a tiny piece of the things of value that Menendez received and that Hana and Daibes

1 provided.

So let's look at the ways that the evidence proves that Menendez received and accepted things of value and that Daibes and Hana gave them to him, directly and indirectly, through Nadine. We're going to be coming back, by the way, to the implications of the giving of some of these things of value later, but for now let's just focus on how you know that Menendez, in fact, received and accepted them, either personally or indirectly through Nadine.

First, there was the sham job. Right from the beginning of the scheme, Hana offered payment to Nadine in the form of a job, and Nadine made sure Menendez knew it, like she made sure that he knew a lot of things you're going to see throughout the scheme. So here, as far back as April of 2018, very early on in the scheme, she told Hana that she was talking to Menendez and that she was going to ask him about the two deals. So right from the beginning there's a discussion of some sorts of things that are going to result in her getting paid in some way.

Now, what you're looking at here, you may recognize, is just one line from one of the government's summary charts, which you may recall were featured at some length during this trial. We're not going to go through all the evidence with you today, because you sat through the trial, but if you want to go through any of it as you deliberate, you can just write down

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the exhibit numbers and it's going to be there for when you deliberate if you want to look at it again.

This one is from Government Exhibit 1302. That's the chronological summary chart that's been focused mainly on this Egypt conduct that we went over. All right. So that was April.

Now, May 2018, here, Nadine is sending an email to Menendez telling Menendez that Will and the general, this general, got her clearance for a project. Is this a volunteer project? Obviously not. This is something that's going to get her paid. We're going to come back to this message in a bit, but right now just note how early this is that she's telling him about things that are going to get her paid.

So menendez also knew that Hana might actually get her some sort of job with the Egyptian government. This is a message that he sends in January 2019, when she's on her way, you saw from the summary chart, with Hana to talk to an Egyptian embassy official about work doing some import-export to Egypt. So this is all right from the beginning. But you really find out about just what Hana had been promising her a few months later when he fails to deliver.

So here, in the spring of 2019, Nadine is very explicit that Hana promised her a job and a job paying about \$10,000 a month. Here, in this version, it's 2,500 every week, which is a bit more than \$10,000 a month, but it's close.

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she's saying she kept every promise to Will. That's not because she's done work for the halal company. It's not in operation by this point. No. The promises that she kept to Will are because she got Menendez to help Egypt and to promise help to Egypt, as you've seen and as we'll go over. So Hana obviously knew about these promises of payment to Nadine. And here, Nadine is telling Hana's lawyer, Howard Dorian, and Howard Dorian is desperately trying to keep her happy in the messages around this time period. These promises are not just to Nadine. Hana's also telling his Egyptian contacts about these promises that he's making to pay her.

Here, he is sending his Egyptian contact, HH HH, a salary list, and this is a list of salaries for this new halal company that is just getting set up. And in the salary list, he is telling his Egyptian contact that Nadine is getting That obviously is the same as the \$10,000 a month that she wants. And it also makes her the second highest paid employee in the company. So, of course, Hana knows that he's offering her something of value -- \$10,000 a month. But did Menendez know about this job?

Of course he did. Nadine, here, gets inside information that Hana is going to have a halal certification monopoly handed to him. This is April 8, 2019, before the U.S. Department of Agriculture got notified that there was going to be a monopoly. Nadine learns from Hana, and right away she

passes it on to Menendez. Menendez knew before Bret Tate. She says "seems like halal went through." She doesn't explain more about what that means because she doesn't need to. Menendez already knows. Says "it might be a fantastic 2019 all the way around" -- fantastic for Hana because he's going to start raking in huge monopoly profits, and that fantastic 2019 is going to make its way all the way around to Nadine and Menendez, because they're going to get paid from those profits.

So it's not just that Menendez hears this directly texted to him, he also takes actions to get Nadine paid. Gets a lawyer to set up her company. He's getting her the lawyer to do that. He gives her advice on looking online for a consulting contract to paper it when she can't find a contract for her consulting company at Staples.

He knows that a check is coming in, either from Hana or from Daibes. You see here, June 13, 2019, this shows you that by this point Daibes, who's been financially backing Hana's business, Daibes is part of this bribe scheme too. Even as early as June 13, 2019, he's so much a part of it that in this message Nadine is actually worried about his vacation schedule when she's trying to figure out when she's going to get paid. It's not just talk. It's not just talk for Menendez or for Daibes.

The first \$10,000 check for the sham job, August 2019, Daibes personally puts into Menendez's hand: "Nadine, I

personally gave Bob a check for September." And you know
Daibes is right when he says to Nadine he personally gave Bob a
check for September, because Nadine, who's been asking for
money and saying that she has a list of demands for how much
she's owed, she then goes and checks. She sends Daibes back
this handwritten rundown of what she believes that she's owed.
And this rundown is \$10,000 less than what she had originally
asked Fred Daibes for, because after Fred Daibes clarified that

he had personally gave Bob a check for September, she thanks him for clarifying. She says, "thank you very much for clarifying," subtracts that \$10,000 check. \$10,000 check from Hana handed by Daibes to Menendez.

That right there is the thing of value. Element done. And there's no reasonable dispute that Menendez knew about this payment. He held it in his own hand. And by the way, that May 1 date that she's sort of listing as the first of the month when she's owed payment, if you remember, May 1 is the date that this halal company monopoly started. So right from the beginning she's talking about getting money for this company. But we could be done with this element if that was the only thing of value, but there is so much more.

Another \$10,000 check is coming in late September.

And again, Daibes, Hana and Menendez, they all know about it.

Menendez knows about it because, as you see here, Nadine

complains to him about the check not coming fast enough. She

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leaves him a voice mail, saying I really want my check. is also the check that Menendez tells Nadine not to put anything in writing about, because he knows what they are doing is wrong, because he does not want to get caught. He says no, you should not text or email.

We'll come back to that. But Daibes knows about this check too because Nadine calls him about it. She leaves him a long voice mail on September 27 of 2019, and then after that call, Daibes gets Hana to write it because the check is issued, as you see here, the next day, another \$10,000 check that Daibes and Hana provide to Nadine, with Menendez's approval, another proof of a thing of value element. But there's more.

A third check. Daibes again offers to give this one right to Menendez. I have the envelope for Nadine. Menendez tries to distance himself from it. You see here he's saying well, actually, just mail it to her. But obviously the point isn't whether he gets Daibes to send it by mail rather than by accepting another hand delivery. The point is Menendez knows that hana writes the check, Daibes is involved in the delivering of it, and Nadine is receiving it with Menendez's approval, another thing of value.

But it's not just the checks to Nadine's sham consulting company. Hana also pays to bring Nadine's mortgage He doesn't want to, but he does it. Does Menendez know that? Of course he does.

Now, at first, she keeps it from him, and so you see here, this is what it looks like when Menendez doesn't know something. This is on the few occasions when something is being kept from Menendez, he complains, he asks, he brings it up. As you see here, he's complaining that she's not telling him what's going on here. Remember, like Michael Soliman told you, he is detail-oriented. You don't get to be the chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee by being clueless.

But we also see from this it's actually out of the ordinary. This particular thing, her delinquency on the mortgage she keeps from him for a while. But as you see, again and again and again, she's looping him in on big things and on little things. So, about the mortgage, she keeps it from him for a while, but then she realizes she's going to have to tell Menendez when they get back from a vacation on July 5. She leaves this long message for Daibes and says that she's going to tell Bob on Friday, that's July 5, after they get back.

Well, that's what she says, but does she do it? She sure does. A few days after getting back, she has told Bob all about it so that she could just mention in this text message to Bob. Just in the course of a message about how she's having a productive day, she says that she double-checked about the payments. She doesn't have to explain what the payments are for, and Menendez doesn't ask her what she's talking about because she has already explained it. And then Menendez stays

on top of this.

Menendez calls her in July and tells her to call Daibes. You see the call from Menendez to Nadine there, and then a few minutes later, the call from Nadine to Daibes. And what she says here is -- she's actually a little cagey about who called. She says, I just got a phone call asking me to give you a call.

We'll come back to that sort of cageyness there, but Daibes clearly gets the message. He immediately calls Nadine, who immediately reports back to Menendez. You can see this is just minutes later. Daibes is calling her back, and she's immediately keeping Menendez posted. And then Menendez keeps following up. And so when nothing has been done, he has Nadine call Daibes back to get the payment made: Bob called me today to find out if everything's been taken care of. Bob insisted on me letting you know.

So, obviously, Nadine benefits from claiming that

Menendez has been following up about it, but that's what the

records show. She was keeping him in the loop every step of

the way. And Daibes is an old friend of Menendez. She's

telling Daibes that Menendez knows about this payment. And

she's telling Daibes that Menendez has been following up about

this payment.

If that wasn't true, if Daibes thought that Menendez knew about this and Menendez didn't actually know, how could

she stop Menendez from finding out about it the next time he has dinner with Fred Daibes or has a phone call with him or texts with him? She can't. She didn't. Menendez knew all the along. Hana and Daibes's bribe payments were secret, but they weren't secret from Menendez. Another thing of value from Hana, with Daibes's help, with Menendez's approval. Another way that this element is proven. But there's more.

Hana sends them an elliptical exercise machine. It's worth thousands. It's for Bob. Your elliptical we put together at 9 a.m. Monday morning, and it's there in their bedroom, while they're married. Obviously, Hana sent it and Menendez received it.

Then there's the gold. Hana gave Nadine a total of about \$12,000 in one-ounce Asahi gold bars. These are bars that he bought in June 2021, months after they were married. So again, he knew that they were both going to benefit from them. And Daibes -- Daibes gives Menendez one of the kilo gold bars when Menendez and Nadine Menendez come back from a trip to Egypt and Qatar, on October 18, 2021. They land on October 17. Daibes stops by with doughnuts the next day. And right after Daibes has left, Menendez googles the price of a kilo of gold for the first time. This wasn't just curiosity. Menendez never googled the price of gold at all before 2018.

And here, in 2019, this might be just curiosity. Here, he's just googling for the price of gold without a

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quantity, just a commodity, spot price of gold. But here, this

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is just when Fred Daibes happened to stop by with doughnuts. This is the first time Menendez's search history reflects a search for a kilo of gold. A few things on this. This is Menendez doing the searching. One minute before he was searching for how much is one kilo of gold he was sending out a letter of recommendation. So the things that you heard the defense sort of suggesting about trying to blame his wife for his Google searches and the gold is just plain wrong.

Now, let me be clear. The defense has absolutely no burden in this case. The burden is on us at all times, and we embrace it. Defense counsel does not have to ask any questions of any witnesses. They do not have to make any arguments, but when they do, like they did here, you can and you should scrutinize them and ask if they're consistent with the evidence that you've seen and heard. When you do, you find that the idea that Menendez's wife is to blame for the gold does not make sense and does not square with the evidence. This is him searching, not her.

And when is he searching for the price of a kilo of gold for the first time in his life? Right after Fred Daibes stops by. You know that from the cell site records, like the records that you see in the bottom corner of the slide. You also know that from the text about how he brought doughnuts too when he came.

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By the way, the point of the doughnut text isn't that doughnuts is code for gold. It's that Daibes actually came by in person, bringing doughnuts with the gold. So menendez is searching for the price of a kilo of gold right after Fred Daibes comes by. And what did the FBI find in Menendez's house a few months later, in June? Two kilos of gold. And what did Nadine take pictures of? Just before selling two kilos of gold to Vasken Khorozian, which you heard about, she takes a picture of two more kilos of gold.

What do all of these four kilos of gold have in They had serial numbers showing that they belonged to Daibes, the man who stopped by just when Menendez googled the price of a kilo of gold for the first time in his life.

So all of this talk about Nadine having family gold is a distraction. This case doesn't have to do with jewelry. doesn't have to do with gold coins. It has to do with something very specific, which is kilo bars of gold. There's actually no evidence that Nadine ever had kilo bars of gold from her family. Even that handwritten family inventory that you saw just said that the gold bars added up to three kilos, but it didn't say that they're actually one-kilogram bars. And even if Nadine's sister Katia didn't remember if she ever saw Nadine with any kilo gold bars, but even if Nadine did have any kilo bars from her family around the time when she was in college in the 1980s, she obviously didn't have them in 2021,

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her house.

And the only kilo bars which have serial numbers that

after she had been struggling to pay her bills and almost lost

are in evidence, the only ones have serial numbers matching
Daibes's gold inventory. And if Menendez was googling Nadine's
family gold, why did he do it for the first time in his life
when Daibes, who was, in fact, the source of the kilos of gold
that were found in Menendez's house and found pictured on
Menendez's wife's phone when he stopped by? And why did he do
it again, here, after meeting up with Daibes in 2022, right
after a dinner? He's doing another kilo of gold search. Again
and again, Menendez is googling the price of a kilo of gold
after meeting in person with Daibes, and Daibes is the actual
source of the kilo bars of gold that are found in Menendez's
house and found pictured on his wife's phone.

It's not a coincidence. It's a bribe. It's a thing of value. It's another way that you know this element is proven.

We'll talk more about the gold when we come to some of the later counts, but right there, you know that Menendez is getting yet another thing of value. That's not even all the things of value. Hana sent over things like an air purifier. Early in the scheme, Hana promised that his business associate, Nader Moussa, would do some carpeting for Nadine. That fell through, but Hana's lawyer, Howard Dorian -- you may remember

him. He's the one who asked Bret Tate, the U.S.D.A. official, for what halal certification was right before Hana's company was about to get the monopoly on all halal certification. This is Howard Dorian. He sent Moussa over to do some household tasks so that Nadine and Menendez wouldn't cancel their meetings with the Egyptian officials. And some of the cash in the house, including what we see here in Menendez's boot, that was in envelopes with Moussa's fingerprints on them or some with fingerprints of Gus Lita, one of Hana's employees. So more things of value from Hana to Menendez. So we're done with the thing of value element. You only need one thing of value for this element, but you have one after another after another.

Now on to the third and the fourth elements of these bribery counts, because the same evidence proves the third and the fourth element. I'm going to talk about them together.

The third is whether the thing of value is given or received in exchange for official action, what the law calls a quid pro quo, and the fourth is whether the defendants had corrupt intent.

Corrupt intent I expect the judge will instruct you is conscious wrongdoing. It's a bad state of mind. I expect the judge will instruct you the defendant doesn't have to be aware of the specific law he's violating. He can have corrupt intent even if he has both an unlawful intent to seek a bribe but also some other noncriminal intent in part. And for the quid pro

quo, I expect that Judge Stein will instruct you that what matters is whether a thing of value is offered, given or received in exchange for a promise to take what is known as official action.

To be clear, the public official doesn't have to take any action at all. The promise alone is enough. And you know that from your common sense. If a politician is promising to abuse his power for money, that right there is corruption. And if what he's promising instead is actually good, if he's promising to do something good in exchange for money, then he shouldn't be demanding money for it either. The promise itself is the crime. But the promise does have to involve official action, which the judge will instruct you on. And I expect the judge will instruct you that could either be action Menendez takes with his own powers or an attempt by Menendez to advise or pressure another public official to take official action.

So for these counts, if Menendez promised to approve military aid to Egypt, like a foreign military sale or a grant of foreign military financing money, that's a promise of official action. Or if Menendez promised or attempted to pressure or advise the U.S.D.A. to stand down on their efforts to stop the monopoly, to change the official position of the United States on a matter related to U.S. foreign policy, well, that's a promise of official action, or that's an attempt to take official action.

Now, obviously, on this point, I expect Judge Stein to instruct you that just having a meeting or picking up a phone, having a meeting or a phone call without more, that's not official action. But when the official makes a promise of official action at a meeting or uses a phone call to advise or pressure another official to take action, well, that is official action. Satisfies the quid pro quo elements.

So these two elements regarding a corrupt quid pro quo, those are the ones we're going to spend the most time on, because they're really at the heart of the dispute between the

quo, those are the ones we're going to spend the most time on, because they're really at the heart of the dispute between the parties here. The question for you is when Menendez and Nadine were receiving and accepting these things of value from Daibes and Hana, did Menendez have, or did he convey to Hana and Daibes that he had, corrupt intent to be influenced in the performance of an official act?

(Continued on next page)

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MR. MONTELEONI: On the flip side, when they were offering and giving things of value to Menendez and Nadine, did Hana and Daibes have the corrupt intent to influence an official act? You know they did. Your common sense tells you that they did. And the overwhelming evidence at trial has proven that they did beyond a reasonable doubt.

Let's go through six different reasons why you know that these elements are satisfied, and Menendez, Hana, and Daibes are guilty.

How do we know they had corrupt intent and engaged in a quid pro quo? The first reason is the timeline. You've heard the saying "actions speak louder than words." Watch the defendants' actions. Again and again, when he knew that there was money on the line, for him and Nadine, Menendez sprung into action to take or promise official action. And Hana and Daibes sprung into action to pay him for it.

Let's start with the very early stages. May 28, 2018. Nadine and Hana by this point have already arranged a meeting with Menendez and General Shawky, the Egyptian defense attache, two months previously. And a few weeks ago, Menendez has given Egypt through Hana sensitive information about the personnel at the U.S. embassy. By this point, Menendez has also given Hana information on holds that another U.S. senator had placed on aid to Egypt based on human rights concerns.

But now, in this message here, Nadine has a new

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request. She wants Menendez to polish up a response by Egypt to those very same human rights concerns. So, what does she do to motivate him? She says she's going to get paid. The General and Will have given her clearance for a project. What type of project do you need clearance for? You don't need clearance for a volunteer project. You need clearance for something that will get you paid.

So May 28, 2018, 4:26 p.m., what does Menendez do when he gets this? 8:34 p.m. that day, he writes the Egyptian government's response. He is a U.S. senator. One of his colleagues said let's not send so much aid to Egypt because of their human rights record. And for years Senator Menendez had a reputation as a critic of Egypt. All of a sudden, when he hears Nadine could get paid, within hours, Menendez writes up a response from Egypt based on some talking points that Hana had sent through Nadine.

He writes up this response saying don't worry about these human rights concerns. Give us -- that means give us, Egypt -- our money. We're going to come back to this later in the quid pro quo, and we'll come back to this when we talk about the charges that Menendez was acting as an agent of Egypt.

Right now consider just the way this timing shows a corrupt quid pro quo. Is this letter itself an official act?

No. You know what it is? It is a promise of one. Remember,

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this funding is going to come before him as the ranking member of the SFRC. These human rights concerns will come before him, too. Here, what he's saying by writing this letter is I'm not going to give you too hard a time on these human rights concerns because, look, I'm writing your rebuttal to them. does it just like that.

A few weeks later his promises of official action get much more specific. So, Hana and Nadine set up a meeting on July 25, 2018, between Menendez and General Shawky, that Egypt defense attache, the same Egyptian general they'd arranged the meetings with before. This meeting was part of a delegation that was making the rounds to a lot of different people in Washington asking for military aid. But the dinner afterward was special. So first, Hana and Menendez arranged the July dinner a few weeks before, in June. What you see here is this June dinner that they're having at Mr. Chow, a Chinese restaurant here in Midtown Manhattan. And while they're here in Midtown at Mr. Chow in June, while he's there with Menendez, Hana texts the date and time for this July meeting and for the July dinner to Shawky. He did it while he was out at Mr. Chow setting the time and date for that meeting.

So in July, then, after the meeting, when the time came for the dinner, this is a dinner that General Shawky was hosting, what you see here is General Shawky is expressing to Wael Hana how he is really stressed out and worried he

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committed a gaff by not seating Menendez next to Nadine at the dinner. But it turns out, Shawky didn't have to worry.

Because the next day, Menendez texts Nadine to tell Hana he's going to approve Egypt's tank ammunition. Nadine takes a screenshot. Screenshot of another promise of an official act. Again, after Menendez had heard back in May that Nadine was going to get paid. Going to work on that project for the general and Hana.

But then when we get to the spring of 2019, the timing is even clearer. In March 2019, Nadine hasn't been paid yet. And she makes clear she's been getting promises of a job by Hana for a year. All the way back to that first meeting she set up for Hana and the Egyptian defense attache with Menendez. She says it's been a year of broken promises from March 2019 That takes you back to March 2018. And that is the month when there was that first meeting that General Shawky had at Menendez's office set up by Hana and Nadine.

So, she's complaining about this to Howard Dorian,
Hana's lawyer, but she doesn't just complain about it to him.
She's also obviously talking to Menendez about it. She's
leaving messages the next day, talking about how she refuses to
set up dinners for Hana.

In this voice messages you'll see she doesn't explain why in this message she's refusing to set up a dinner for Hana. She doesn't have to. Menendez knows about Hana's promises to

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pay her already. So this is one of a huge number of calls and texts that you have seen about Nadine keeping Menendez updated. She is not keeping him in the dark. She's letting him know something as basic as the fact she is not planning a dinner. That's the level of detail in her updates. You can tell from the context she's told him a lot more too.

In April, Nadine still hasn't gotten paid by Hana, but she does tell Menendez she's going to. Seems like halal went through. Now, remember, Menendez has worked on Nadine's résumé. He understands she does not have consulting experience. She doesn't have a consulting track record. He knows that this is not a real job for the company. That it is a way to collect payments in exchange for Menendez's promises.

A few weeks later, Menendez takes another meeting with Ahmed Helmy. This is one of the Egyptian officials that Hana has been setting him up with. Someone you can see from the text Hana has regularly been taking orders from this Helmy.

Hana is saying the quiet part loud. He's talking about the halal company, the company that's going to pay the Nadine in the meeting. It appears from what Nadine is telling Menendez that Helmy is actually angry at Hana for talking about the halal in the meeting, while Menendez and Helmy want to talk about issues related to military aid. They want to talk about things like the case of April Corley. April Corley is the American who is injured in an Egyptian air strike.

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And here's another thing about this meeting with Helmy and Hana and Nadine. Not on the calendar that Menendez's staff keeps for him. This is not an ordinary meeting. meeting that Menendez wants kept off the books because it's another meeting in which he's putting his power up for sale. Maybe it was smart for him to keep it off the calendar, because the halal business came up. But you know he doesn't want Sarah Arkin, who is pressing on him to be more vocal about human rights, at this meeting.

What do they do after the meeting? Well, that evening, the evening of this meeting, is when they go out to That's when the FBI catches Nadine offering what Morton's. else can the love of my life do for you. Turns out, we find out what in the next two days.

Hana gets mad the day after that Morton's steakhouse Mad about the USDA criticizing his monopoly. That criticism is getting press in Egypt, and he sends an article reporting on the criticism and a translation to Nadine. Nadine sends it to Menendez, and within minutes, Menendez has his staff send it to Undersecretary McKinney. Not just Menendez's staff. The article was following up on a call Menendez personally made to Ted McKinney, the undersecretary of Agriculture. And not just any call.

Before we talk about the call itself, I want to pause here for a moment. As you've seen throughout this trial, the

a corrupt quid pro quo.

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Egypt part of the scheme involved many players, multiple bribes, different kinds of actions Menendez promised, all spanning about 4 years. But this one incident, the McKinney call, and the bribes surrounding it, is all you need to convict on the Egypt bribery counts. If you consider what Menendez said on the call, in the context of what happened in the few days before and after the call, it includes everything you need to find him guilty on Counts Five and Six, just this one brief chapter. Thing of value, in exchange for a promise of official action, and Menendez following through on that promise. That's

So if you find that Menendez in fact made that call in exchange for Hana's promises of payments to Nadine, that's all you need to convict Menendez and Hana of Counts Five and Six, and as we'll see, it becomes enough to convict Daibes as well a few months later when Daibes actually delivers one of those bribes to Menendez.

Of course, you have a ton more because there were plenty of other bribes and promises of action related to Egypt, which we'll talk about. But the McKinney piece alone makes each defendant guilty on these counts.

So turn back to the timeline of events surrounding this McKinney call. So we just talked about how a few weeks before Menendez got texts from Nadine she's going to get paid from the halal monopoly, might be a fantastic 2019 all around,

and then we've also looked at Menendez's incredibly swift actions to make the call, right after meeting with Hana and Ahmed Helmy, right after that steakhouse dinner where Nadine offers Menendez's help, and then minutes after getting this article texted to him.

So what happened on that call? You already know a lot just from the timeline of hard evidence. This is a call that McKinney needs to reassure his staff about. A call that makes the undersecretary of agriculture for trade and foreign agricultural affairs feel that he needs to tell the staff at the embassy that he has their back.

So just from the documents, just from the timeline, you can tell what's happening. But you don't just have to look at the documents. McKinney testified, and he told you what happened on that call, he told you. And what happened on that call was exactly what Hana wanted.

Menendez demanded that McKinney stop interfering, stop interfering. Those words were stuck in McKinney's memory. Cut out his efforts to make Egypt change its mind about Hana's monopoly. Reverse the USDA's policy position and just let Hana have his monopoly.

It was a shocking call that you could tell clearly left an impression on McKinney. And that's because Menendez was being as forceful as he could to help Hana keep that monopoly. Using his power as a senator to try to pressure

McKinney to change the USDA's position.

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Remember, doesn't matter whether the pressure on McKinney actually worked. What matters is Menendez tried to pressure him.

So the timeline leading up to that call shows that when Menendez knows there is money in it for Nadine, he swings into action. From zero to making a call that alarms the undersecretary of agriculture enough that he has to tell his professional staff that he has their back.

Menendez gets the request from Hana. He gets right on it like it's his job, because it is. Because he's getting paid for it through Nadine.

You can tell that with what happens after with the sham job. The follow through after the job makes the corrupt quid pro quo undeniably clear. Not even a week after Menendez's call to McKinney that you see Hana here telling his Egyptian contact Nadine is going to be getting \$120,000 a year. Not even a week after that official act attempted that there is this thing of value being promised and set up. You can stop right here in the timeline and that's all you need to convict Menendez and Hana on these counts. This text tells you Hana is making good on these promises of payment in exchange for Menendez's call to McKinney just days earlier. You have even more.

Week after that is when Menendez set up Nadine with

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the lawyer to form her consulting company. The week after that, later in June is when Nadine's asking Menendez if the check coming from Daibes or from Hana. Then by mid July Nadine has told Menendez about the mortgage company payment, and Menendez is urging her to follow up with Daibes to get it paid. Bob insisted on letting me know. On me letting you know, rather.

But he doesn't stop there. At the end of July,

Menendez is telling Nadine to tell Fred Daibes her company name
so that Daibes can write the check. And then one month later,

Fred Daibes is personally putting a \$10,000 check into

Menendez's hand. And at that point, when Daibes is delivering
one of the bribe payments himself, is where you get all you
need to convict Daibes on these counts, too. Just this
sequence.

From Nadine texting seems like halal went through in April, to Menendez calling McKinney to protect Hana's halal monopoly in May, Hana beginning to put Nadine on the payroll days later, Menendez setting up a sham consulting company for Nadine in June, pressing Daibes to get Hana to pay the mortgage from that company in July, and getting a \$10,000 check from Hana put into his hand by Daibes in late August. That sequence gives you all you need to prove Counts Five and Six against all the defendants. You can begin and end with this sequence surrounding the McKinney call to convict all the defendants on

1 the Egypt bribery counts. But of course there is so much more.

The timeline alone shows you this whole time Menendez is still promising more help to Egypt. Right after calling McKinney, he is fielding a request which comes from Ahmed Helmy to Hana, passed from Hana to Nadine, to him. To help out in Egypt's negotiations with April Corley, who is injured in an Egyptian air strike. Ahmed Helmy is saying our decision is we already gave our final offer. 2 million and not a single dollar more. They don't want to offer more money to this injured plaintiff, and that is the case that Helmy sends Hana images of a document from, Hana sends them to Nadine, and Nadine sends them to Menendez.

Doesn't stop there. In September, Helmy has a question for Menendez. So he asks Hana is this true? Hana tries to get through to Nadine. Then he connects with Daibes who calls Menendez. Daibes reports back to Hana who gets the message back to Helmy. All in less than 20 minutes. What was Helmy asking about? First of all, doesn't matter. That kind of immediate access to a U.S. senator already shows how serious Menendez was about his promises to be helpful to Egypt, even if in this case what Helmy was asking about was something minor. But second of all, you know from the evidence and your common sense what Helmy was asking about. He was asking about the things that Egypt always cared about.

And look, couple days later, Helmy is letting Hana

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know they're getting promises from Menendez's staff about, quote, having things go well in what relates to Egypt. They're getting the same kinds of promises of assistance to Egypt that Menendez has been giving all along.

A few days after that, Menendez is back at it, sending a bill about things in the region through Daibes to Hana to Helmy. Why does Menendez do it? For the money to Nadine.

All of that, what we've just been through, is days, days before Menendez is again telling Nadine how to collect her money. In particular, is telling her she should not text or e-mail Fred Daibes, a phrase we'll come back to in a moment.

Quid pro quo. This for that. Promises made to Egypt and protection of the monopoly Egypt gave Hana, for checks from that very monopoly right into Menendez's hand.

The timeline tells you what happened. When Menendez hears Nadine is going to get paid, he springs into action again and again. The exhibits in this chart are everything you need to prove the corrupt quid pro quo. You've heard the evidence, but if you want to see it again, you can write down the number of this chart and then look at every exhibit in it that you want. Government Exhibit 1302. Just based on the evidence in this timeline alone, even if there were nothing more than what we've just been through, we would be done with these elements. But there is so much more.

Beyond when he acted, look at the kinds of things that

way that you know these elements are met.

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Menendez did or promised. Again and again, he did things or he promised things that were not just ordinary. That's the second

Now, to be clear, this is absolutely not necessary for you to find these elements proven. In fact, I expect that Judge Stein will instruct you, even if Menendez would have done all these things anyway, even if all these things were in the U.S.'s interest, these elements can be proven, so long as part of his motivation for doing so or promising to do so or attempting to do so was a corrupt quid pro quo. In fact, Menendez didn't even have to do anything at all, let alone do anything out of the ordinary. Even if you thought everything Menendez did or promised to do was the most normal thing in the world for him, the kind of thing he should be doing, should be doing in the public interest, these elements are still proven if there was the promise of an official act, and if he made that promise, even in part, because of things of value he was getting with corrupted intent.

You can't take a bribe for promising to perform an official act, even if it's an ordinary and routine act. you know from this trial that what Menendez promised was not ordinary. That's another reason you know it was a corrupt quid pro quo.

Let's take a look. So you've seen this before. Menendez is promising an official act here. The approval of a

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sale of \$99 million in tank ammunition. Now, of course, you've heard the actual sale itself was supported by the State

Department. Was supported by the administration. Planning on approving on a sale like that is not out of the ordinary.

What is out of the ordinary? First of all, obviously, why is he texting this to his girlfriend? Why is Nadine getting involved with anything about \$99 million of tank ammunition? For that matter, why is he asking her to send it to Will Hana, who you heard was at that time a failed trucker. Not that becoming a halal meat certifier would give him any particular reason to know about \$99 million of tank ammunition, but he wasn't even a halal meat certifier at this point.

about this promised approval? The speed of the promise to approve. Menendez is saying here's going to sign off today. That's July 26, 2018. That's within the 40-day period. And you know that that is unusually fast. Joshua Paul, the former State Department employee, told you it is extremely uncommon for a sale to Egypt to clear within that time period.

What you're seeing here, by the way, is a quote from some of his testimony. What you see being stated here with the white letters TR, those are the page numbers of the transcript from his testimony. If you want to take notes on that, if you want to request those transcript pages, if you'd like to see them again when you deliberate, just like anything on these

slides.

So Menendez is promising not just an approval, which is ordinary, he's promising a quick approval, which is anything but. And Hana and Shawky, they knew this was unusual. After getting the promise, here they are, you know, Shawky sending a bunch of thumbs up emojis and talking about who will get the credit for it. Saying the people should repay the kindness. Another reason you know that this promise of an official act was part of a corrupt guid pro quo.

But that's not even the most unusual official act or promise Menendez took. Let's talk about what he did to protect the monopoly that his bribes will be paid from. Not just his bribes, also the monopoly, it was going to make Hana rich and was going to put millions of dollars of investments into Daibes' business through joint ventures, which we're going to talk about. This monopoly was going to be a payday for all three of them, Menendez, Hana, and Daibes.

So what did Menendez do to protect that payday? You heard it from Undersecretary McKinney. Menendez's call was the only time, the only time he had ever gotten a call from a member of Congress that was advocating for a constituent at the expense of the rest of the United States. You know it was unusual, and you know it was an attempt to pressure McKinney. Menendez didn't raise his voice, and Menendez didn't say he was going to retaliate against McKinney about this. He didn't need

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to. Menendez was the ranking member of the SFRC. He didn't have primary jurisdiction over the farm bill that funded McKinney's agency, but parts of that bill came before him. You heard that from Sarah Arkin who worked for Menendez at the SFRC. And McKinney knew that Menendez was powerful and influential in Washington. He told you that. And he also told you how he responded. You saw he had to reassure his staff that he had their backs. And that's the only time that after getting a call from a member of Congress that McKinney had to reassure his staff.

This is not an ordinary call. It is not just McKinney that says a call like this is unusual. It's Menendez. It is his own website. "Our office cannot overturn or influence matters involving private businesses." That's what he told the world. That's what he told the people who weren't paying him. But for Hana, it was totally different. For Hana, Menendez sprang into action to try to do exactly that. He tried to overturn or influence what the USDA was doing involving Hana's private halal business. A business that just so happened to be generating money that was promised to Nadine.

That's another reason you know there was a corrupt quid pro quo. An official act to protect the monopoly of a business that had promised to put some of those monopoly profits right into the pocket of Menendez's girlfriend.

Another way you know these elements are proven.

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That monopoly, by the way, doesn't just show you Menendez's intent. It also shows you Hana's intent and shows you Daibe's intent also. For Hana, it is obvious this was his payday. None of his businesses had succeeded until Egypt dropped this lucrative monopoly in his lap so of course he's going to pay Menendez to protect it. But this monopoly will pay Daibes too. Daibes signs, a few years after this monopoly gets up and running, signs a multimillion dollar joint ventures with Hana. Hana only has this money from the monopoly. That's where the money he invests with Daibes comes from.

Daibes puts checks from the halal monopoly right into Menendez's hand, and Daibes in turn got millions of dollars from that monopoly invested into his business. That shows Daibes knew all about Menendez's promises of official acts.

He's Menendez's friend. He's backing Hana's business. He is the guy that Menendez sends Nadine to get Hana to pay up the bribes from the business. And Menendez's right to send her to him because Daibes does in fact help Hana pay Menendez the bribes from that business. And Daibes is getting millions of dollars of investments from that business. Of course he knows what Menendez is doing for that business.

In any event, Daibes sure knows about the information that Menendez is sending around about promises of official acts, because he uses Daibes to pass that information along to others in the scheme. Right. We just saw where Daibes

answered Helmy's questions of Menendez that were passed through Hana really quickly. And here. Here he got a draft of a bill from Menendez. He got that from Menendez, and he passed it along from Hana to Helmy.

The evidence is clear that Daibes knew about

Menendez's promises of official act. So this special treatment
to protect a monopoly that benefits both Hana and Daibes, and
both Hana and Daibes used to put payments into Menendez's hand,
is another powerful reason you know there was a corrupt quid
pro quo. Again, this is all you need to convict each defendant
on Counts Five and Six. There is so much more still.

So maybe the most unusual special treatment of all, the ghostwritten letter, here is Menendez using his personal e-mail account to write a letter for the Egypt government against the position of one of his own fellow U.S. senators. It is even against his own public position and the position that Sarah Arkin knows. As I've said before, it is a way of promising official acts. Obviously he's not saying he is joining in the objections that's writing a response to. But even leaving that aside, it is obvious special treatment. Your common sense tells you that.

The special treatment isn't just things that are official acts or a promise of official acts themselves. The whole pattern of giving Egypt special treatment so that they know that when he does promise them official acts, he means it.

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This ghostwritten letter didn't come out of nowhere. It is a response to the facts that Menendez himself sent to Hana.

He was handing out a summary of the concerns that led another senator to hold up aid to Egypt, and then he was helping write a response to those concerns.

But that's not all the information that Menendez provided to Egypt. Here he is, the same day, giving out sensitive, non-public information about the number of Americans stationed abroad and the number of foreign nationals working at the U.S. embassy in Egypt.

You heard from Bret Tate early in this trial that this information was highly sensitive because it could help foreign governments identify people working for the U.S. embassy. Now, eventually, that information would go stale and the number of the employees at the embassy changed. So, the historical information about what those numbers had been in the past, that wouldn't be sensitive anymore. It could be publicly released after the fact, as you saw in the trial.

But that's not what Menendez was doing. He was giving them real-time information. That's what's at American embassy present tense. You heard from Bret Tate why this information was so sensitive. It could be combined with other information to allow foreign governments to identify and locate people working with the embassy. As Bret Tate explained, even if the foreign government knows where to find some of the people

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working with the embassy, they shouldn't get a roadmap to find the rest. But that is exactly what Menendez texted out here.

Everyone involved knew that this was out of the ordinary. "Don't ask why I'm asking." They know this information is sensitive. If you look up to the middle e-mail, Tiernen Miller at the State Department said she needed a reason to disclose it. In order to get this information, I would have to ask and someone is going to ask why.

But the reason, if you look at the top, is Menendez is That's how much responsibility he was trusted with. His name was reason enough to disclose sensitive information. Information that Menendez then texted out through Nadine to Hana, and it went to Hana, from Hana to Ahmed Essam, one of the Egyptian government officials that Hana was always texting with.

This wasn't just a one-time thing. Hana sits down to dinner with Menendez. Next thing he's texting the Egyptian defense attache that the State Department has given a heads up that they're lifting a ban on small arms to Egypt.

He keeps doing this even years later. The head of Egyptian intelligence is coming to meet with U.S. senators in 2021. That's usual enough. But the day before the meeting, what does Menendez do? He meets with them at the hotel for a special meeting his staff didn't know about. And then, he sends the Egyptian government an article through Nadine that

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his own fellow U.S. senators are planning to ask about reports that Egypt was involved in a human rights abuses. In this case, the notorious murder of the U.S. resident Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi Arabia. Why? He's doing it so that the Egyptian government can prepare their answers. Wanted to give you a heads up so you can prepare your answers is what Nadine says when she's sending along what Menendez sent her. So the head of Egyptian intelligence can better defend himself against questions Menendez's own fellow U.S. senators have about whether Egypt committed a human rights abuse.

By the way, remember those small Asahi 1-ounce bars of gold from Hana, some of which found their way into Menendez's house? Hana bought them the day after this meeting with the senators. The special treatment was frankly obvious.

Menendez's SFRC staffer Sarah Arkin knew it when Menendez told her he was changing approaches right during this spring 2019 timeframe when Hana's halal company was just in the process of getting approved. Right when Hana was becoming in a position that he would be able to deliver on the promised bribes.

And you saw it in the text messages. Menendez along with Nadine and Mai Abdelmaguid tried to plan a special trip to Egypt. Not a normal CODEL planned by the U.S. government. This would be a trip that would be planned by Abdelmaguid. When Sarah Arkin followed the normal procedure, Mai said she would lose her job. She said SOS. SOS now it has to be a

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normal CODEL. SOS because the State Department learns about the trip and gets involved.

This wasn't just Nadine and Abdelmaguid saying this to each other. Nadine forwarded this to Menendez, SOS and all.

So how does Menendez respond. Does he say why should Abdelmaguid lose her job just because the CODEL has to be planned in the ordinary way? Does he say why does the State Department finding about my trip to Egypt an SOS? No. "Taken care of." He knew exactly what was going on. He took care of it.

Sarah Arkin wasn't even on these messages. She never saw these messages and she still knew the way Menendez was behaving about Egypt was weird. It wasn't just her. Damian Murphy, Menendez's own staff director knew it. "All of this Egypt stuff is very weird. I've never seen anything like it." I've never seen anything like it.

Sarah Arkin told you this wasn't just about the CODEL.

It was in connection with the CODEL and beyond. And beyond.

Damian Murphy and Sarah Arkin knew Menendez was acting weirdly, but they didn't know why.

After hearing and seeing the evidence at this trial, you know what they didn't. The softening of his public statements, the secret meetings, the sharing sensitive information, secretly advising and defending Egypt, even while trying to hold onto his public reputation as one of its

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toughest critics. Menendez wasn't acting weirdly. He was acting corruptly. He was acting like a bribed man, because that's what he was.

Which bring us to the next reason you know it was a corrupt quid pro quo. The bribes themselves. We've already talked about this in the second element, but let's state the obvious. The fact that Menendez knew Nadine was getting these things of value is powerful evidence that this was a corrupt quid pro quo.

We've been through some of the evidence that Menendez knew about the things of value. What I want to focus is what that means about the quid pro quo. Why are Hana and Daibes giving Nadine these sham job payments? And why is Menendez accepting them? Menendez knows Nadine is not a consultant. He knows she's not getting paid for her consulting skills. You even got confirmation of that from her sister. Nadine didn't have a job, she didn't work, and IS EG's own office manager confirmed she never saw Nadine do work.

Why is Nadine getting paid by IS EG? What does she bring to the table? She brings Menendez's power and influence. Menendez knows it. He's been working on her résumé. He has helped her through every stage of setting up this supposed consulting business. Hana knows it too. When his contact asks him for job titles and descriptions, he gives other people real responsibilities, but Nadine he just makes a vice president.

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He doesn't know what she's going to do, he just knows she is going to be his second highest paid employee.

You heard from one of Hana's employees about Nadine sending a few text messages and e-mail about looking at office space in India. That's obviously not what she was getting paid \$30,000 for. You heard Hana asked her to look at offices, she sent an e-mail about looking at a few offices, and a few weeks later she got another \$10,000 checks.

That's not a real consulting job. That was a fig leaf. Nadine wasn't getting hired to doing real work. She wasn't fired either. She didn't act fired. Nobody took any action to fire her. Hana just paid her the last of the agreed-upon checks and she stopped pretending to do work. The job was a sham, and Hana knows it.

Howard Dorian, Hana's lawyer, he knows it too. If we don't keep Nadine happy, she'll cancel the meetings with Menendez. And obviously who would have to agree in order for these meetings to get canceled? Menendez himself. She doesn't have the ability to reach in and cancel Menendez's own meetings against his will. Howard Dorian knows Menendez is in on it.

Who else knows? Fred Daibes. Nadine complains to him about not getting paid, and she complains that Hana wants her to come into the office. This is one of the first times that Nadine has ever spoken to Daibes on the phone, and she doesn't have to explain any context. Daibes already knows. The idea

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that Nadine would have to come into the office and do some work 1 2 for the money, that's obviously not what they agreed to. 3 that's why the fact that Hana is saying now in late June of 2019, oh, you got to be in the office eight hours a day, that 4 5 doesn't mean he thinks it's a real job. That means he's already gotten what he wants from Nadine, he's gotten the 6 7 monopoly, and he's gotten Menendez to protect it. Now he doesn't want to have to pay, so of course he's throwing up 8 9 barriers. But in the end, he ends up paying her for no real 10 work.

Just like the other things of value, gold bars, payout on the mortgage, these checks are another reason you know it is a quid pro quo.

The next reason is the secrecy. Menendez, Hana,
Daibes, and even Nadine, they don't act like these things of
value are unrelated to Menendez's promises or his official
position. They act like they have something to hide.

Because this is a new section, this might be a good time for a break.

THE COURT: 10 minute, ladies and gentlemen.

(Jury excused)

THE COURT: Let me see counsel at sidebar very briefly.

(At the sidebar)

THE COURT: I'm just going to ask once again that

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counsel have a game face on. Don't show skepticism, disapproval or approval, for that matter, of what a lawyer is saying. Game face for everyone. Thank you.

(Recess)

(Jury present)

THE COURT: Mr. Monteleoni, you may continue.

MR. MONTELEONI: Thank you, your Honor.

So as we left off before the break, the next reason that you know that there was a corrupt quid pro quo is the secrecy. Look at how Nadine reaches out to Daibes about getting her mortgage payment here.

After Menendez calls her, she says, I just got a phone call asking me to give you a call. A phone call from who?

Well, from Menendez. But why not just say it. Daibes and Menendez have been friends for years. Why not just tell Daibes that Bob told her to call. Because she knows Menendez wants his fingerprints off it. And Daibes, of course, understands this perfectly.

Why do Daibes and Menendez want Menendez's fingerprints off of it? Because it's part of a corrupt quid pro quo and because they don't want to get caught.

The secrecy isn't just Nadine's idea. It comes straight from Menendez. Here, in September of 2019, Nadine wants her next bribe check. She wants to follow up with Daibes, but she knows she has to clear it with Menendez if

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she's going to text Fred. And what does Menendez tell her?

Wait. Don't text Fred. But Nadine still really wants her

check. I really want my check. So, she asks Menendez again,

let me know if I should text Fred. And again, she wants to

text Fred, but needs permission. Please let me know if I

should text Fred. This sequence is happening within minutes of

each other. Nadine's really following up. What does Menendez

say? No. You should not text or e-mail. He doesn't want this

in writing because these aren't consulting checks, they're

bribe checks. And he knows it. And that's one more reason

that you know it. This message alone is devastating evidence

of Menendez's consciousness of guilt. His awareness that

putting something in writing about the checks could create

evidence of a crime.

It also shows that Menendez was calling the shots. As you see from this sequence, Nadine needs to get his permission, and she needs to get his instructions before reaching out to demand more bribe payments, even when these payments are supposedly for her job about her consulting services.

But they don't stop with the secrecy there. She says she sent the picture of the guy who orders the elliptical. If this elliptical is a totally innocent gift of friendship from Hana, why not just use his name? Why use code? Because it's a bribe. The lady who gave me the scarf. Again, why not just say Mai when you're texting to Menendez. Because they're a

part of a criminal conspiracy with her.

Hana and Daibes do the same thing. Our friend would like to have dinner on Thursday night. This is Menendez. But when Daibes texts Hana, he's "our friend." Giving the perfect amount of deniability for when Hana then forwards that text to Helmy, which you can see he does minutes later.

This kind of secrecy is another reason why you know that they know that there is a corrupt quid pro quo. Why not mention Menendez's name? Why take so much care to avoid putting it in texts? You know why. Because they know these are bribes.

And that brings us to the next reason why you know there was a corrupt quid pro quo. After Menendez finds out about the investigation, he lies. He pretends he didn't know about any of this.

Let's start with the checks. You remember this

PowerPoint presentation presented to the U.S. Attorney's

Office. Well, he has his lawyers say that he didn't know about

that first check, even though Daibes handed it to him. For the

second check, again, he had his lawyers say he didn't know

anything about it, even though Nadine told him all about how

much she wanted it on her way to getting it, so much that, as

we've just seen, he told her not to put it in writing. And

then for the third check, he had them say that he didn't know

about that one either, even though that's the one that Daibes

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offered to hand him.

Remember, he didn't have his lawyers say he knew about the checks and they were fine because they were just legitimate consulting payments that have nothing to do with any quid pro quo. He didn't have his lawyers say there's no problem with picking up the first check from Daibes because it wasn't part of a quid pro quo. No, he had his lawyers say he didn't know about the checks at all. A complete lie. Because he knew it was part of a quid pro quo, he knew they were bribes.

It wasn't just the checks. Same thing with the mortgage company payment. He had his lawyers say he didn't know anything about it and that it was a loan. But that wasn't true either. Nadine told him about the mortgage payment when she got back from a trip with Menendez, just like she had told Daibes she would. And then Menendez followed up to make sure that she followed up with Daibes to get that payment.

And let's be clear. There is no reason a loan cannot be a bribe. If there had been an agreement that Hana would get paid back, a 2 years zero interest loan would still be a bribe, would still be a thing of value, if it was made as part of a quid pro quo. But here it wasn't even a loan. How do you know that? Because Nadine put that in writing.

Nadine here is deducting the amount of that mortgage company payment, that's the top red box, from the amount that she is saying that Hana has to pay her as part of the paychecks

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she's wanted. She's deducting the payment from the paychecks she wants. Obviously, Nadine is not planning on paying her paychecks back. So, by deducting the mortgage company payment from the paychecks, she's saying she's not planning on paying that back either.

This was never a loan. It was a bribe. A bribe that Menendez lied about, pretending he didn't know anything about it, when he very clearly did. But there's more.

Remember those financial disclosure forms? So those were lies, too. Menendez had to file financial disclosure forms because the public has a right to know where public officials are getting their money. This is part of the basic transparency that our laws require. And once he married Nadine, he had to report what she received.

So, when he received a kilo of gold in October 2021, from Fred Daibes stopping by with gold and doughnuts like we talked about, he had to disclose that as income. If it was a gift, he would have gotten permission from the ethics committee and disclose it as a gift. Did he do that? No. What did he do instead?

Well, in early 2022, he and Nadine were getting ready to sell the gold. And you heard why. They wanted to pay down their mortgages so that he could either buy a new house or build a new house, but you can't buy a house with gold bars. You can't pay a construction company with gold bars. They had

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to get the money into their bank accounts. They had to go into the financial system, but there is a problem. Putting money from the sale of gold would create a paper trail showing that they received tens of thousands of dollars. A paper trail that risks raising questions about where that gold and money came from.

So, what did Menendez do? He went to the ethics committee, but he didn't tell them he had gotten this gold in October 2021 as a gift and it was fine because it wasn't part of a quid pro quo. No. He knew he had to hide how he had really gotten the gold, so he claimed that he had just learned about it more than a year after his marriage to Nadine, and that it was old gold from his wife's family before their marriage. Those were lies. As we've seen, it was from Fred Daibes.

Now, like the best lies, this is built around a kernel of truth. Nadine had gotten some gold in some form from her family in the past. But the gold that Menendez was Googling on October 18, 2021, wasn't Tabourian family gold. It was gold that Daibes had just stopped by with. Family gold is just where they got the idea for the lie.

And see right there? How he told Shannon Kopplin, the ethics counsel, how he needed to use it to pay down the mortgage. That's why he was disclosing it at the time. But he doesn't stop at lying to the ethics counsel. He then filed an

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amended form for 2020, a form trying to build a paper trail that this was Nadine's old family gold from before the marriage.

So when the time to came to file for 2021, he didn't list the gold that Daibes gave him that year as income, and he didn't list it as a gift. He didn't list that he had received it at all.

(Continued on next page)

MR. MONTELEONI: And he said this form was complete and accurate. He lied. He lied to hide the fact that he and Nadine had gotten a kilo of gold from Fred Daibes. That's another reason you know that there was a corrupt quid pro quo.

Here's one more.

Everything that we've talked about is just one part of the broader scheme, the broader pattern of corruption you've seen from the start to the finish of this case. McKinney isn't the only government official that Menendez reached out to on behalf of someone who was paying him. I'll go over the others in a minute, but when I get to the New Jersey attorney general conduct, you can ask yourself. If Menendez is reaching out to the attorney general of New Jersey on behalf of someone who just happens to be paying his girlfriend, how can it be a coincidence that he's doing the exact same thing with Under Secretary McKinney on behalf of someone who just happens to be paying her too?

And when we get to the New Jersey U.S. Attorney conduct, how can it be a coincidence that he's trying to help the case of someone who just happens to be paying him when he's also trying to help the business here of someone who also just happens to be paying him?

When we get to Qatar, when Menendez is trying to please people he thinks are connected to a foreign government that might benefit the business of someone who just happens to

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be paying him, how can that be a coincidence when he's trying to do the exact same thing with the government of Egypt?

Common sense tells you when Menendez did the same thing again and again, it wasn't a coincidence. It was a corrupt quid pro quo -- this for that, money, gold and valuables from Hana and Fred Daibes for promises of official acts to protect and enrich Hana and Daibes and their associates, another reason that you know it was a corrupt quid pro quo.

So that's six reasons, six reasons that you know it was a corrupt quid pro quo, six reasons that you know the third and fourth elements are proven. Six reasons that you know of Menendez is quilty of Count Five. Six reasons that you know that Hana and Daibes are guilty of Count Six.

Let me also talk about something called venue for a It's not an element. It's something that the judge will instruct you has to be proven. Venue, unlike the elements, only has to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. It doesn't have to be beyond a reasonable doubt, just that it's more likely than not. And venue just means that for some essential part of the offense, something that's part and parcel of the core offense conduct, whether that's an element or something that's part and parcel of an element, it has to have happened in the Southern District of New York. Doesn't have to be known to all defendants, but it does have to

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be foreseeable. They have to foresee that an act that's part and parcel of the offense is going to be done in the district.

So there's plenty of bases for venue on these counts, but here's one obvious one. When Menendez and Nadine are in Mr. Chow in Manhattan at the dinner in June that we saw, Hana pays for their dinner. So that's actually a thing of value right there. That's enough, but also, when Hana from Mr. Chow sends Shawky a WhatsApp message that's scheduling that July meeting and dinner, that July meeting's right before Menendez sends that promise about the tank ammunition, that's part and parcel of Menendez's promises and of what leads to Menendez's promises. So that right there is also enough for venue without even getting to the other bases like Khorozian selling gold in New York for Nadine.

Then, finally, so for this count and for several of the other counts that Fred Daibes is charged with, you're going to be called upon to find that he was on bail at the time of the offense. So here, there's a stipulation that you can look at, where the parties agree that he was released, since back in November 2018. That covers the time period of what we've been talking about that Daibes did in these offenses, so this is proven for Count Six. I'm not going to keep mentioning it, since it's the same for each count, but this is also proven for the other counts that Daibes is charged with, where you're going to be asked to find whether or not he was on bail at the

time.

So we are done with Count Five and Count Six.

Menendez, Hana and Daibes are guilty. So those are among the longest counts. I'm not going to spend as much time on those three others.

The next three counts in particular are going to go much more quickly. So let's go to the next count.

Count Seven, honest services wire fraud. This is against Menendez, Hana and Daibes. Remember, this also relates to the Egypt part of the scheme. Honest services fraud is a federal law that makes it a crime for an elected official to deprive the people, the citizens he represents, of his honest services. And providing people with honest services means you can't take official actions in return for bribes. So we've already covered the key evidence for this part of the scheme. I'm going to go much faster here.

The first element is that there's a scheme to defraud the public of its right to the honest services of Menendez as a U.S. senator and the chair or ranking member of the SFRC through bribery. Here, the same evidence we were just looking at -- that Menendez is a public official, that he received things of value from Hana and Daibes and he did so as part of a corrupt quid pro quo with Hana and Daibes in exchange for promises to take official acts -- those satisfy this element for Count Seven. I expect that Judge Stein will instruct you

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the same instructions on quid pro quo apply to this element of honest services fraud. This count is based on the same quid pro quo as those counts we just looked at, Counts Five and Six, so the same proof that we just went through proves this element too. So we're done with the first element.

The next element is intent to defraud. I expect Judge Stein will instruct you that this can include things like hiding things of value. So was there intent to defraud here? Of course there was. Remember the secrecy that we were just talking about? All of that is evidence of intent to defraud. The sham job, the lies on the financial disclosure forms, the lies to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, that's all proof of Menendez's intent to defraud.

And it wasn't just Menendez. All three defendants were all trying to hide the bribe payments. Menendez lied on the disclosure forms, told Nadine not to text or email and helped her set up the sham company to collect the paychecks. Hana paid that sham company paychecks for a bogus job, and Daibes handed off some of those checks for the bogus job. And the whole job, remember, was a sham but didn't disguise the fact that Hana was paying Menendez, and Hana and Daibes both knew Nadine wasn't planning on doing real work. They all had intent to defraud. That element is proven.

That takes to element three. The scheme must have involved a material misrepresentation, false statement, false

pretense or concealment of fact. Was there here? Of course there was. The same proof of intent to defraud proves that here — the false financial disclosure forms and the efforts to set up the sham company for Menendez; Hana and Daibes, the bogus paychecks that Hana issued and that Daibes delivered, all to hide from the public that they were not receiving the honest and faithful services of Robert Menendez.

Brings us to the last element of Count Seven, an interstate or international wire. That means a wire that can include a phone call or a text message across state lines.

This one's easy. So hana's right here in Midtown Manhattan,

June 2018, and he sends WhatsApp messages to Shawky, setting up a meeting and a dinner with Menendez in July. I expect that

Judge Stein will instruct you that the wire itself doesn't have to contain any fraudulent representation, doesn't have to contain any request for money. All that's needed is that it furthers or assists in carrying out the scheme. And that's what these messages do.

They set up the July meeting and dinner. And again, as you heard, that's not just any meeting or dinner. That's the meeting or dinner right before Menendez promises to do a speedy approval of that tank ammunition sale. So those WhatsApp messages from Mr. Chow setting up those meetings are wires in furtherance of the scheme. OK, they're wires, but did they go interstate?

Yes, they did. They were actually WhatsApp messages, and WhatsApp messages are all processed by servers located out of New York State. You see the stipulation here establishing that. So any WhatsApp message from New York is going to have to be interstate. So those wires right there are all you need. Last element for honest services wire fraud is proven, and that wire is enough for venue for this count since it was sent from right here in Manhattan, from midtown.

So we're done with Count Seven. Menendez, Hana and Daibes are quilty.

Let's look at the next count.

Count Eight, extortion under color of official right.

Just against Menendez. This charge, again, relates to the

Egypt part of the scheme. And extortion under color of

official right essentially means Menendez used his official

position to get payments he wasn't otherwise entitled to.

Again, we can do this one quickly.

Public official, that's undisputed.

Let's go to the next element. Menendez must have obtained property for himself or another person other than just the salary and benefits he was entitled to as a senator. So here, the exact same proof of a thing of value that we discussed for Count Five and Count Six proves this element too. We don't have to go over it again.

The third element essentially requires a quid pro quo.

I expect the judge will instruct you quid pro quo here has the same definition as it does for honest services fraud. And so that means the same proof that we were just talking about for Counts Five, Six and Seven satisfy this element too.

Now this fourth element, the interstate commerce element, just has to prove that interstate commerce or an item moving in interstate commerce was delayed, obstructed or affected in any way or degree. And I expect the judge will instruct you this effect can be minimal. So if a single payment obtained by a defendant went through interstate commerce, that's enough.

Here, that's easy. If you look here, when IS EG Halal was paying to make Nadine's mortgage current, they sent a wire transfer to John Moldovan, the lawyer, for him to essentially write the cashier's check from New Jersey to California in a wire that is processed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. So that is a payment through interstate commerce.

It's not the only one, of course. When Vasken

Khorozian went to Manhattan to sell gold bars and brought a

check back to New Jersey for Nadine, that's also an effect on

interstate commerce, but just one is all you need. So this

element is proven as well.

Venue is also easy. The Mr. Chow payment or the Vasken Khorozian selling the gold in New York, either one of those is enough.

Menendez is guilty of Count Eight. Menendez is guilty of extortion, and he, Hana and Daibes are all guilty of bribery and honest services fraud. Menendez was entrusted with oversight of our nation's foreign policy and all the powers that come with it, and he sold all of that trust and all of that power for the benefit of Hana and of Egypt for money and gold, money and gold that Hana and Daibes, who both wanted to share in the profits of a monopoly that Egypt gave Hana, they were all too willing to pay.

Let's move on from Egypt to another part of the scheme. Count Nine, this is honest services fraud. This relates to Menendez's promise to disrupt the New Jersey attorney general's prosecution and investigation of José Uribe's associates. This count is against Menendez and Hana. We haven't talked much about this part of the scheme yet, so this is one of the counts we're going to spend more time discussing.

Let's look at the first element, which is what we're going to spend the most time on -- scheme or artifice to defraud. Essentially, was there a corrupt quid pro quo for promises of official action?

So before we get started, I want to point out one little aspect of the law that differs here from the bribery charge we talked about. I expect that Judge Stein will instruct you that for honest services fraud, if Menendez

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promised or agreed to pressure a state official, not just a federal official, that can be honest services fraud if all the other elements are satisfied. So that means that if you find that Menendez attempted and promised to advise or pressure Gurbir Grewal, then that can be a component of a corrupt quid pro quo even if he was a state official. In fact, if he just promised to advise or pressure Grewal but never even tried.

So let's start. How do you know that there was a corrupt quid pro quo for promises of official action in this part of the scheme?

Well, each of the same reasons that prove the *quid pro quo* for the Egypt counts applies here -- the timeline, special treatment, the things of value, the secrecy, the lies and the scheme.

Let's go through each of them.

The first reason you know is the timeline. Now, this timeline is, if anything, even more overwhelmingly obvious than the last. Take a look at just a few key moments. January 15, 2019, this is after Menendez and Nadine broke up for a month or two at the end of 2018, but they're back together now.

Nadine's lost her car in an accident in December, a month before this. She's telling Hana she doesn't have a car.

January 15. What does Hana do? Well, the next day he starts sending her information about the Elvis Parra prosecution.

Is Hana the only one who knows that Nadine needs a

car? Of course not. Look at this. Menendez and Nadine went, also in January, and test drove a Mercedes C-300, but the prices are too high monthly to finance, and Menendez knows this. He knows she can't afford it. You see in this message, he tells Nadine to ask her friend who knows somebody in the business.

What kind of car does she want? A Mercedes-Benz C-300 convertible.

Well, what does Menendez do? He sees how much he could sell another car for, and he looks at how much a Mercedes C-300 costs. So he knows what she can afford and what she can't afford.

What does he do next? He meets Nadine at the auto body shop to empty her old car out, and the very same day, he invites Uribe and Hana to a meeting. This is not a coincidence. He invites them to solve the very same problems they spent the last few days on. Nadine wants a new Mercedes. Menendez invites Hana and Uribe over the very same day he and Nadine go to the auto body shop so that he can use them to get a car for Nadine? How? By promising to intervene in Elvis Parra's case.

How do you know that? Menendez, Nadine and Hana have the meeting, and hours after the meeting, Hana is resending Nadine info about the Parra case. He knows what they talked about at this meeting. Parra's case. Nadine doesn't respond

and say, what's this about? Why are you sending me this? She knows.

And what happens just two days after that meeting?

Menendez calls Nadine's flip phone, January 29, 2019, 11 a.m.

Talk more about the flip phone later, but here, he calls it and he asks for the info about what case he should intervene into. How do you know that? You can see it.

Immediately after getting off the phone with Menendez, Nadine calls Hana. Hana asks Parra for Parra's address. Hana gets that and sends it to Nadine.

What does Nadine do? She asks what the charges are.

And look what Hana sends -- the case number and a very basic description that it's a small case. He doesn't send evidence of discrimination. He doesn't send evidence that anyone has been treated differently than anyone else. He doesn't send any of that. Why? Because Menendez couldn't care less about that.

How do you know that? Well, look at what Menendez does. He talks to Nadine on the flip phone for less than two minutes, and then he calls the New Jersey attorney general, the ultimate boss of the law enforcement officers handling Parra's case -- later that same day, just hours after first calling Nadine on her flip phone that day, days after meeting with Hana, less than a week after googling the price of the car Nadine wants. What you didn't see in that timeline was any evidence of any research Menendez did into whether there was

any discrimination in Parra's case at all. He didn't make the call to Grewal based on careful consideration of evidence of discrimination. He made the call based on careful consideration of the Google search results for how much does a Mercedes C-300 cost.

By the way, why is Menendez looking to Nadine as the one to send him information about this case? Menendez has a robust staff. He has professionals to handle issues about policy. He could look -- he could ask them to look into criminal justice issues. What does Nadine know about the policy issues involved in insurance fraud prosecutions? The only reason she's involved, the only reason he is communicating directly with her about this is the scheme.

Look what happens right after. Now that Menendez made the call, it's time for Hana to deliver. So Hana goes to Fred Daibes, just two days after the call. Two days after that, what does Nadine think? All is great. I'm so excited to get a car next week, a car that she couldn't afford, the car that Menendez knew that she couldn't afford. All of a sudden she's going to get it. Why? Because Menendez promised to interfere in a criminal prosecution in exchange for Hana's promises of a car.

But the same problem that we saw in the Egypt part of the scheme comes up. Hana's not following through. Remember, he hasn't gotten his monopoly yet, so he's still broke. So

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what does he do? Hana tries again to get Daibes to step up with the car. But Daibes isn't doing it. So look what happens next. Look who sets in motion what's going to lead to Nadine actually getting that car. Look who's involved in this. Watch this part carefully.

First, José Uribe says to Bienvenido Hernandez, tell them that we're ready. Hernandez and Uribe both have an interest in the investigation. We're ready to pay the necessary bribe. Well, later that day, Andy Aslanian, Ana Peguero's lawyer, and close with Uribe, calls Nadine late at night, talks for 25 minutes, starting 11:21 p.m. He's laying out to Nadine that it's not just Parra. The deal is to kill and stop all investigation, just like Uribe has been texting about with Hana since last year. And that's why Nadine hasn't gotten her car yet.

How do you know that that's what Andy said? Well, look what happens next. The next day Menendez calls Nadine. They don't talk for long, but you know exactly what they talk about. How? Look what happens when they get off the phone. Nadine calls Hana literally the minute she gets off the phone with Menendez. Menendez calls Michael Critchley literally the minute he gets off that same call with Nadine. What do Critchley and Hana have in common? Elvis Parra's case.

This, by the way, this call that you're seeing in this timeline, that's the call you saw Michael Critchley testify

about by video. We'll come back to that.

And just like that, Hana is reminding Nadine of what case Menendez is supposed to influence. Now let's see what

happens later that day.

Nadine checks with Andy Aslanian, and then for the first time in her life, she picks up the phone and calls José Uribe. Talks to him for over 20 minutes at ten at night. What do they talk about? Well, you know just from the timeline, just from the text that they sent: I am real. I will stand by my word. After getting off the phone with her, Uribe gave his word on the call. He promised a car. It's not just Uribe who made promises on the call. Uribe tells Hernandez the next day: I received a call with good news. Let's keep the faith.

It's good news for Uribe because Nadine made promises on that call too, promises that Menendez would kill and stop all investigation. And you know from that call with Menendez earlier that day, followed immediately by Menendez calling Parra's lawyer, you know that Menendez knew all about it. And that -- that -- is how the process of Nadine getting the car starts. And it only gets more explicit from there.

A few days later, while Uribe's on the phone with Hana, while he's on the call with Hana, he texts Nadine the address of the Mercedes-Benz dealership. So you know Hana was involved with Uribe providing the car because he's literally talking with Uribe as Uribe sets up plans to get Nadine a car.

You know who else knew about it? Menendez. Nadine leaves him a voice message saying she's going to go get a car on Monday in Edison. She's going to go see if Will is going to step up and do anything on Monday, but even if Will doesn't help, Uribe is. So she's definitely going to get a car on Monday -- Nadine's words to Menendez. She doesn't explain why. She doesn't have to. He already knows. Common sense and the evidence tell you that Nadine and Menendez have already talked about the plan for Uribe to get Nadine her car. Menendez knows Uribe's providing the car and he knows that Will has offered to help, but they don't know if he's going to step up and actually do it.

I can talk more about the car and how Menendez knew that Uribe was providing it, but for now I want to go to one other part of the timeline that makes crystal clear -- crystal clear -- that there was a corrupt quid pro quo. That's the summer and fall of 2019. Let's look.

Uribe reaches out to Nadine right away. Nadine and Uribe meet, and she, of course, tells Menendez, because he's a critical part of the scheme. And you see her throughout telling

Menendez what she's doing. And the day after the meeting, once
Uribe has explained what is going on, Uribe starts following

up: I don't want these people to bother my Ana. Please help.

And Nadine makes very clear what she's going to do to

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help and who is going to do it: I will address it first thing tomorrow morning or tonight depending on when he is home -- he, Menendez, the one with the power. We need to make things go away. We need to move fast.

How is Nadine going to move fast? Through Menendez making calls. He will be home first thing tomorrow. I will address it first thing tomorrow and have the phone calls go out.

Phone calls to do what? To stop this. Promises Menendez will use his power and influence by picking up the phone and stopping a criminal investigation. Did Menendez know about this? Of course he did. After meeting up with Nadine that night, the night that those texts were sent, he googles NJDCJ, the end of Det. Lopez's email address, New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice. He's figuring out who is investigating. He's figuring out whose boss he has to call. He's figuring out who he's going to have to lean on.

Actions speak louder than words. And you know when Menendez's actions speak even louder? Look what happens the next month.

September 3, one month later, by this point, Menendez, Nadine and Uribe have met. Uribe's kept paying for the car, but nothing has been done. So Uribe, he reaches out and he puts the whole quid pro quo in writing. Please don't forget about me. I will never forget about you. You see what he's

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saying here. Please stop the investigation. I will keep paying for the car. Quid pro quo. This for that. Car payments for Menendez's promise to disrupt a criminal investigation.

How's Nadine respond? You will never be forgotten. That's a promise. It is a promise. It's a promise of an official act. And that's exactly what Uribe says. He says: need peace. He's saying I need you to deliver on that official act. I need you to stop this investigation.

But how do you know that Menendez knows about this quid pro quo? He tells you with his actions the next day. next day, after Uribe says please don't forget about me, I will never forget about you, Menendez is on the phone with Grewal, summoning him to his office. Actions speak louder than words, and Menendez's actions are shouting from the rooftops. Uribe tells Nadine I'll keep paying for the car if you stop the investigation, and Menendez is on the phone the very next day trying to do just that.

And it's not just a call. On September 6, three days after Uribe has sent the please don't forget about me, I'll never forget about you text, Menendez has Grewal in his office. And look what happens right after. Menendez meets with Uribe to report back. On my way to big meeting with the amigo.

What does Menendez tell Uribe at the big meeting? Menendez tells Uribe it's very positive, but not final. That's

because he knows Uribe's not just looking for a meeting. He's looking for an official act. He's looking for Menendez to make the investigations go away. And that's exactly what Menendez is promising Uribe he's trying to accomplish.

One more part of the timeline.

Uribe keeps following up, asking for peace, because he doesn't just want a meeting. He wants results. Here he is saying he's going to keep following up until he gets results:

I always text you on Monday in case you have an update. I just need peace.

Look what happens when Nadine gets the message. She reads that message the next day, at 11:37 a.m. Who does she tell after reading that text? She talks to Menendez about an hour and a half later. You know that during that conversation Nadine is telling Menendez he needs to reassure Uribe that he's kept his end of the bargain, because Uribe's not going away, otherwise Uribe might stop the car payments.

So what does Menendez do? Next block of office time Menendez gets he calls Uribe, basically assumes he learns that Uribe is going to keep following up until he gets results.

What does he tell Uribe? Menendez tells Uribe what he wants to hear. You can read it from the text. I just got a call, and I'm a very happy person. God bless you and him forever. You and him. Uribe knows this isn't just a scheme with Nadine. This is a scheme with Nadine and Menendez.

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And look what Uribe does. He says he's going to put
the car into auto pay, and then two minutes later -- two
minutes later -- he says: I have so much peace. Gracias adios
and to you guys. Quid pro quo. This for that. Car payments

for promises of disrupting a criminal investigation.

As if it's not clear enough, look who he thanks.

Uribe thanks three people: God, Nadine and Menendez. You know from looking at this evidence this is just what happened. Even based just on the evidence cited in this chart, Government Exhibit 1303, the quid pro quo is proven against Menendez and, it's proven against Hana. Even if there were nothing more than this, the quid pro quo would be open and shut. But again, there's so much more that it might make sense to do tomorrow.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, be here tomorrow at 9:30. There are no more legal issues that I'm aware of that the parties can raise. So if you're here at 9:30, we'll continue with Mr. Monteleoni's summation, and then we'll go into one of the defense summations.

9:30. Thank you. Keep an open mind.

(Jury not present)

THE COURT: Who's giving the first defense summation, on behalf of whom?

MR. FEE: I am.

THE COURT: Mr. Fee. And how long is that going to be, approximately?

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                                 Summation - Mr. Monteleoni
               MR. FEE: Three and a half hours.
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               THE COURT: Thank you.
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                I'll see everybody tomorrow at 9:30.
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               MR. FEE: Thank you.
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                (Adjourned to July 9, 2024, at 9:30 a.m.)
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